



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PEASANT ASSOCIATIVE FORMS IN ECUADOR

A failure or an alternative?

by

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A thesis submitted to the Victoria University of Manchester
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Faculty of Economic and Social Studies

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The author declares that no portion of the work presented in this thesis has been submitted in support of an application for another degree, or qualification, of this or any other university or institution of learning.

To **Alberto** and **Esthelita**
mis queridos viejos

To **Andy**
mi compañero

"Nosotro puro campesino. A vece trabajamo.
A vece noma estamo"

"We are only peasants. Sometimes we work.
Sometimes we just exist"

(Saying by Mexican Indian Peasants)

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GLOSSARY

ACAE	Asociacion de Cooperativas Agricolas del Ecuador or Association of Ecuadorean Agricultural Cooperatives
ACAL	Asociacion de Cooperativas Agricolas del Litoral or Association of Agricultural Cooperatives of the Littoral
Aparceria/ Arrendamiento	Forms of holding land under feudal system
Arrimados	Propertyless peasants who "lodge" (without paying money but produce and/or labour to the house-owner) with the huasipunguero's family. They constitute an appendant to the huasipunguero's household.
Asistencia Publica/ Asistencia Social	Public Assistance, Institution that during a long period controlled the state lands in Ecuador.
BNF	Banco Nacional de Fomento or National Development bank
Base-organization	Also known as first degree or grass root organization. A pre-cooperative, cooperative, community, association, commune, are considered base-organizations.
CAAP	Centro Andino de Accion Popular or Andean Centre for Popular Action
Camara Nacional de Representantes	National Chamber of Representatives or The Parliament
CREA	Centro de Reconversion Economica del Azuay Canar y Morona Santiago or Centre of Socio-Economic Development for Azuay Canar and Morona Santiago provinces
CREI	Centro de Reconversion Economica de Manabi or Centre of Socio-Economic Development for Manabi province
Cuadra	Six-thousand square metres or 1.48 acres
DRI-P	Proyecto de Desarrollo Rural Integral or Integral Rural Development Project
FEI	Federacion Ecuatoriana de Indios or Ecuadorean Federation of Indians
FENACOPARR	Federacion Nacional de Cooperativas Arroceras or National Federation of Rice Cooperatives
FENOC	Federacion Nacional de Organizaciones Campesinas or National Federation of Peasant Organizations
FODERUNA	Fondo de Desarrollo Rural para los Marginados or The Fund for Rural Development of Marginal Areas

Formas Precarias/ Sistemas Precarios	Different types of feudal tenure. The peasants do not own the land they work.
Hectarea	Hectare, ten thousand square metres or 2.471 acres
Huasipungo	Land held in usufruct by Indian serf
Huasipunguero	Indian serf who enjoys the usufruct of a huasipungo
Huerto	Large market-garden cultivated collectively by the members of a base-organization
ICE	Instituto Cooperativo Ecuatoriano or The Cooperative Institute of Ecuador
IEOS	Instituto Ecuatoriano de Obras Sanitarias or Ecuadorean Institute for Sanitary Works
IERAC	Instituto Ecuatoriano de Reforma Agraria y Colonization or The Ecuadorean Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization
INERHI	Instituto Ecuatoriano de Recursos Hidraulicos or Ecuadorean Institute for the Hydraulic Resources
Ley de Fomento	The Agricultural Production and Livestock Raising Development Law
MAG	Ministerio de Agricultura y Ganaderia or The Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock
Minga	Collective working day in a rural community, which takes place usually once a week with the obligatory participation of all the members of the community.
Minifundista	Owner of a small plot of land in the Sierra region whose size generally does not exceed 5 hectares
OCPRA	Organizacion Campesina Provisional de Reforma Agraria or Provisional Peasant Organization for the Agrarian Reform
Precarismo	It has been known as such the system of peasant-landowner relationships which comprises the feudal tenure of land or the existence of labour relations taking place under conditions of exploitation
Precarista	Any peasant who holds land under feudal tenure
PREDESUR	Programa de Desarrollo Economico del Sur Ecuatoriano or Economic Development Programme for Southern Ecuador
Reducciones	Initial system of indigenous relocation
Reversion	Returning land property to the State
SEDRI	Secretaria de Desarrollo Rural Integral or The Integral Rural Development Secretariat

SPA	Sector Publico Agropecuario or Agricultural Public Sector
State functionary	Person who works in a state institution and has to perform functions or duties in Rural Development Projects
Sucre	Ecuadorean monetary unit, 85.00 sucres = \$1.00 US (January 1984)
UPA	Unidad de Produccion Agricola or Agricultural Production Unit
UPOCAM	Union Provincial de Organizaciones Campesinas de Manabi or Provincial Union of Manabi Peasant Agricultural Organizations

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INTRODUCTION

The peasant situation in the Latin American context has been analysed from different perspectives. While there is general agreement with regard to the increasingly difficult conditions under which the peasants carry out their economic activities, there are widely differing views as to the true import of the peasantry in the society at large, its forms of insertion into the capitalist mode of production and its socio-political significance. These are indeed important questions which will be examined here.

Several proposals which attempt to resolve at least in part the "peasant problem" were put forward by several scholars. Some of them have been purely theoretical approaches while others concerned themselves primarily with the design of specific agrarian policies. The implementation in most of the Latin American countries, of agrarian reform programmes and more recently of integral rural development projects were attempts to answer this problem.

One of the main objectives of the state's agrarian policy has been to promote the formation of peasant associations -with many variations regarding structures and levels of collective organization- so as to improve production and circulation. However, experience under different economic and political conditions has shown that this type of organization has not been the answer to the problem it was intended to solve, especially in terms of increasing the levels of production and productivity and also as regards the incorporation of important peasant sectors into the market.

The arguments put forward to explain this failure are presented here in their essentials. Some of them assert that peasant associations for agricultural

production as viable structures without direct state support or even with it are imposible. Other arguments stress that such associations are irremediably doomed to dissolution and failure as a result of the expansion of agrarian capitalism. Nonetheless, these explanations do not adequately account for reality.

It is possible to find in Latin America some cases of massive state support -through financial and human resources- towards peasant sectors organized under diverse associative forms. The collective ejidos in Mexico and the Chilean Agrarian Reform may serve as pertinent examples in this respect (Barracough and Fernandez, 1964, Carroll, 1971). On the other hand, there are some relatively successful cases in countries or regions where capitalist development is particularly vigorous and where state support is not highly important (Carroll, 1971),

It is not our intention to deny apriori their possible value, but rather to emphasize that such analyses are not sufficient to give a clear picture of the reality.

In Ecuador as in other Latin American countries the problem of small-scale agricultural producers and especially the issues related to the use of technology, of productivity, and of social and political aspects of their situation, are a major concern to both the public and private institutions which promote rural development in the countryside. During the late 1960s Ecuador implemented various policies aimed at economic and agricultural development. During this period government planners while emphasizing industrialization, have taken the view that agrarian reform is essential in order to overcome the problem of inflexibility in agricultural supply for the country's internal consumption. It is within this context that planners have

argued the need for a suitable strategy of incorporation of the rural economy into the developing national economy. Government regulations of the agrarian reform process have taken the form of gradual elimination of non-capitalist relationships of production, appropriation of certain ineffectively exploited estates, legalization of landownership by the **huasipungueros**, cultivation of new land through settlement programmes, linkage of the rural work-force into the labour market and introducing the use of money for wages. The concentration of landownership, however, remained substantially unchanged.

In 1964 an agrarian reform law was passed and with the implementation of it, the formation of peasant organizations received its greatest stimulus. This law made it possible for peasant organizations of any type to gain access to the land and the peasants opted for the organizational structures proposed by the State for this purpose. Inasmuch as agrarian reform was part of a general economic strategy planning for agricultural production was influenced by the emphasis placed upon modernization. In this context the various development agencies began to promote the formation of peasant organizations within the cooperative framework.

In adopting an agrarian reform programme which preserved in a more or less rigid form the current concentration of landownership, the State took for granted the continuous existence of the "minifundia". The socially explosive nature of this situation induced the government as well as private agencies to design and execute community development policies aimed at "helping the peasants to help themselves". The problem confronting the peasants at least in the eyes of government planners, was not mainly the question of redistributing land but rather how to overcome inefficiency in the use of resources, primitive technology and low productivity. Furthermore, the government pursued policies for bringing new land under cultivation which primarily benefited peasant landowners and cooperatives.

The resulting promotion of peasant cooperation (and its different forms depending on conditions and circumstances) has had diverse results and will be discussed in detail. Several documents produced by private and public institutions in the country have attempted to explain the operation and perspectives of forms of cooperation. Some central questions were never answered however. This regards such issues as organizational structures, the combination of current circumstances and the methods of support that most effectively would enable the peasants to improve their quality of life and their production. The presence or absence of legal and other obstacles to the formation and functioning of rural production associations, as well as the other factors which lead to increase in the number of cooperatives in some region and to a weakening or breakdown in peasant organizations in the others, are issues which have been usually ignored.

The anthropological studies undertaken have also failed to address important questions, as for instance: Should organizational structures designed on the basis of a socio-cultural context foreign to that of the peasants be imposed from outside, or should traditional organizations be identified and supported?. And in the case of the traditional peasant commune (the nature of which will be explained below): Can it be transformed into a self-managing structure, permitting an increase in the scale of operations and the gradual transition to a collective form of agricultural production?. Available experience and the opinions of scholars diverge, but the weight of the evidence suggests that the answer is negative.

The possibility, for instance, of modernizing traditional forms of organization has for some time intrigued social scientists, commentators and development planners alike. Could traditional structures be expected to

evolve -or be deliberately converted- into modern, more technology and market-oriented associations without passing through the individualistic phase (Texier, 1967, Carroll, 1970)?

Some have suggested that the organization and operation of traditional communes are so fundamentally different from modern forms of cooperation that they cannot be considered as parts of the same continuum. It is argued that traditional systems of work organization and mutual help e.g. minga, faena, presta manos, etc. are "consensus" types and authoritarian in character, which frequently promote the institutionalization of inequality, while the elements of cohesion manifest in such structures are neither spontaneous nor voluntary, but are a form of collective behaviour which is accepted and agreed upon as the "only possible alternative for the survival of the group" (Texier, 1967). Thus, attempts to transform these traditional systems into modern production collectives may well be futile. Other problems regarding cooperation have been extensively discussed by Veillard (1963), Vazquez and Dobyns (1964), Pearse (1966) and Texier (1967) among others. ?

The purpose of our study is to identify the factors which hinder or enhance the viability of peasant associative forms and to determine which factors ensure the success and survival of communal production associations and which ones lead to their collapse. Elements studied will include the processes by which these organizations are formed, the degree to which family and collective economies complement or conflict with each other and the importance of the external context surrounding the peasant organizational sphere.

The initial assumption of this study was the existence of a strong State which despite internal polemics and disagreements/conflicts regarding the "peasant problem" was nevertheless capable to implement a model of peasant associative

production. The available census and the case studies carried out on the topic were carefully reviewed, and after the first investigations of the selected areas had taken place, it was decided to give priority to the internal factors of the peasant associative forms in order to grasp the viability question. The State, it became clear, is not the single organizer of social relations in the agrarian context. The high heterogeneity of the various peasant sectors, the numerous variations from region to region, etc. are in fact the distinctive mark of an "autonomous" rural dynamic in Ecuador today. On the basis of this understanding extensive research was conducted in two areas: Tungurahua in the Highlands and Manabí on the Coast. Due to regional specificities, the focus of the research varied. In Tungurahua, area of productive expansion, the emphasis was laid upon the economic and historical aspects of social change. In Manabí, on the other hand, an area of economic depression and highly restricted by ecological conditions, the stress was placed on those organizational steps taken by the peasants to face the crisis.

The initial approach in both cases was essentially qualitative: an extensive number of interviews were carried out, life histories were collected, etc. Other sources were used, as for instance, oral and written testimonies, which would allow the historical reconstruction of the case-studies. Since priority was given in the case of Tungurahua to the economic development, it was necessary to pay attention to the dynamics of capital accumulation of the peasants by following their life stories as well as to the type of relationships between family and collective spheres, etc.

In order to carry out an analytical comparison between our two case-studies a methodology scheme had to be defined. It was necessary to review the role of the State under a new perspective: as the **mediator** between peasant associative

forms (whose structures and objectives vary from one region to another) and the external context. At the same time, it was also important to define other factors which influence the viability of the forms of cooperation especially the strategies of production and organization. These factors have been considered as the basic criteria of comparison within an analytical model whose core element is made up by the processes of accumulation within the peasantry.

The terms of the theoretical debate in Ecuador, concerning the viability of peasant associative forms are outlined in Chapter I. This yielded important clues which helped to design a suitable approach to the question of cooperation. Chapter II, focusses on the agrarian policies proposed by the State regarding peasant associative forms. Those policies are analysed from the perspective of the laws adopted and within the framework of the rural dynamic. Reference is made to the kind of peasant response given to matters of organization. Particular emphasis is placed on the inconsistent role of the State when dealing with the problem, and on the diverse, often contradictory state proposals and regulations still in force regarding the issue of cooperation. An attempt has been made in Chapter three to integrate the case-studies into an analytical model in which the factors, assumed to promote the viability of the peasant associative forms in the different situations, have been systematically combined. On the basis of this model the case-studies have been analysed in Chapters Four and Five. The conclusions summarizes the results of the case-studies laying particular stress upon those elements which define the viability of the peasant associative forms in rural Ecuador.

A short note on the setting follows.

THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR


Ecuador, situated in northwestern South America, is, after Uruguay and Guyana, the smallest state in South America. It is crossed by the Equator, from which it derives its name.

Ecuador is bounded by Colombia to the north, Peru to the south and east, and the Pacific Ocean to the west. The border with Peru has long been a source of dispute between the two countries. The latest delimitation of it was in the treaty of Rio, 29 January 1942 when, after being invaded by Peru, Ecuador lost over half her Amazonian territories. Ecuador unilaterally renounced this treaty in September 1961. Fighting between Peru and Ecuador began again in January 1981 over this border issue but a ceasefire was agreed in early February.

No definite figure of the area of the country can yet be given, as a portion of the frontier has not been delimited. One estimate of the area of Ecuador is 270.670 sq. Km, excluding the litigation zone between Peru and Ecuador which is 190.807 sq. km. (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1.982).

Ecuador is divided into four principal geographic regions: the Sierra or uplands of the Andes, consisting of high mountain ridges with valleys and high-priced farming land, the Costa or plain region is composed of lowlands extending from the Pacific Ocean to the western edge of the mountains, the Oriente, the upper Amazon basin on the east, consisting of tropical jungles threaded by large rivers, and the Galapagos Islands which lie in the dry zone of the Equatorial Pacific, 1.000 kilometres from the coast of Ecuador.

Despite the fact that Ecuador lies on the Equator, the climate is modified by the Andes Mountains and by a branch of the cold Peru or Humboldt Current that flows along the coast.

MAP 1: THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR

Source: Expedition Report. Manchester University
Geography Department, 1985

The coastal region is warm, temperatures rise slightly away from the sea and average between 73 and 77 F (23 and 25 C). Rain falls from January to May. Annual precipitation varies between 16 inches and 78 inches.

In the Sierra, the climate varies with altitude and is modified by winds. Using 79 F (26 C) as a median temperature at sea level, it may be said that the temperature decreases by 1.8 F (1 C) with every 660-foot increase in the altitude (The Statesman's year-Book, 1984).

The east is the warmest and most humid region of Ecuador. Median temperatures range between 73 and 81 F (23 and 27 C) rainfall can reach 236 inches annually, while humidity as high as 90% may be sustained for several months.

The traditional regions of Ecuador coincide with the country's three physical regions of the coast, the mountains, and the Amazon Basin. The highest proportion of peoples of Indian descent lives in the isolated mountain basins. The east is thinly inhabited by indigenous peoples.

The coastal region is the site of banana plantations, its other tropical products include cocoa, tobacco, yucca (a fibre-bearing plant of the lily family) and fruit. The Sierra is the granary and cattle centre of Ecuador. Grains, beans, and peas are grown in small patches. The peasants occupy mainly houses of adobe (brick made of sun-dried earth and straw) roofed with straw. A small amount of settlement has taken place in the east, where grain is grown on land reclaimed from the rain forest.

The majority of the population (for 1984 reached 8.050.000 inhabitants) is about equally concentrated in the Andean Highlands and the Coastal Lowlands, with migration to the coast gradually displacing the centre of population away from the Sierra. About 51% of the people live in the Sierra region, 46% in the Coastal region and 2% in the easter region, the remainder in the Galapagos.

The population is ethnically mixed with mestizos (people of mixed Indian and European -white- origin) forming the majority, 55%.

The Indians, 25% form the second largest ethnic group. They are divided into a number of groups, including Otavalos in Imbabura, Salasacas in Tungurahua, and the descendants of the Puruha in Chimborazo who represent the largest and the poorest Indian group.

The white population, 10% is largely descended from Spaniards who arrived in Ecuador from the 16th to the early 19th centuries.

The blacks, 10% were brought from Africa as slaves during the colonial era.

Spanish, the official national language is spoken by nearly all the population. Quechua, an Indian language, is also spoken within Indian groups, while Jivaros and Colorados among others use dialects of their own.

The overwhelming majority of the people are Roman Catholic. The State recognizes no religion and grants freedom of worship to all.

The annual birthrate is 39.6 per 1.000 inhabitants (1981), and the infant mortality rate is 79 per 1.000 live births (1981). Life expectancy at birth is 62 years (1979), and the annual population growth rate is 3.0% (1981).

As for Education in the country, it is free and obligatory at the primary level. Attendance through 6th grade is about 76% in the urban areas and 33% in the rural sector. Literacy in Ecuador is approximately 90% (1984) (The World Almanac and book of facts, 1986).

The rural peoples lead lives characterized by poverty and hard labour. Some of them own small plots of land, or minifundios, the products of which are insufficient even for subsistence. Others work as tenant farmers on the haciendas (large estates), and a large number of peasants offer their labour force in the construction sector.

The main cities are increasing their population at an accelerated rate. Quito the national capital houses most of the country's government officials, state salaries are not high and most civil servants live from day to day, Minimum wages established by law are not always paid. Guayaquil, the principal port and national commercial centre, gives greater opportunities to the population who are mainly engaged in commerce. Cuenca, among others e.g. Ambato, Riobamba, Loja, etc. is known for its traditional culture and for its growing industry.

The traditional social divisions based on family lineage are being translated into economic terms, thus allowing for greater mobility. Alongside the opulent few, however, a large percentage of the population lives under almost subhuman conditions for example in some city ghettos and in some Indian communities, especially in Chimborazo province.

While Ecuador is a country of tremendous economic potential, it has never experienced a period of sustained development.

Until the oil discoveries early in the 1970s in the northwestern Oriente province, the economic heart of the country was the coastal provinces of Guayas, Los Rios, El Oro and Manabi. Esmeraldas, the remaining coastal province, was underdeveloped relative to the other four, but with great potential in land and timber reserves.

Gold, silver, copper, lead and zinc are all found and there are some exports of copper and lead as well as the precious metals. Recently foreign consultants have declared the possibility of vast reserves of uranium in the country. Sulphur has also been discovered in the north part of the Andes. There are coal deposits in the biblian area but their exploitation has so far proved uneconomic.

Pines are cultivated in the Sierra region where there are also natural forests of romerillo (herb yielding a yellow dye), walnut and cedar. Large eucalyptus

forests occur in all three regions.

Agriculture employs about 49% of the working population. The chief products are bananas and coffee. Other products include barley, cocoa, cottonseed, corn, potatoes, rice, wheat, kidney beans, chickpeas, limabeans, and fruit. The forests supply the domestic needs of the construction and cabinetmaking industries. Fishing provides work and a subsistence diet for small coastal settlements. The tuna, sardine and shrimp industries in Guayaquil and Manta produce far over 26,500 tons annually (Encyclopaedia Britannica, 1982). Stock raising is extensive in the sierra and coastal regions, and is growing in importance in the eastern region. Meat production in 1980 was as follows: beef, 92,000 metric tons, pork, 63,000 metric tons, lamb, 10,000 metric tons (The Statesman's year-Book, 1984).

The industrial sector (which employs about 11% of the working population) has had a rapid growth given the resources that drew in from the oil production, as well as for the need of creating an import substitution industry at least for certain goods. Ecuador produces good quality wool and woollen works, handicrafts or industrial wool works. There has been a large expansion in the production of consumer durables as a result of the creation of an internal market export possibilities through the Andean market. The industrialization has been helped by, among other things, the large hydro-electric reserves which for 1980-85 enabled the country to have large reserves of electrical energy.

The manufacturing industry has kept its growth rate, and the latest projections signal an increase of 11.2 in industrial production (The International Year Book and Statesmen's Who's Who, 1986).

Exports include bananas (47%) coffee (25%) and cocoa (11%); these products are sold primarily to the United States, Japan, West Germany, Belgium and

Luxembourg. Imports include motor vehicles, food and chemical products, consumer goods and machines and primary materials for industry. They are mainly bought from the U.S.A., Japan, West Germany, The United Kingdom, Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg (Enc. Brit. 1982). In 1970, Ecuador began the exportation of specified products to Bolivia, Chile, Colombia and Peru on a duty-free basis following the Andean Agreement ("Pacto Andino").

Ecuador has only a partially developed road system which constitutes an obstacle to production in many areas. The Pan-American Highway crosses the country from north to south through the sierra region. There are about 35,000 Km. of roads of all types (1980). A trunk highway through the coastal plain is under construction which will link Machala in the extreme south-west with Esmeraldas in the north-west and with Quito and the northern section of the Pan-American Highway.

Railroads total about 700 miles (SEDRI, 1984). The principal lines connect Quito with Guayaquil and Cuenca through the railway junction at Sibambe. There is also a line from Quito north along the mountains and across the coastal plain to the port of San Lorenzo. Service is slow and poor, and the railways are used more for the transport of freight than for passengers.

Ecuador: Its History

In 1551, when Francisco Pizarro's lieutenant Sebastian de Benalcazar conquered what is now called Ecuador, he found an area that had been part of the Inca empire for about half a century.

The people of Quito claim that it was the scene of the first Ecuadorean patriotic uprising against Spanish rule (1809). Invading from Colombia in 1822 the armies of Simon Bolivar and Antonio Jose de Sucre came to the aid of Ecuadorean rebels, and on May 24 Sucre won the decisive Battle of Pichincha on

a mountain slope near Quito, thus assuring Ecuadorean independence.

Ecuador for some eight years formed together with Colombia and Venezuela, the confederation of Gran Colombia. But in 1830, after a period of protracted regional rivalries, Ecuador seceded and became a separate, independent republic.

An increasing rivalry and ideological difference between the Sierra and the Costa usually focussed on the two leading cities Quito and Guayaquil. Quito was the home of a landed aristocracy, whose positions of power during this early period were based on large, semifeudal estates worked by servile Indian labour, it was (and to some extent has remained) a conservative, clerical city; resistant to changes in the status quo. Guayaquil, on the other hand, by the 19th century had become a bustling, cosmopolitan port, controlled by a few wealthy merchants; these men and those around them were influenced by 19th century liberalism, interested in trade they favoured free enterprise and expanding markets.

These early rivalries tended to be exacerbated by the nature of the two cities. The people of Guayaquil, the nation's breadwinner and the home of Ecuador's industry and trade, felt that a disproportionate part of the state's tax income was spent in Quito by government bureaucrats. Those in Quito complained that their exports had to pass through the monopolistic bottleneck of Guayaquil, which acted as a traditional middleman and, by adding to the price of sierra products, reduced their competitiveness in the world market. Ambitious generals and politicians have played on this Quito-Guayaquil rivalry since the foundation of the republic in 1830.

The period between 1925 and 1948 was one of greater turbulence than Ecuador had ever known.

Ecuador was still suffering from the effects of the Great Depression when it

became involved in World War II. It sided with the Allies and allowed the United States to build military bases on its territory but it played little direct part in the war. The major problem occurred in 1941 when the Peruvian army invaded, seized much of the disputed Amazonian area, and devastated El Oro province. The Ecuadorean forces, poorly trained and equipped were easily defeated. A peace conference was hastily called in Rio de Janeiro in 1942, and Ecuador was forced to relinquish title to much of the Amazonian region to which it had claims.

Politics and government after World War II presented some contradictions. Ecuador enjoyed a long period of constitutional government and relatively free elections following the presidency of the Liberal leader Galo Plaza (1948-52). There were also two long interludes of military government (1963-66, 1972-79). But the period was dominated by one of Latin America's great caudillos, Jose Maria Velasco Ibarra. Velasco, who died in 1979, was president of Ecuador five times but completed only one of these terms. He seemed able to win any election, such was his popularity with the masses, but his terms of office were marked by sudden reversals in policy, contradictory economic programmes, wild personal outbursts, temporary suspensions of civil liberties, military interventions, and public strife.

After Velasco's last fall from power in 1972, military officers ruled for some seven years before handing over the government to a constitutionally elected (July 16, 1979) civilian president.

The civilian and military governments of the 1970s had not developed any firm policy for dealing with the oil boom that occurred in that decade. The boom increased the size and wealth of the middle class, led to the building of roads, quays, pipelines, and other infrastructural features, and caused severe inflation.

Jaime Roldos Aguilera, a young and charismatic social democrat was elected president on a reformist platform, a new Constitution came into force on 10 August 1979. Roldos promised greater social equality and a more equitable distribution of the profits of the oil industry. Unfortunately for Roldos, he was unable to manage the legislature and soon quarrelled with the powerful leader of his own party. Roldos and his opponents made several unsuccessful efforts at conciliation in 1980, and the military forces always waiting in the wings, warned that they were becoming impatient with the impasse.

Jaime Roldos died in 1981 because of an airplane accident, and the Vice-president Osvaldo Hurtado Larrea assumed power on 24 May 1981.

New elections took place in May 1984 and Leon Febres-Cordero, a member of the powerful entrepreneurial class of the Coast, became president of Ecuador. His presidential period will last till August 1988.

CHAPTER 1

PEASANT ASSOCIATIVE FORMS IN ECUADOR AND THEIR VIABILITY

The Argument of the Matter

1.1 ANTECEDENTS OF THE AGRARIAN CHANGE IN ECUADOR: 1960-1980

We may identify a process of mechanization in the last 3 decades as a major stage of the general tendency of capitalist development in the Latin American agricultural sector. In the case of Ecuador, agrarian change which began in the 1960s has been recently pointed out by a number of scholars in a large number of studies. The main characteristics of this process have their roots in the transformation of the traditional "hacienda" (large estate) into a new enterprise whose character is entirely capitalist. Particularly important within this context is the landowner as an entrepreneur who undertakes the organization of the productive process. Thus, the hacienda, specifically in the Sierra region, seems to be not an obstacle but rather an option in the development of capitalism.

The transformation of the landowner's estate has affected the various strata within the agrarian sector differently and accounts for the specificity of the Ecuadorean case. The peasantry, who as a result of this process became increasingly differentiated was separated from the hacienda system. Consequently, we now find in the Ecuadorean agrarian sector large landholdings adapted to the conditions of the development of capitalism and peasantry which is no longer organically linked to the landowner sector. Instead, they appear as a "social problem" in charge of the State which attempts to become an

organizer of social relations within the agrarian context (1).

1.1.1 The Problem

The described process of change in rural Ecuador had a great impact on Social Science research in the country. It required extensive empirical studies designed to generate a better understanding of the agrarian situation.

These studies concerned themselves with two major controversial issues and were focussed separately on the landowners and the peasantry.

The first issue addressed by the researchers was that of the Latifundia-Minifundia polarity. Some studies carried out in Ecuador (2) and in other Latin American countries by the Interamerican Committee for Agricultural Development (CIDA) pointed out that the underdevelopment of the agrarian sector during the 1960s was caused by the predominance of a latifundia-minifundia model. It comprised of an uneven distribution of land with high concentration of ownership, a basic articulation between landowners and peasants; and the existence of overwhelmingly powerful units of landowners economic organization e.g. haciendas, plantations, etc. It was necessary, therefore, to substitute this model with another based on family enterprises. To this effect, it was imperative to implement Agrarian Reforms aimed at destroying the monopolized ownership of land, as well as to introduce new state policies concerning credits, technology, and the trade system.

The 1954 land tenure census showed that in Ecuador, 1369 owners or 5% of the total owned 2,706,700 hectares or 45.1% of the area covered in the survey. At the other end of the scale, 92,387 or 26.8% of all owners held only 46,000 hectares or 0.8% of the land. Extensive research of agrarian structure took place, the main stress being placed on the existing land tenure system. Its findings were subsequently used by governments to justify the implementation

of a land reform. This mode of analysis did not clarify, however, all of the factors and the protagonists involved in the process of social change. In an attempt to understand this problem, several studies on the landowner sector were later carried out (Guerrero, 1975, 1977 and 1983, Barsky, 1978, Marchan, 1982). A significant debate was sparked ~~off~~ by these studies, regarding the question as to whether or not there was a coherent large landowner sector partially responsible for the agrarian policies introduced later by the government; an interesting point which I shall briefly elucidate here.

I.1.2 The Meaning of the Landowner Initiative

For some decades there has been a process of growing differentiation among landowners in the Inter Andean corridor of Ecuador. During the last twenty years some of them began to plan the reorganization of the haciendas following their own economic interests rather than pressure exerted by the State or by the peasantry. As a result, one area of haciendas located in the central and northern zones of the Sierra became a sector of dairy production of considerable importance in Ecuadorean agriculture based on the introduction of pedigree cattle and various technological changes. These changes, visible at the level of production and technical development, have been accompanied by a strong initiative from the hacienda owners of this area in order to eliminate precarious forms of production, e.g. huasipungo, share-cropping, tenant farming, etc.

This so-called "landowner initiative" which took place in the Ecuadorean Sierra, mostly in its northern and central areas, is largely responsible for the partial transformation of the agrarian structure. It consisted of a voluntary hand-over of huasipungos to the indian serfs. As a process it began in 1959 and acquired a national dimension with the passing of the

Agrarian Reform Laws of 1964 and 1973. Those have profoundly affected the situation of rural labour since haciendas now depend on wage-labour. The landowners were able to carry out their strategy unopposed due to several reasons:

- a) There was a notorious weakness in the peasant movement, particularly on the private haciendas. At the state haciendas the peasant movement had few opportunities to develop and even when existent it was not successful.
- b) The differentiation of the peasantry increased lately in this period because of the voluntary hand-over of land to those peasants who held land in precarious tenure. This meant in fact that the organization of the peasants, even at local levels, was impossible. This allowed the landowners to carry out their strategy without much resistance from the peasantry.
- c) The industrial bourgeoisie was as yet underdeveloped. According to conventional Marxist analysis, these are the social forces which would be expected to create the necessary conditions for the modernization of the haciendas and their integration into a process of capitalist development.

During the 1960s the traditional landowning class of Ecuador transformed itself into a class of agrarian capitalists and the landowner initiative substantially contributed to this development. Nonetheless, this modernized landowners were able to define, for themselves, only a limited space within the capitalist development process. They were unable to establish any type of social alliance with other sectors of the bourgeoisie to conduct an integrated capitalist development process of the whole society. Moreover, they failed to express their basic interests in a project in whose execution the State,

itself, could be strongly involved. Therefore, they became a faction of the bourgeoisie which is neither central within the socio-economic class context, nor does it represent a large concentration of capital. It exists, indeed, as a small group with limited power using its influence to benefit its own economic position. As an economic group, it has connections with the market and tended to use it in order to obtain the highest prices for its products, rather than to achieve its expansion.

Let us now consider the second controversy which attempted to adopt the peasant's perspective. In the context of this debate various empirical studies were conducted regarding such topics as peasant movements, social differentiation processes, peasants in the process of accumulation or rich peasants, migrant peasants. These studies were usually carried out from a local perspective and served to shed light on particular aspects of the problem. They did not succeed, however, in achieving clear explanations of the peasant dynamic as a whole. Most of them focussed on the family as the basic unit of analysis, and only few of them have addressed themselves to the collective or cooperative sphere (3). Peasant collective forms of agricultural production were seen, by some researchers, as temporary structures limited in numbers. A line of analysis concerned with wider forms of cooperation developed by the peasantry gives priority to the ethnic question (4), which has become a significant topic of discussion in recent years.

Placed within this perspective, our chapter will elucidate the ways in which Peasant Associative Forms have been adapted to the capitalist development of agriculture during the last few decades and the different ways of organizing communal production (5). It will seek to achieve a better understanding of the forms of cooperation which have, on the whole, been neglected.

I.2 Understanding the Peasant Associative Forms and their Basic Types

The concept of Peasant Associative Forms refers to the system of economic, social and political cooperation established by the peasants beyond their family relations. Two points need to be made here.

The first concerns the arrangements established among various peasant groups to carry on necessary activities for their social and economic reproduction. These groups e.g. commune, productive association, cooperative, community, etc. develop joint activities of their family units. Those activities range from the production to the organization of festivities. From this "internal" perspective the major stress is placed upon economic factors and organizational models. The second point concerns the role played by the peasant associative forms in their relationship with the external world i.e. the State and other social agents. From this point of view, the system of cooperation allows the peasants to express their demands, and to defend themselves against the external interference.

It is necessary to give a general definition of the main forms of peasant organization existing in the country. The first type comprises agricultural cooperatives. They are organizations formed by peasants for the purpose of producing agricultural products, in which a given number of members share jointly in the responsibility of the cooperative and participate in activities and services for the common good. The law on cooperatives defines them as structures "in which the members participate directly in production activities and share in the common management of the operation...".

But the definition established in the law on cooperatives, in the areas of agriculture, livestock raising, homesteading and services relating to

agriculture and the peasantry, is very broad and serves only as a formal framework imposed by the State for purposes of regulating their operations. In fact, Ecuador has a great variety of rural cooperatives which differ from each other with respect to their origins, social composition, systems of working in common, location, political orientation, leadership, resources and their relationship to the State, development agencies and other political institutions. On the other hand, all peasant cooperatives have to function within rural communities or towns which are related to regional socio-economic structures and policies determined by the specific development of capitalism i.e. they are enclaves within a sea of capitalist relations of production. The result of all this is extreme heterogeneity of form and a large variety of ways in which these cooperatives are integrated into the processes of rural development.

The second type comprises pre-cooperatives and OCPRAS (Provincial Agrarian Reform Organizations). Pre-cooperatives are simply provisional associations of agricultural producers who are participating in common activities while awaiting legal recognition of the cooperative by the Department of Rural Development of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock. An OCPRA, is created when an estate has been expropriated by the IERAC and the workers occupying it have not yet organized. Both types of organization, however, are temporary and must eventually become cooperatives.

Thirdly, there are Agricultural Workers' Associations (6). The law, in this respect specifies that all agricultural workers or other persons in Ecuador have the right to organize and form free associations without prior authorization. In this way for example, if a minimum of eleven peasants decide to form an organization in order to carry out a specific agricultural activity, they have the right to appoint directors, draught statutes and seek

legal recognition. Such associations are free to operate with little interference from the law.

And finally, the type of rural organization which most nearly reflects the traditional social structure of Ecuador's peasantry is the commune, which is a legally recognized peasant community. But to identify the commune as a form of peasant organization for carrying out economic activities is misleading. Because the law respecting communes does not classify them as production units, but rather as political-administrative structures having a local authority and a specific defined territory with over fifty people, which are located within a parish. The law reads as follows: "Every population centre which has not achieved the status of a parish and which now exists or may be established in the future, whether commonly called a "caserio" (hamlet), "anejo" (rural district), "barrio" (district), "partido" (county), "comunidad" (community), "parcialidad" (farming centre), or referred to by any other designation, shall have the term "commune" attached to any other name by which it is already known or under which it was founded" (Article 1).

From the above it can be seen that there exist a great variety of "communes", including some which have now been absorbed into the larger urban centres. The most interesting type is the indigenous commune whose specific character is on the whole violated by the legal-political framework superimposed by the State. In terms of numbers, this type of commune is the most representative among the peasantry of the Ecuadorean highlands. I will refer to this matter in the next chapter.

Within the communes, the peasants have organized the production processes in a number of different ways. In some cases, members are "minifundistas" who have full title to their own land which they work independently, using family

labour or a system of exchange of labour services with their kin and neighbours. In other cases, the commune possesses -in addition to the above-communal lands to which all have access, both individually and collectively and from which every member traditionally has an equal right to obtain his subsistence. Leaving aside the institutional framework imposed by the State, the importance of these communes for their members lies in the fact that they embody forms of mutual cooperation or exchange, kinship and community relationships, informal mechanisms for social control and forms of collective management.

1.2.1 Antecedents of the debate on Peasant Associative Forms

Peasant Associative Forms allow the family units to interact. They generate a dynamic somehow different to that taking place in the domestic unit. They have a corporate domain over the land and organize the work in a variety of ways. They maintain an internal dynamic which is relatively autonomous. On the other hand, peasant associative forms also adopt a mediating role between the peasantry as a whole and other agents. Because peasant associative forms are not socially homogeneous, certain interests, interferences and conflicts can be observed within their sphere of influence which are similar to those occurring in the whole of society.

There are at least two basic lines of thought regarding Ecuadorean peasant associative forms; the first one is adopted by numerous studies and investigations carried out during the 1940s which seek to promote the cause of the indigenous population. They relied on scant empirical information and were aimed at restoring the indigenous commune, the Pre-Columbian Ayllu (7) as the principal form of economic and social cooperation among indigenous groups (8). These structures were expected to serve as the foundation for the later

construction of a more just and egalitarian society. They also intended the indigenous commune as the fundamental form of peasant organization which could be incorporated without difficulty into the overall national development.

The second line of thought adopted a different perspective, it stressed the modernization processes, fuelled by diverse social forces. Its proponents placed great emphasis upon the establishment of production cooperatives as the most adequate mechanism for the peasant sectors to gain access to the benefits of national development. During the 60s consecutive governments adopted this line of thought. From this point of view the small peasant property which has been greatly enlarged together with the modernization process (9), was not to have an attractive economic future since there existed inefficiency in the use of resources, primitive technology and low productivity. Production on a large scale was regarded as preferable and viewed as the only guarantee of adequate productivity for the peasants who also had to compete with other sectors of production. In Ecuador, however, unlike other Latin American countries, these issues were not properly discussed. A good illustration of this is the inability of the State to adapt or to propose models for the improvement of peasant production as happened in other countries where Land reforms were more seriously implemented and where the State concerned itself with the peasant question because it was, clearly, a critical problem.

It would be valuable to explore briefly the meaning of the cooperation system, above all the way it has been adapted to the general context of the capitalist development.

The cooperative as the better known form of cooperation comprises of a number of individual private producers or consumers and implies the maintenance of private property and usually a profit-oriented mode of economy. As a form of

modern agriculture compatible with private ownership and small-scale agriculture, the cooperative has been particularly attractive to modernizing governments of Latin America. It has been stressed that rejecting collectivized agriculture, the cooperative offers economies of scale, infrastructural support to innovating farmers and socialization via vertical integration (Worsley, 1971).

Important views on this matter stemmed from the tradition expressed by Chayanov. He asserted that organizational control of agricultural production processes is possible only by replacing scattered peasant farming with concentrated production forms. Cooperation was, then, the answer and it was to start with the unification of small producers in the preparation of means of agricultural production. It would rapidly proceed to organize cooperative sales of agricultural produce.

The issue was given considerable theoretical attention in Europe at the turn of the century. In particular there has been the discussion of horizontal concentration as against vertical integration as solutions to the agrarian question. Horizontal concentration in cooperatives of agricultural production implied: maximization of size of the enterprise, handing over of the entity's authority to the general assembly of producers, and the horizontal social organization of the cooperative whose character would cut across the "vertical" lines of the traditional organizational structures. "The traditional peasant lines of authority, division of labour and support (e.g. the typical peasant household, patriarchal patron-client relations between neighbour, etc.) would be transgressed" (Shanin, 1971 p. 269). These as well as other difficulties related to natural conditions could be overcome, it was said, by vertical integration. In this way small farms were to benefit from the advantages but not the disadvantages of scale by using the formula of

cooperatives. The peasantry was to be organized so as to gain access to all resources, to obtain on the market the same conditions for price and credit as do large producers or merchants. Vertical cooperation was to follow the spontaneous development of peasant agriculture in a market economy.

The development of the cooperative structure in analogy with the development of capitalism would mean "primary accumulation of cooperative capital". Furthermore the primary processing organization of agricultural raw material in conjunction with its selling operations could take place. Industrialization of the countryside would follow and with the state support development processes would be speeded up. Agricultural cooperation, by vertical concentration may be the most effective method of involving agriculture in the system of state capitalism. It could offer a way of adaptation of small commodity producers to conditions of capitalist society, and also a weapon in the struggle for survival (Chayanov, 1966).

Speaking on behalf of the Marxists of the same generation Kautsky was basically pessimistic about the power of the cooperative movement under capitalism. He argued that under the rule of private property in the means of production, the cooperative form could never become general, and assuming that they succeed, all such attempts sooner or later were to take anyway a capitalist direction (Kautsky, 1973). He saw the cooperative enterprise as a means of prolonging the life of the "irrational small-scale unit" instead of easing its transition to large-scale production. In Kautsky's view, the greatest benefit of the cooperation system was enjoyed by the medium-sized farm and the least by the small one. The formation of cooperatives "is easier for the capitalist in agriculture, who is wealthy, intelligent (or provided with intelligent officials) and lives in close contact with the whole of social life, than it is for the poor, ignorant, isolated small peasant"

(Kautsky, 1964, p.24). Nonetheless, Kautsky was aware of the possibility that cooperative forms and agro-capital could bring about vertical concentration of production in agriculture without expropriating the peasants. He emphasized that agricultural cooperatives are a "powerful means for promoting economic development and the transition from the small to the large establishment, and are far preferable to the more typical capitalist means of effecting this development, the expropriation of small property" (Kautsky, unpublished version).

Chayanov's views rather than Kautsky's suggested that the central point of the vertical integration was to link the productive advantages of peasant farms in intensive cultivation and livestock raising, and those of the large enterprise characterized by a high level of technology, mechanization, production and marketing. He expressed this in his Principle of Differential Optimums. The cooperative could be the instrument of that integration. Moreover, for Chayanov, it was essential to maintain the democratic and voluntary character of cooperation "opening it to all the peasantry and thus making it a mass movement". Cooperation has a chance to succeed on this also.

The idea of the cooperation as the best system adapted to combine the advantages of large-scale enterprises with those of the family farms for intensive production, has been widely discussed in Latin America where the cooperative represents a form intermediate between the traditional peasant family and the pure collective form, and whose economic and social advantages attract both the peasants and the State.

1.3 The Debate on the viability of the Peasant Associative Forms in Ecuador

1.3.1 The context of the debate

The government's implementation of different forms of peasant organization, particularly cooperatives, depending on specific conditions and circumstances has had varied results and has been discussed at great length. Despite the technical and political arguments, however, the problem of organizing the peasantry has remained an unsolved problem within the overall context of rural development and agrarian reform.

The two lines of thought regarding Ecuadorean peasant associative forms, which were mentioned above, extend into today's polemic on the same topic by means of two main arguments. They cannot be posed, however, in terms different than before because of the shortage of systematic and broader studies concerning this issue.

The first view emphasizes the organization and cooperation of peasants as a mechanism for increasing the intensity and productivity of agricultural activities. From this viewpoint, peasant associative forms require constant support from the State in order to ensure its economic viability. State intervention is essential for the organizations to gain direct access to resources. Also various institutions from the private and state sector involved in promoting rural development, see the peasant associative forms as a means to avoid the social fragmentation of the Ecuadorean peasantry, an opportunity to improve productivity, a way of improving the living conditions of the peasants and to strengthen their participation in every sphere of community life, and, at the same time, as an instrument to boost productivity.

Both arguments stress the necessity of transforming the peasant organizations into an effective tool for gaining access to land, credit and technical know-how. Accordingly they also maintain that these organizations should be offered different types of training and support services. For such policies to be effective it is, of course, essential that the State is strong enough and capable enough to intervene in the economic and social order of the rural sector (10).

Against this, Ortiz (1978) and others argue that the forms of cooperation among peasants have been an economic failure since their structure bears no relationship to the essential features of the rural economy in capitalist societies.

This position states that the peasant associative forms in a capitalist society are doomed to failure. The development of capitalism intensifies class polarity and also accelerates the disarticulation of collective forms of production. The capitalist process does not welcome alternatives of a peasant character; it favours instead a growing process of social differentiation. The cooperatives, for example, have developed into capitalist companies in which social differentiation has not only taken place but has also been reproduced and in which the benefits tend to become concentrated in the hands of the management. Consequently, the cooperatives end up either being absorbed into the bureaucratic capitalist sector or serving as a more sophisticated method of weakening the pressure from peasants by enabling them to function within the rules of the cooperative movement. Those who accept this analysis either approve or disapprove of the existing cooperative movements within the rural sector, others would wish to see a different content for such movements. Those who accept existing cooperatives, nevertheless, demand changes in state policies. Such changes would have to

include plans for the formation of cooperatives on the basis of a comprehensive programme of education and training in the fields of agro-technology, social organization, and political and legal aspects of the cooperative movement.

The above mentioned position emphasizes the lines of the classical conception of the development of capitalism which in agriculture, as in industry, must necessarily mean the increasing concentration and centralization of production into larger units. Various studies, however, have explained why this has not been what has in fact happened historically, even in some of the most advanced capitalist economies (Vergopoulos, 1978, Mann and Dickinson, 1978, Harriss, 1982).

In an interesting article Goran Djurfeldt (11) points out that, unlike the classical notion, the typical unit today in agricultural societies is the family farm and stresses the fact that peasant household production is able to persist in a capitalist economy. Furthermore, following the differing views of Kautsky and Chayanov on the subordination of agriculture to capitalism in terms of "stages", he underlines them as their most important contributions. It is in this context that references as far as cooperation is concerned can be found. As mentioned Kautsky was not optimistic regarding the "emancipatory potential of cooperatives". According to Djurfeldt, Kautsky did not foresee the fact that although cooperation is not a force of emancipation, it can successfully reproduce itself in a capitalist society where cooperation is subordinated to the market. In Kautsky's arguments against cooperatives, he finds the very factors for defining viability in the cooperation forms, "This industrialization of agriculture does not entirely eliminate the smallholder, it binds him to the monopsonist power of the factory and converts him into a serf of industrial capital" (Kautsky's Summary, 1976 p.44-45).

The role of the cooperatives, Djurfeldt asserts, is "to centralize capital without expropriating the peasants so that we get a capitalism without capitalists. In that form, cooperatives are eminently able to reproduce themselves, and they come to play exactly the same role as private capital in other countries" (p.146-7).

As to Chayanov's position on the matter, vertical cooperation is associated with new forms of capitalist penetration into agricultural production. They are related to the transition in the capitalist mode of production itself, from competitive to monopoly capitalism. Chayanov explains that capitalist penetration takes this new form and stresses that "capitalist exploitation gives a higher percentage from vertical than from horizontal concentration. Moreover, to a considerable extent it transfers the undertaking's risk from the owner of the capital to the farmer" (Chayanov, 1966 p.263). He underlines that this vertical concentration assumes possibility of cooperative forms and that the development of cooperation in the vertical agricultural concentration comes only in certain phases of this process with "relative" weakness of local capital as a necessary precondition.

As Djurfeldt notes, concentration of agricultural production meets with a difficulty which does not exist in other branches: "The cultivable area is already occupied by farmers unwilling to part with their land. This fact may also contribute to explain the non-development of a large-scale technology" (1985, p.153). In Chayanov's view agricultural cooperation is essentially part of a process of vertical concentration in agriculture. He goes on calling attention to the fact that "in its co-operative forms this process goes much deeper than in its capitalist ones, since the peasant himself hands over to co-operative forms of concentration sectors of his farm that

capitalism never succeeds in detaching from it in the course of their struggle (Chayanov, 1966 p.264).

Vertical cooperation, as pointed out above, seems to offer agricultural forms more acceptable to the peasants. As a process, it should accept and promote the spontaneous development tendency of peasant agriculture in a market economy, and place the new services in the hands of cooperative organizations concerned mainly with their members' interests. Such cooperatives were to promote agriculture while defending the peasantry from exploitation by both capitalists and national bureaucracies.

In the Latin American context, such forms of organization following "Chayanov's line" have found serious difficulties when facing capital investment. In these cases, the State has intervened to support these economic entities. This lead to increasing peasant dependency on the state as a "paternalistic" figure. There has been also strengthening of well-to-do peasants in detriment of the poor.

Following the debate on cooperation in the country, the Ecuadorean Peasant Associations and Indigenous Organizations have also emphasized the beneficial character of peasant associative forms from different points of view although they have not presented a clear argument to substantiate their views. Some of them agree with the government's position and maintain that the peasant associative forms should be regarded in terms of productivity i.e. the peasants must be organized in order to achieve more efficient use of productive factors. Organizations were formed to enable peasant access to different services; the Ecuadorean Federation of Indians (FEI) is a case in point (12).

Others reject the preceding argument. They oppose the formation of cooperatives and instead advocate the commune as a better alternative for the impoverished peasant groups. They view the commune as an element of "resistance" to the capitalist advance, as a guardian of peasant patrimony and basically as a possible means of maintaining the principle of cooperation to benefit the poor peasant sectors: ECUAKUNAKI (Ecuador Runacunapac Riccharimui) is one of the peasant federations holding this position.

Finally, there is a third and less well defined position regarding peasant associative forms. In this perspective the peasant associative forms should not only be concerned with maximizing productivity, but they should also serve an integrating function between peasants and indigenous groups by way of gaining a better understanding of the nature of their relationships. From this perspective another important task of peasant associative forms is to act as mediators between peasants and the state institutions: the Shuar Federation and the Saraguros Organization, among others, are examples of this position.

The following positions in the debate on Peasant Associative Forms would seem to be of fundamental importance:

- i. Only state support can guarantee the permanence of Peasant Associative Forms of Production.
- ii. None of the various types of organizations can ensure the viability of the peasant associative forms of production in the long run as long as they exist in the context of capitalist development and as long as the logic of capitalist accumulation remains the dominant one.

Viability is the capability of a peasant organization to implement,

under certain circumstances and given certain conditions, strategies of production and organization in accordance with their internal factors and the external constraints. This will enable the organization to exist in the long run and to deal with the state and the external context.

- iii. Although the peasant associative forms were originally intended as an economic alternative for the more impoverished peasants, they function as mechanisms of socio-economic differentiation.
- iv. Given that Ecuador is a capitalist society, peasant associative forms must be constructed in such a way that they can survive within the system, deal with the contradictions arising out of it, while at the same time promoting the development and welfare of the peasantry as the fundamental consideration.

1.3.2 The Arguments regarding Peasant Associative Forms in the Sierra context

Of the contributions to the debate discussed in the previous section none dealt with the question of viability of peasant associative forms. There is, however, a number of studies which would seem addressed themselves to this problem. Let us consider the most significant of them.

During 1978, Furche conducted some research which comprised two case-studies on cooperatives in the Central Sierra region (13).

The first case was the cooperative "San Patricio", formed in 1974 by the State in agreement with 31 peasants. All the members worked previously in the

hacienda as tenants (huasipungueros and arrimados). Out of 485 hectares, 105 were allocated individually in order to function as individual farms, the rest constituted the common land to be worked jointly by the members. The individual plots were of different sizes, from 2 to 6.5 hectares in which the peasants combined the production of annual crops (wheat, potatoes, maize and barley) and some vegetables (runner beans, lima beans, kidney beans and cabbage). At the same time, in the common land the cooperative cultivated wheat, barley and potatoes and had almost 100 milk-cows. The members or kin (wives, sons and daughters) worked in the common land receiving a daily wage. Therefore, the income sources of the families were threefold: daily wages, milk sales and sales of their own agricultural surplus production.

The second case was the "San Antonio" cooperative set up by the State in agreement with 64 peasants. This organization illustrates quite another situation, out of the 690 hectares made available to the cooperative, almost 300 of these were allocated to the members to enable them to organize their own individual units of production, the rest was left as common land. This implied that the size of the individual plots was higher than in the San Patricio example. The result of this division was that the peasants were obliged to devote more hours of their working time than at San Patricio to individual plots which in turn affected the working operation of the common land. In the common land the same strategy of combining milk production with agricultural products can be observed; however, because there is less collective land per capita, there is in consequence less work for wages for the members.

Furche describes in the case of San Patricio a rapid process of investment in new technology, especially in relation to milk production. The strategy of cooperative production was based upon a combination of ecological resources

which made possible a rapid development of milk production in a context of favourable prices. However, the cooperative produced some agricultural goods and invested heavily in new machinery which was used for tilling the plots of their members. The cost of this service was considerably lower than the prices previously existing in the region. The author calculates the monetary income per hectare in the common land and concludes that the productivity of the cooperative was as high as that achieved by the most modern haciendas of the area. He points out that this situation provoked a rapid improvement of economic conditions for the peasants, increasing the monetary incomes and the general standard of living of the families. Thus, the cooperative at San Patricio was very successful. Conversely, Furche states, at San Antonio the introduction of capital, was not effective especially when applied to the increase of milk production. The main impact of this situation was on the monetary income of the members and their families. According to the estimates of the author, the monetary income in this cooperative was half of that of the members of the San Patricio cooperative. Concomitantly, the productivity per hectare is much lower.

From the comparisons drawn by Furche, we can observe that "San Antonio" accumulates less capital than "San Patricio" and, therefore, generates less surplus. The author concluded his analysis by pointing out that these cooperatives illustrate two different examples of logic or rationality: a) The logic of "San Patricio" is based on work on the common land, generating favourable conditions for the accumulation of capital and the continuous process of incorporation of technical innovations, b) The logic of "San Antonio" is based on the maximization of work in the individual plots and therefore the conditions for capital accumulation on common land are absent. At the same time, the cases of San Patricio and San Antonio cooperatives illustrate other social and economic processes: internal differentiation or

the members based on the different sizes of the individual holdings and differentiation between cooperatives.

Furche's work shows, then, that factors such as state policies, ecology, technology and market cannot explain the medium term-viability of the peasant associative forms. These factors are considered by the author as "contingent elements" which under certain circumstances might have caused the appearance of phenomena such as peasant differentiation. Among the internal conditions conducive to the viability of cooperatives there are two main types necessary for the viability of peasant associative forms in the medium term. Firstly the type of articulation obtaining between the family and collective which depends on the priority given by the peasants to each of the two dimensions of economic activity. The collective sphere can acquire a beneficial function for the family sphere as a consequence of the generation of income, actually higher than the local average. The high level of surplus makes conflict over its direct or indirect distribution, less likely. This fact eases the pressure at the collective level so that its surplus can be directly or indirectly distributed. In addition it makes possible the acceleration of a process of accumulation and collective capitalization. Nevertheless, Furche also points out that the balance between both levels of production activity can be easily upset as a consequence of either the social differentiation processes or the economic failure of the family enterprises. The second internal condition mentioned by him, as a determining element for ensuring the viability of Peasant Associative Forms, is an adequate equilibrium in the use of the productive factors. The key is the use of the labour force. The import of capital and technology is part of that.

To summarise, according to Furche's study, the present agrarian process makes us conclude that the internal conditions of the peasant associative forms of

production are a basic determinant for the explanation of their successes or their failures. Capitalist development in the agrarian sector does not entail the immediate destruction of such productive forms (as it does with those urban forms which are in conflict with the development of capitalism). They vary as to the degree of contradiction to the model of accumulation obtaining throughout society.

One of the unresolved questions in Furché's study is why in some cases it is possible to achieve an equilibrium between the collective and the family levels and an appropriate use of productive resources, and why in other instances the same is not possible even if there exist similar contexts of regional development. The answer to this matter seems to be given by Chayanov when he concerns himself with the idea of differential optimums. The desirable dimension of the production unit was not identical at all stages of production and for all products (Chayanov, 1966). Differentiation by branches of production was, then, necessary. The various branches could be divided into those organized on such levels as: broader-than-community, community, and peasant family unit. Organization of this kind could guarantee production at optimal levels and would benefit both the peasantry and the national economy as a whole (Shanin, 1971).

From a similar perspective, there is a study conducted by Portillo (1980) in the same zone of Ecuadorean Highlands. It argued that the predominance of the collective sector can be explained by the precarious conditions determining the reproduction of the family economy prior to the implementation of the cooperative model. This would suggest that under such conditions the collective level should be given priority so as to encourage the accumulation process. Portillo's study sought to explain also other problems arising from the implementation of the cooperative model e.g. the political demobilization

of the peasantry. The State by means of the cooperative law kept strict control over the peasant organizations. She also emphasizes the existing processes of social differentiation both within the cooperatives and in the relationships between these productive units and the local peasant sectors not encompass in this dynamic. The results of Portillo's study seem to suggest that those who were formerly huasipungueros and administrators of the hacienda had, in fact, better economic conditions in the slow pace accumulation process during the period of decline of the hacienda than other tenants e.g. arrimados and labourers generally, at the bottom of the hacienda hierarchy. The roots of this are, in the author's view, to be found in the old hacienda system as well as in the variety of links which existed between peasants and hacienda, and which had been established before the latter was dissolved. Furthermore, another cause of social differentiation seems to be that the cooperative model encouraged differentiation as it allowed members of the cooperative's management to obtain not only preferential treatment, but also additional benefits for investment in individual projects.

To sum up, the findings of Portillo would seem to indicate that both, success and failure of the collective enterprises will depend on the economic and social conditions of the peasantry prior to the implementation of any type of peasant associative form. Those conditions refer to the way peasants organized production and their relationships with the local and external power structures. From this perspective the success of the collective enterprise should be defined as the possibility for the peasants to accumulate on the one hand, and on the other to maintain mechanisms of cooperation and communal relationship. This success, however, is permanently threatened by the social differentiation process.

To proceed with our review, in another study carried out by Almeida in the

central zone of the Ecuadorean Sierra, similar obstacles to the cooperative model were found. These restrictive factors stemmed from the communal context in which the cooperatives are being developed. This case, refers to the cooperative "El Abra" located in La Esperanza, province of Imbabura. This cooperative was originally part of a huge hacienda which belonged to the church. The peasants bought 257 hectares in 1971.

The cooperative was started by 23 members, all of them worked in the hacienda as tenants (*huasipungueros* and *arrimados*) and many were kin. 65.6 hectares were allocated to the individual plots and the rest, 191.8 hectares, constituted the common land. The strategy of production in the common land combined the cultivation of potatoes, barley, wheat and runner beans, with animal husbandry both bovine and ovine. The cooperative invested in new machinery and in the introduction of animals of a better quality. Almeida describes a rapid process of change, a better standard of living for the members and ideal conditions for the introduction of capital. He mentions that the credit obtained in different periods was always repaid. He also points out, however, that the economic well-being accelerated the process of internal differentiation among the members of the cooperative. He was surprised by the lack of internal democracy and by the accumulation of power in the hands of a few members. He strongly sustains that the ideal of cooperation has been distorted and that in reality a kind of nepotism, based on kinship and money, has been introduced.

The cooperative model, Almeida stresses, did not take into account certain requirements of the broad kinship structure e.g. the *huasipunguero's* extended family, it allocated more resources to certain powerful members of the community. He reported that a degree of social stratification had taken place inside the community resulting mainly from the type of link established by each family unit with the cooperative enterprise. He suggests that the

cooperative form permitted certain groups who had acquired a ruling position to exploit the complementary mechanisms and various forms of traditional cooperation. These mechanisms were used by them in order to recruit labour.

The cooperative as an agricultural enterprise needs labour force which is supplied not only by its members but also by the other small peasant producers of the community who are basically "sellers of labour-power" rather than "sellers of food-stuffs".

Already Kautsky, when referring to the problem of "where to get rural workers" pointed out some "methods" for combatting the seasonal shortage of workers. Thus, he noted that landowners try to bind the workers they need to the land by: a) The creation of small peasant plots wherever most of the land has been cleared of them. However, this seemed to be no sufficient to overcome the attraction of industry, b) Legal compulsion, used to keep workers on the large landholdings. Thus, landowners rent out new small plots to the peasants in return for the formal obligation to perform certain labour services.

A substantial increase in wages, Kautsky asserted, is the most effective method for combatting the rural shortage of workers. However, even this did not seem to be enough to retain the necessary labour force in agriculture. "No remedy for the shortage of agricultural workers has been found in capitalist society. All farms employing wage-labourers will be hit by the debilitating effects of the labour-shortage, but the smaller will be worse affected than the larger" (Kautsky, unpublished version).

In the study carried out by Almeida, mechanisms of traditional cooperation have been used by the powerful peasant sector to combat the shortage of labour power. This, according to the author seems to be the condition for the

viability of the peasant associative forms of production. Almeida stresses that this factor was limited by the demographic growth of the community and the increasing deterioration of the kinship relations. In this situation those peasant groups, basically ex-nuasipungueros, turned against the cooperative and sought to destroy it, while the wealthier peasant sector tried to defend it.

I.3.3 The Arguments regarding Peasant Associative Forms in the Coastal context

As mentioned, the processes of social differentiation of the peasantry impose various limits on the viability of the peasant associative forms. This has also been analysed in some of the case studies in the Ecuadorean Coast (14). These studies carried out mostly in Guayas province, emphasized that the internal differentiation processes among peasants increased considerably since the Agrarian Law Reform was implemented in the area. These processes took place in the cooperative, associative form which prevailed in the region.

Luna's work (1970) illustrates the situation of the rice cooperatives on the Coast. Researching 12 cooperatives in Daule, province of Guayas, he observes that in only five cooperatives was new machinery introduced and only three of them have cooperative funding. In relation to the internal democracy, he finds that only two cooperatives hold annual meetings, in the rest they do not exist. Nonetheless, in any single cooperative the so-called Committee of Control works. The only real function of the cooperative is, at the moment, to obtain credit from the National Development Bank, the members jointly apply and the bank gives credit, using as a guarantee the rice sown by the cooperative. The credit is later distributed individually to the members, who are also individually responsible for credit repayments. This introduces an

element of uncertainty because the cooperative lacks common funds and therefore, most of the members in difficult times must obtain an additional credit from the local usurer, who traditionally is intermediary and owner of the rice-mill.

The first surprising result was the lack of common land, all of which was allocated to form individual plots, which appears to be the main characteristic of that case. The author asserts emphatically that this situation signifies the failure of the "cooperative model" in the implementation of the 1001 Decree (15) on the Coast. Many positive results are related to the elimination of Formas Precarias, the first and the most important is the rapid increase in rice productivity per hectare. Luna interprets this finding as a consequence of the abolition of the rent system that had existed previously. Without the obligation to pay the rent the peasants have some incentive for increase productivity. Luna finds that in most of the cases studied, the possibility of capital accumulation existed for the individual producers, but this process has not increased the level of capitalization of the cooperative. Since the individual producer's interest has become the predominant one, the collective dynamic has been reduced. The process of internal differentiation among the peasants has been considerably accelerated. From these findings the author concludes that the cooperatives are in a process of rapid breakdown.

In another study, Redclift (1975) finds also that the social differentiation processes and the formation of a new agrarian social class on the Ecuadorean Coast are a result of the abolition of Precarismo and the implantation of the cooperative model. According to him the State, on the one hand, contributes to the development of a system of production and commercialization under urban-bureaucratic control. The peasant organizations, on the other hand,

have adopted a mediating function between the producers and the State without the capacity for exerting adequate pressure upon the State. This incapacity, Redclift argues, is due to the geographical organizational dispersion and the divergencies of interests in the peasant sector in that area.

To conclude, the process of formation of cooperatives lead to considerable changes in the agrarian structure of the country. The cooperatives themselves face several problems. The main difficulty stems from the way in which they were established; they were not created by the peasants themselves but in most cases by the State or by external agencies of development. The cooperative model of organization was the core element of the agrarian reform project launched by the State. The peasants in order to obtain land, credit and technical assistance accepted this model. This produced an imbalance between the collective and the individual dynamic within the organization.

In many cases the cooperatives function well, but the overall collective dynamic has been reduced. Most acute is the case of the coastal cooperatives, according to the Cooperative Institute of Ecuador (ICE) almost 60% of these production cooperatives, do not in fact, function as such. It seems that the best of the cooperatives are those combining in a balanced way the individual and the collective dimensions of production. But even this does not by itself produce an automatic process of capital accumulation, yet the main feature associated with the economic success has been capital accumulation and an intelligent and rational strategy for the introduction of new technology related to it.

One of the main characteristics of the Ecuadorean rural cooperatives seems to be their lack of collective production on land. Land was redistributed to form individual plots. The ownership is dual, part is held by the cooperative

and the other is held by the family which work it. Other problems can be added to that such as the lack of internal democracy, the mismanagement and misallocation of credits (16), the insufficient control, the unequal division of labour between "organizers" (hierarchies) and "executors" (base-cooperators), and the inequality in the control of resources. Therefore, different possibilities for capital accumulation do exist. This increases in turn the internal differentiation of the cooperatives.

The development of the cooperative model has lead the peasants to face many problems caused by their increasing relationship with capitalist groups, landowning sectors and the State. The uneven character of this relationship is another element which increases the existing processes of differentiation. This, however, does not necessarily entail accelerated proletarianization of some peasant sectors or the formation of an agrarian bourgeoisie which might have resulted from accumulation on the part of individual families within the cooperative. Accumulation takes place in the peasant organizations, leading them to many contradictions. Thus, there exists an extensive labouring class many of whom receive state support side by side with some family entrepreneurs with privileged access to resources.

It should be clearly understood that the State made economic and political use of the cooperative model. It was designed to incorporate the peasantry as a whole into the agricultural development aimed at the formation of entrepreneurial family farms. But this has mainly produced a high level of differentiation among the peasants.

1.3.4 The Andean Commune

In a comparative study of forms of Peasant Action and Peasant Organization

carried out in various sectors of the Sierra and the Eastern region of the country, Bustamante and Prieto (17) found that production cooperatives have been utilized by peasants not only for gaining access to the land but also for obtaining certain forms of state support. Once the land, acquired by means of this mechanism, was paid for the cooperative collapsed. This study seems to suggest at the same time that in other zones of the Ecuadorean Sierra, peasant associative forms have had success where the organizations' objectives were not only defined in terms of the productive processes but also in terms of other objectives. This is even more true in the case of those organizations which also identified themselves with a particular ethnic group. The Shuar Federation in the Eastern region of Ecuador is a good illustration of this.

Another line of studies about peasant associative forms concerned itself with the analysis of the particularities of the Andean Community or Commune. The authors of those studies argued that the commune is a homogeneous body characterized by strong internal cohesion and by the ability to establish relations of exploitation and domination with the external world. It may be the only actual alternative for the indigenous peasantry (Iturralde and CAAP, 1981). In this view the commune is a productive structure aimed at satisfying the consumption needs of the family units, that means, the commune tries to guarantee their survival and to ensure social reproduction. This strategy of subsistence farming, it is argued, has been adopted due to the restrictive character of ecological conditions and of some cultural, organizational and technological factors. This view is supported by the fact that almost all communes of this type are to be found in zones of high altitude where the prevailing climatic conditions place, in fact, a limit on production. The reciprocity, redistribution and complementary relationships, as the very principles of indigenous every-day life, would seem to constitute the basis of the communal forms of production.

Many researchers point out that in the Andean region the strength of the communes derives from the harsh environmental conditions which call forth the cooperative spirit (18) (Golte, 1980, CAAP, 1981, CESA, 1982, etc.). Golte (1980) who supports this view stressed that from this perspective, the more the strategy of cooperation is used by the indigenous peasants, the less other types of energy and technical implements are needed. There are three factors which Golte regards as damaging to the viability of the commune. Firstly, the population explosion of the community and the consequent migration of some of its members challenge its functioning. Next, the establishment of market relations tends to replace the logic of full employment typical of the commune with that of profit maximization for the family and therefore to substitute cooperation by forms of wage-labour, The third closely related factor concerns the actual establishment of wage relations among the members of the commune. These elements tend to impose a new logic on production in the communes of the Andean region. According to Golte, however, the commune could disappear only if the simultaneous use of various types of agricultural cultivation and the principle of cooperation are completely set aside by its members.

The studies following Golte have found that the ecological conditions represented the key factor, responsible for the expansion or restriction of productivity in the Andes. They have proposed a scheme for classifying ecological areas according to which the high altitude sectors have less productive potentiality and are, therefore, less suitable for commercial cultivation (CAAP, 1981, CESA, 1982; etc.).

Although those who support Golte's line of argument recognize the existence of the social differentiation processes inside the commune, they see it as dynamics external to the commune. There are, however, two sectors inside the

commune. The first consists of impoverished peasants increasingly dependent upon wages obtained as a migrant-labour force. The second comprises a peasant sector dependent upon communal relations and on kinship relations, it seeks to enhance the social condition of being "peasants" among the members of the commune. For the achievement of this end, some peasants use family ties and certain veiled forms of exploitation inside the commune. This has not been usually looked at by those who subscribe to Golte's view, neither did they notice that the permanence of the commune depends on migration and on other types of arrangements made by impoverished peasant units. Instead, they assume that the peasants reject any kind of transformation. From this perspective, "modernization" comes only from outside and has a necessarily negative effect on the indigenous population.

Grondin's view point (1978) about the commune is particularly interesting. In his study of rural Peru he points out that the high mountainous commune is an institution which groups together a certain number of households in order to produce surplus. This institution is controlled by a powerful group inside the commune who takes advantage of this structure in order to appropriate the surplus and make use of a cheap source of labour. This situation has been named Planned Exploitation (Explotacion Calculada) by the author.

The exploitative use of communal resources is not only a product of capitalist expansion but it has occurred throughout the history of the Andean Commune. The commune cannot be classed as an internally homogeneous body. This phenomenon has been observed also by some studies carried out by the Andean Centre for Popular Action (CAAP) which describe the existence of asymmetrical relations and mechanisms of exploitation in commercial agriculture. These facts by themselves leave unexplained the same studies' statement that the commune has the capacity to construct relatively stable internal and external

relations. Despite diverse internal strategies, the commune is able to experience itself as a homogeneous entity in its relationship with the external world. This line of thought seeks to reinforce the idea that the commune is a structure of resistance protecting the indigenous sectors against capitalist development. Therefore, this kind of peasant associative form was conceived of as anticapitalist and with no possibilities of surviving in the long-run (CAAP, 1981).

Plaza and Francke (1981) in a systematic series of studies carried out in Peru about the "commune", concluded that this organizational form would be viable only if it is backed up by an intercommunal support structure. In this sense, the commune is the core of a well defined organizational system whose external factors would supply the necessary resources and mechanisms for the commune to defend itself from any kind of constraints to its development. The focus of analysis is the internal market and from this perspective the commune faces several contradictions which stem from the continual polarity between the family and the collective level of operation. Tensions resulting from this polarity, tend to be resolved at the expense of the collective principle. There is another level of contradiction obtaining among communities where the systems of traditional domination have promoted a kind of communal identity whose restrictive character disregards class identity. The inter-communal network perspective tried to move in this direction by developing economic and political mediating mechanisms between such groups.

According to Plaza and Francke the Andean Commune, as it exists nowadays, is destined to fail because its present dynamic has set a limit to the development of the productive forces which prevents greater control over the natural conditions. It is this situation which the "intercommunal alternative" proposed to remedy in so far as it claims to provide better

control over resources and over power relations.

To sum up, we can stress that peasant communities based on small family holdings and not tied to haciendas face yet another kind of outside constraint. Such communities are exploited not only by local "middlemen" but also by the power structure of the towns and villages on which they are economically and socially dependent. The "intercommunal alternative" proposed would, in these cases, cope with the political power exercised by such cliques which derive their influence from a combination of land-holding trade and clientele relationships with individuals holding "office" at the regional or national level.

To those who adopt an optimistic view as to the viability in principle of peasant associative forms, the main concern is under which conditions can they achieve success. The likelihood of success of the cooperative forms depends upon a complex set of factors. The nature of existing "traditional" social bonds is an important aspect of it (Worsley, 1971). There is also the nature of "motivation" to cooperate expressing for instance whether the peasant producers are appropriately skilled or not, whether they are culturally and structurally homogeneous or heterogeneous, whether they are responding to instrumental or ideological inducements, or are merely subject to the pressure of authority, or some combination of all of these (Galeski, 1971). Each peasant, each group may be differently motivated. Particularly important is the difference between a "spontaneous" peasant cooperative and one which is planned. The spontaneous collective action is generally opposed by the State, political parties, marketing sectors, etc. and also by landowners, private middlemen and so on. Chances of success improve when the solidarity principle is supported by favourable legislation. The social characteristics of the membership of the cooperative are another significant set of factors. they may

be migrants, ex-huasipungueros, resettled population, etc., each group of them have different predisposition towards the associative form. The kind of land under the members' control and its suitability for the crops they grow affect also the chances of success.

Capital accumulation is a decisive factor (and in some cases the "trap") of communal organizations. Although in the context discussed a high level of accumulation renders success in the medium term the resulting processes of social differentiation would lead in the long-run to the destruction of the collective form of production. The process of accumulation assumes various forms in the different regions and it has a number of mediating mechanisms which act with different degrees of efficiency.

CHAPTER II

STATE POLICIES AND PEASANT ASSOCIATIVE FORMS

II.1 The Commune and the so-called "Community Development"

The Spanish presence in America imposed on the existing indigenous population, new forms of occupying the space according to the needs of the conquerors who did count on the provision of labour force, food and other commodities generated by the native population. The reducciones or well defined settlements (1) were the initial system of indigenous relocation. According to historical sources, communal lands did exist before and after the Spanish conquest and they were exploited, collectively, by indigenous families (Jaramillo, 1925, Kay, 1977, Moreno, 1976).

In order to establish the origin of the commune, we should refer to the origin of the Ecuadorean indigenous population which, according to several historians, can be found in the "Chibchas migrations" that came from Central America 1000 and 2000 years ago. Puruhaes and Canaris were the first groups that settled in the Inter Andean corridor, specifically in the provinces nowadays known as of Tungurahua, Chimborazo and Canar in the Ecuadorean Sierra (Ulhe, 1929 p.15-45). The political and social organization of these groups before the Inca conquest is not very well known, historians have, however, pointed out that the aborigine lived in "ayllus" which gave place to the tribes (tribus) and defensive confederations whose permanent base was the "primitive community".

It is important to be clear about the nature of the community in the Ecuadorean Sierra. Since the last century at least, haciendas have entered

into diverse relationship with the indigenous communities. In certain cases this relation was with communities whose members worked temporarily in the hacienda, and in others, that was with communities located in the hacienda area i.e. huasipungueros, arrimados who obtained, as a payment, the allocation of a piece of the hacienda land in usufruct. The first ones were called "free communities" and were characterized by three elements: a particular ethnic character, the collective property of land, and a specific mode of social organization based on wide kinship structures and reciprocity of complementary relations, especially when using collective labour. Accepting that these types of community have existed from the outset and that in certain stages of agricultural development they obtained great importance in Ecuador, we should underline that the community as a form of social organization had not had a recognized juridical status till 1937. In that year two laws were passed. The Organization and Regime of the Communes Law, Decree N.142 of 6 August 1937 and The Juridical Statute of the Peasant Communities, Decree N.23 of 11 December 1937.

Studying the text of the decrees, one notices that both of them point at different problems. The first decree is, in a certain sense, a complement to the "Territorial Division Law of the Republic" aimed at establishing a territorial order for decision making at local levels. It refers to small populated centres which did not enter the category of "parish" but had received till then various designations i.e. "caserios", "anejos", "barrios", "comunidades" or "parcialidades" (2). Once the decree was put into force, all of these populated sectors were called "communes". Administratively they depended on the Ministry of Social Welfare and were required to have at least fifty inhabitants with permanent residence in the place, their governing body was the "Cabildo" consisting of five members.

Importantly, the communes in accordance with the conception of the law are not indigenous by definition, nor are they supposed to have a collective control over the land. All along the country various communes have been formed because of administrative reasons. Within these communes, however, some other organizational forms existed.

The commune, has not been a communal territory, but a rural settlement more or less well defined where a number of peasant family plots can be found. According to the law the commune is an association of individuals, in practice, however, it is an association of families. We can assert that the commune is in fact a "link" of the family economies where the peasants make specific arrangements to carry out their production. The members of the local power structure use the knowledge of this articulation to extract surplus from the peasantry in labour force, produce and money. For this reason, the peasant families are unable to accumulate capital and to evolve other forms of organizing production. Thus, the peasantry has been maintained as a social force subjected to the domain of powerful sectors of the national society.

The second decree, due to its contents, has created a big confusion between communities and communes. This statute does recognize the existence of the peasant communities existing prior to this legislation. It points out that these peasant communities have the right to receive state protection. It also says that the communities approved by the Organization and Regime of the Communes Law (first decree) must be subjected to similar norms. Therefore, this specific type of organization i.e. the community, is ruled by both decrees, but can only acquire the juridical form through the Communes Law (3) (first decree) which also regulates other forms of organization.

The Statute seems to have been aimed at protecting the communities and the

communal property and also to establish the Ministry of Social Welfare as a jurisdictional authority for the resolution of the conflicts and controversies in this sphere which were not to be resolved therefore through the ordinary channels of justice. There is also an important point in the Statute which refers to the following: "The state institutions will adopt the necessary measures to transform the communities into production cooperatives. Once this transformation has taken place, the communities are to be ruled by the General Statute of the Cooperatives in all those aspects that do not contravene this law". There was a clear intention to give legal status to the historical community, it was, however, to be superseded by a modern social form: the cooperative. As we will see below the State retained this idea during the next three decades, in the respective legislation.

With the passage of the two laws of 1937 some indigenous communities, "caserios" "anejos", etc. tried to obtain their juridical recognition to resolve various conflicts. The state institutions were to support later this form of juridical organization so as to allocate their resources. In 1950 the Andean Programme supported by the United Nations (4) was initiated in Ecuador under the name of "Andean Mission". It was set up to coordinate international development policies and specific national interests. The international conception inspiring the project was "Community Development" (Andean Mission, 1961). The approach appealed to the more depressed communities, particularly in the rural districts of the poor countries as it would help them to overcome situations of extreme poverty. For this purpose it was the task of the government functionaries in the selected communities to define the individual and collective needs of their members, also, to plan either collectively or individually how to satisfy those needs and to resolve the more serious problems in the community, and finally, to execute those plans with the objective of maximizing the available communal resources and supplementing

them with material help and services from the Private and Governmental Institutions.

The Andean Mission in Ecuador was aimed at helping, primarily, the indigenous peasants of the Sierra provinces which were selected jointly by state and private institutions. Particular importance was given to the initiative of certain landowner sectors who were carrying out processes of production modernization in their haciendas and were willing to wait for the Andean Programme to perform a "peaceful" transition towards new forms of social organization which would eliminate non-capitalist relations established between the labourers and the haciendas (5). On the other hand, those sectors like the state bureaucracy who were particularly concerned with the development of the Nation and the consolidation of the National State, were also looking for the "integration" of indigenous groups into the rest of the society. "It was imperative for the indigenous population to overcome the idiomatic, cultural and geographical isolation and to establish themselves as more than merely the necessary labour force of the haciendas" (Andean Mission, 1961). This was a ruling principle for the Andean Mission and it was not accidental that this programme which was established in Ecuador during the governing period of Velasco Ibarra (1952-1956), was enhanced later by a decree passed also by Velasco on 27 May, 1961 under the name of "Peasant Integration Campaign to the National Life" (Official bulletin, 1961).

The Andean Mission began its activities in the country in 1956 with a demonstration-research project concerning the indigenous population of Chimborazo province which lasted till 1958. Since the project's results were considered successful by the government, the programme was extended to other provinces in the Ecuadorean Sierra in 1959. The Andean Mission was guided by two basic objectives: "To overcome and banish the lack of harmony in the

relationships between indigenous sectors and other groups of the population, and to promote the development of the indigenous communities in the broadest sense" (6). Towards 1965 the impulse given by the United Nations to the "Community Development" Policies came to an end. Before this, however, the Military Junta ruling the country by then, did "nationalize" the Programme by the Decree N.193 of 30 January, 1964. Therefore, the Andean Mission of Ecuador became the executive department of the Rural Development National Programme within the State's General Plan of Economic and Social Development in the Ecuadorean Sierra.

II.1.1 The Andean Mission and its impact on the development of the Peasant Associative Forms

It is certainly a notable fact that the Andean Mission Programme which for some twenty years systematically carried out development projects in six provinces of the Sierra, has finished without any attempt from the side of the State to assess its results. The main reason for this is that the Rodriguez Lara's administration, who assumed power in 1972 and gave priority to Colonization and Agrarian Reform as the most important processes of development in the country, showed a hostile attitude towards a programme which had international backing. It is important to remember that the military government of Rodriguez Lara was professedly "Nationalist and Revolutionary". According to some ex-functionaries of the programme, the government's hostility had reached such a pitch that several reports of the Andean Mission's activities in the individual provinces were actually destroyed. This has made it difficult, to carry out any overall evaluation. It is possible, however, to obtain from the available information (7) an idea about the Andean Mission's impact on the Ecuadorean Sierra. The following table shows in quantitative terms the number of communities and population

under influence of the Andean Mission.

**Table 1 ECUADOR: COMMUNITIES AND POPULATION INFLUENCED BY THE ANDEAN MISSION
1961**

REGION SIERRA	PROVINCES	NUMBER OF COMMUNITIES	POPULATION UNDER INFLUENCE	
			DIRECT	INDIRECT
North	Imbabura	17	16.000	40.000
Centre	Tungurahua	9	10.000	30.000
	Chimborazo	36	32.000	100.000
South	Canar	9	10.000	30.000
	Azuay	11	8.000	20.000
	Loja	13	10.000	10.000
Total in the Sierra		95	86.000	230.000

SOURCE: Andean Mission in Ecuador, Summary of activities, May 1956-April 1961
Elaborated by the author.

The qualitative impact of the Andean Mission can be analysed from two points of view. On the one hand, in terms of overcoming rural poverty and confronting the problem of development, various studies emphasized that the Andean Mission Programmes yielded unsatisfactory results. The great number of planned objectives (e.g. health, education, production, social-organization, etc.) and the relative shortage of resources in an extensive and difficult area, represented serious obstacles. Santana (1963) points out that in the case of the Saraguros Communities, the Andean Mission had showed negligent attitude expressed in the fact that most of the communal constructions, such as: lavatories, laundries, meeting-rooms, etc. were left unfinished. He also stressed the lack of knowledge by the Mission group of indigenous needs, and suggested that the bureaucratic imposition of international conceived plans

did not take into account the local reality. Taking together all these factors would certainly have caused some communal projects to fail.

The other point of view regarding the qualitative impact of the Andean Mission concerns itself with the long-term effects of its most important aims. The Mission's activities tried to develop the community's capability to organize and strengthen their own spheres of negotiation with the external world, particularly with the diverse institutions of the state apparatus which since the 1960s became increasingly active in the rural sector. This occurred once the development of local leadership took place. They were provided with a special training for handling efficiently the relationship between the community and the external sector as well as for increasing the sense of independence in the communities, especially when they were to face the holders of traditional local power (8). From the interesting articles of Lilo Linke, one can gather how important the Andean Mission's action was in those terms, particularly in the completion of the leaders' training courses at Quaslan, in awakening in the members of the community a certain capability for looking at the external world as being part of their national reality, and in becoming aware that the community through the juridical form of "commune" would be able to exert its influence in the outside world. This last aspect had, later, great significance for the peasant organizations enhancing "ethnic identity" at national level (9).

Santana (1983) offered a general evaluation of the Andean Mission's action in the country which was rather unfavourable. Thus, referring to questions of organization he came to the conclusion that the organization of the communities and the election of their authorities according to the Mission's legal suggestions, have destroyed the traditional ways of enhancing leadership. Nonetheless he also asserts that the Mission developed a valuable

knowledge amongst the Saraguros concerning the various ways in which these groups were to deal with institutions of development (10). The actions of the Andean Mission together with other national initiatives had a strong effect on the powerful groups whose interests were supported by the more traditional and backward landowning sectors, totally opposed to any change in the existing situation. Thus, in 1962 the landowners who held control over the indigenous communities incited the people in the rural areas to reject the Second National Census of Housing and Population. They had assumed the same attitude before when the First Census of Agriculture and Cattle Raising was announced and carried out in 1954. The members of the Andean Mission also suffered the consequences of these actions which showed the landowners' reaction to possible changes in the rural areas (11). In 1959 discussions at government level were initiated towards the possibility of passing an Agrarian Reform Law.

11.2 The Agrarian Reform and the Peasant Associative Forms

The Agrarian Reform and Colonization Law was passed on the first anniversary of the military junta's take-over, on 23 July, 1964 (12). The law aimed at abolishing the non-capitalist relations of production, promoting instead the organization of efficient agricultural enterprises for the purpose of making easier the emergence of more modern and efficient agrarian sectors.

We shall focus on aspects of the Agrarian Reform Law concerning Peasant Associative Forms.

11.2.1 The Growth of Cooperatives: 1937-1982

The formation of rural cooperatives started in Ecuador in 1919 but their growth was limited and very uneven till 1937 when the state institutions

showed for the first time some interest in supporting this form of organization. It was precisely this year when the first law regulating the activities of the cooperatives was passed. The lack of an efficient state control system, however, created many difficulties for the consolidation of a cooperative movement. The new law of 1966 brought about a qualitative change in the situation of the cooperatives. Its main provisions were the following:

- a) The State declared explicitly that the promotion of cooperatives was one of the main aims for changing the economic and social structure of the country.

As it was pointed out in Chapter 1, the agrarian structure was to be characterized by the existence side by side of small plots and large units of production. The situation at the Coast, however, differed from the Sierra and the differences were related to the organization of production on the large estates in both regions. In the Sierra most of the Indian population had been tied to the haciendas by the *huasipungo* system or lived at subsistence levels on independent minifundia. On the Coast the majority of peasants were either free wage labourers or tenant farmers precaristas producing crops for export (14).

- b) The State pledged to offer credit facilities to production cooperatives.
- c) The cooperatives were exempted from several taxes in relation to the import of machinery, instruments of labour and different kinds of inputs.
- d) The cooperatives were given export facilities.
- e) The cooperatives could enter into exchange with foreign cooperatives, and,
- f) The agrarian reform was mainly to be organized through the formation of agrarian cooperatives.

In 1964 the first bank for cooperatives was established. Its resources came from the National Development Bank and from some international agencies who by

means of loans support the "Third World Development". The bank plays, in fact, a very important financial role in Ecuador. In 1969 the National Council of Cooperatives was organized with delegates from the State (i.e. The Ministry of Education, the Land Reform Institute and the Government Planning Office), the Bank of Cooperatives and the cooperative movement. This Council was under the headship of the National Director of Cooperatives. In 1971 the Ecuadorean Institute of Cooperatives was formed as the organization in charge of promoting projects of cooperation so as to consolidate and expand the cooperative movement in the country. During this period the agrarian reform laws of 1964 and 1973 played a central role in the development of agrarian cooperatives. This process of change is clearly reflected in tables 2 and 3 to follow from whose information we can deduce the following.

- i. The rapid growth of cooperatives began after 1964 and it was consolidated after the second law of agrarian reform was passed in 1973 (15),
- ii. The growth has been continuous.
- iii. The growth at the Coast has been more intense. The case of rice cooperatives is the best illustration: They grew from 5 in 1968 to 174 in 1982, and,
- iv. In both regions in question the growth of the "mixed cooperatives" (which combine agricultural production i.e. crops with cattle raising) has been more pronounced than the growth of agricultural cooperatives.

In the 1960 presidential election campaign agrarian reform, for the first time, became a political issue in Ecuador. Until then few politicians had been willing to espouse the cause of the peasant population whose own attempts at political organization had met with strong opposition, especially in the Sierra. The military government which deposed Carlos Julio Arosemena in July 1963 launched the first programme of agrarian reform in 1964. The ideological

aspiration of the law was the "modernization" of Ecuadorean agriculture by way of abolishing "feudal" tenure systems and the establishment of modern business farming. The main provision of the law was the abolition of so-called Sistemas Precarios of land tenure, notably the huasipungo system in the Sierra. Peasant families favoured by the law were to obtain pieces of land whose minimum size was 5 hectares in the Sierra and 10 hectares in the Coast. The law equally affected, public land and the haciendas which were under the control of the State (haciendas of the "Asistencia Publica"). It has been suggested that it was the strategy of the first law to avoid confrontation with the landlords. Indeed, many sociologists and historians have claimed that the progressive sector of the landlords managed to exploit the law for their own benefit, preserving the larger units of production and establishing a capitalist market for land, labour and their products. For this reason the agrarian reform did not in this view operate primarily to the advantage of the peasantry.

TABLE 2 ECUADOR: PRODUCTION COOPERATIVES IN SELECTED YEARS BY REGIONS*

YEARS		1937	1952	1954	1968	1972	1976	1982
AGRICULTURAL	Sierra	1	36	139	174	195	204	231
	Coast	1	65	121	137	160	259	401
MIXED**	Sierra	-	3	26	65	188	245	304
	Coast	-	4	7	26	154	219	268
RICE	Coast	-	-	-	5	34	104	174
TOTAL		2	108	293	409	731	1011	1378

* The Oriente and Galapagos Islands have been excluded from this table

**Mixed cooperatives are units of production combining agricultural activities with livestock production.

Source: Secretaria General de Planificacion, El Cooperativismo en el Ecuador Quito, 1983.

Elaborated by the author.

**Table 3 ECUADOR: NUMBER OF MEMBERS OF PRODUCTION COOPERATIVES IN SELECTED
YEARS BY REGIONS***

YEARS		1937	1952	1964	1968	1972	1976	1982
AGRICULTURAL	Sierra	11	2550	6908	8001	8754	8965	9617
	Coast	-	1684	4495	5051	5951	7699	10731
MIXED	Sierra	-	93	857	2332	6212	8165	10123
	Coast	-	99	176	1099	5556	7424	8637
RICE	Coast	-	-	-	173	1062	3155	4404
TOTAL		11	4426	12436	16656	27535	35608	43512

* The Oriente and Galapagos Islands have been excluded from this table.

In 1982 the Oriente region had 2507 members in the different kinds of cooperatives that existed in the area.

Source: Secretaria General de Planificacion, El cooperativismo en el Ecuador Quito, 1983.

Elaborated by the author.

The second factor that would explain the difficulties encountered in this implementation was the relative weakness of the peasant movement especially in the Sierra region. Peasant mobilization (16) was the result of a series of interrelated factors such as: commercialization, urbanization and social mobilization. The commercialization of agriculture caused landowners to adopt capitalist methods of production e.g. landowners' decision to work their properties with wage labour and to evict the peasants from their farms. The expansion of corporate ownership of agriculture and the mechanization of agricultural production facilitated displacement of rural labour. At the same time, modernizing influences broke the isolation of rural communities, advancing the penetration of urban influences and values into the countryside. Urban political groups engaged in a struggle for power got actively involved in peasant mobilization to widen their base of political support. The most important of them was the Communist Party (17). Urban influences, particularly on the Coast, found a ready audience amongst the peasants whose economic position was gradually deteriorating due to the landowners' exploitation. During the 1930s and 1940s peasant hostility to landowner authority developed essentially on the Coast where the goals of proprietorship emerged among the peasants who were now willing to contest the legal owners for the control of the land. The peasant movement, however, did not play a large role, it could not unify the various peasant sectors in the country, neither was its action responsible for the Agrarian Reform Law being passed in 1964 under the military junta. The two presidents who succeeded the junta (Clemente Yerovi Indaburu. 1966, and Otto Arosemena Gomez. 1966-68) retreated from the Junta's structural reforms and the agrarian reform was brought to a halt. Between April and December 1966 (period characterized by frequent public protests on the Coast) 29 incidents involving peasant organizations on the Coast were reported in the press (El Telegrafo, 1966). From 1966 on, the "concentracion campesina" and its demonstration were to be

the main vehicle for articulating the peasant "regional" interests. The peasant movement played then an active part in public protests, but on the whole it was not able to exert enough pressure against the government. In fact, the government was able to control it at large.

The third major obstacle to the implementation of the agrarian reform was the financial and political vulnerability of the Land Reform Institute (IERAC). The 1966 Yerovi administration took direct action to undermine the junta's agrarian reform. He did it by attacking the IERAC bureaucracy attempting to reduce agrarian reform personnel. This action was a prelude to a direct attack on the IERAC budget which was reduced by 40% (El Telegrafo, March-June 1966). By cutting off IERAC financing, the government was able to reduce effectively the pace and scope of agrarian reform. Table 4 shows the results of agrarian reform for 1964-1971.

Table 4. ECUADOR: LAND DISTRIBUTED BY PERIODS, FORM AND REGION, 1964-71 (%)

Periods	AGRARIAN REFORM			COLONIZATION			TOTAL has.	
	Sierra	Coast	Sub-total	Sierra	Coast	Oriente	Sub-total	
1964-66	23.3	5.7	29.0	40.0	15.0	16.0	71.0	292.867
1967-71	19.0	5.5	24.5	31.2	27.4	16.9	75.5	300.238

Source: Cosse, Gustavo, "Reflexiones acerca del Estado, el proceso politico y la politica agraria en el caso ecuatoriano, 1964-77", Estudios Rurales Latinoamericanos, Vol.3,1 p.62.

Elaborated by the author.

It is clear that most of the land distributed was through colonization of public land, while the impact of agrarian reform was stronger in the Sierra

than in the Coast. 42% of all adjudications occurred under the junta. During 1965 more than twice the size of land was redistributed under agrarian reform than for any other year (Uggen, 1975, op.. cit.).

The expansion of cooperatives began in this period since the model of agrarian reform included the organization of the peasants in cooperatives. The law clearly established that in order to get the land the peasants ought to organize in the cooperative irrespective of whether or not they were working in a hacienda. Land (which in most of the cases did not exceed 500 hectares) was given as a whole to the cooperative, and a model of administration and control was implemented based on the existing law of cooperatives. The land was to be paid for annually by the cooperative once the harvesting was over. The general assembly of members was its supreme authority, the manager and the Administration Council being its executive representatives.

From the point of view of the organization of production the model sought to combine two levels: the work in the individual plots and the work in the common land. In the majority of the cases the peasants were granted the plots that they were already tilling in the hacienda and this introduced an internal differentiation that was very difficult to rectify in the moment of expropriation. The new strategies of production were introduced at the collective level, the individual plots being mostly devoted to subsistence production. The introduction of new capital, machinery and modern techniques depended on the amount of land that was kept at the collective level. The credits that could make possible this change were the responsibility of all the members of the cooperative. Those credits could be given only if the peasants constituted a cooperative. Therefore, because the model of cooperation was imposed by the State, peasants made the cooperatives their instrument to obtain the land from the Land Reform Institute. Once this goal

was achieved the cooperative disappeared as such, and only the individual level of organization of production persisted.

Taking into consideration these aspects we may distinguish 3 main types of production cooperatives each with a different rationale. land, credit and services.

1. Production cooperatives, in which part of the land is worked collectively, the credit is channelled through the cooperative and its political-administrative structure functions regularly. This structure relates the cooperative with the local authorities.
2. Production cooperatives, in which the land is cultivated in individual plots, the credit being obtained collectively. One would expect in these cases that the political-administrative structure works with lesser intensity and regularity than in the first case.
3. Production cooperatives which are registered as such but in which land is worked individually and credit is obtained by the owners of the plots directly. In this situation we can expect that the political-administrative structure declines. The cooperative provides its members with certain services.

By the end of the 60s most Ecuadoreans acknowledged that it was necessary to modify the law concerning Agrarian Reform. This was done by a new military government in 1973. The text of the new law differed from that of 1964 only in its emphasis. It stated that the government would play an increasingly active part in encouraging large landlords to introduce new methods of agricultural production, and to bring more underutilized land into cultivation. The main objectives of the reform were to turn the large agricultural units into capitalist enterprises through a mixture of private

and public investment, and thereby to abolish once and for all the spectre of "feudal" forms of land tenure. Like the law of 1964, the new law placed no "ceiling" on landholding which was greatly approved by the landlords, the national organizations of landlords stated that this legislation is favoured since "it respects property which is worked properly whatever its extension". All that was required was that landowners respected the "social functions of property" which the State had a duty to enforce. It was clear, then, that this law was not directed at the maldistribution of land but rather at the form that agricultural enterprises took. In relation to the mechanism of distributing land to the peasants the law maintained the model of cooperatives. In table 5 the same tendency as in the first period is observed: the majority of the land distributed came from the colonization of public land. However, the total amount of land affected by the agrarian reform increased substantially. This tendency is also reflected in the growth of cooperatives as was shown before.

Table 5. ECUADOR: LAND DISTRIBUTED BY PERIODS, FORM AND REGION, 1972-82 (%)

Periods	AGRARIAN REFORM			COLONIZATION				TOTAL has.
	Sierra	Coast	Sub-total	Sierra	Coast	Oriente	Sub-total	
1972-75	13.7	8.1	21.8	14.5	17.4	46.3	78.2	530.086
1976-77	22.6	8.6	31.2	12.8	16.5	39.5	68.9	434.697
1978-82	14.1	9.0	23.1	5.7	16.5	54.7	76.9	872.019

Source: Cosse, Gustavo, op. cit., p.62. For 1978-82: IERAC, "Resumen de las adjudicaciones legalizadas en Reforma Agraria y Colonización, 1964-82, Quito, 1983.

Elaborated by the author.

Although agrarian reform in Ecuador did not produce a radical change in the agrarian structure, the modernization of the traditional haciendas was achieved and the most backward forms of exploitation disappeared. The amount of land controlled by the units with less than 20 hectares increased from 20.7% of the total area to 30.1%. At the other end of the scale, the amount of land controlled by the units with more than 500 hectares diminished from 49.3% to 19.8% of the total area. Yet according to the agrarian census of 1974, production cooperatives controlled 395,600 hectares. This constituted 4.9% of all the land cultivated in the country. It is obvious that the weight of the "cooperative model of development" at the national level was marginal. It is interesting to note that until 1975, according to the data given by Cosse, only 305,201 hectares were affected by the agrarian reform processes. Until 1982 the total area distributed amounted to 705,820 hectares. We can roughly estimate that the cooperatives controlled by then about 10% of the total agricultural land of Ecuador.

In order to have a better picture of the development of the cooperatives we shall describe the process of creation of the rice cooperatives on the Coast. Rice production took place on the Coast on former cocoa estates, which had suffered from the depredations of the cocoa slump in the 1920s (18). The decline of the cocoa planter elite's status had far-reaching consequences for the structure of agricultural production and for landlord-peasant relationships on the plantations. Thus, the relationship between landlord and peasant went through a fundamental transformation as well. Between 1925-1930 the planter was transformed into an absentee landlord, and the agricultural labourer into a tenant farmer. The system of production developed was a kind of sharecropping agreement known under the name of precarismo. Under normal circumstances the precarista gave the landlord between three and four metric hundredweight of rice in husk for each cuadra (0.65 hectares or 1.48 acres) of

land cultivated by the tenant. Since production averaged between 30 and 40 metric hundredweight a cuadra, this amount represented about one-tenth of his production. Once subsistence needs had been met and the rental payment made, the "surplus" was marketed through intermediaries. However, the precarista had also to repay, with interest, those intermediaries who had lent him credit. The amount of land worked by precaristas varied widely. The average holding was usually between three and eight hectares. It is important to mention that the rent extracted from the precarista by the landlord did not merely consist of rice in husk. The tenant also paid for the use of water pumps when they were available.

by the mid-1960s on the coast, the Agency for International Development (AID) launched some programmes for rural development. It was understood that AID should be confined to providing technical assistance and finding sources of finance in the early stages of the cooperatives' development. It is interesting to observe that the efforts of AID to establish cooperatives were of considerable importance in persuading the government to abolish rice precarismo. In December 1970 the 1001 Decree was passed forbidding rice precarismo in all the area. This decree stated also that the peasants beneficiaries of land expropriations should form production associations (cooperatives). One very significant innovation marked this decree, establishing a direct relationship between the allocation of land and the right to obtain credit from the National Development Bank (Banco Nacional de Fomento). In practice tenants did not even have to wait for titles to receive credit for their crop, they merely had to show that they cooperate with the Land Reform Institute in the carrying out of the reform and the setting up of cooperatives. The Decree considered rice production "a case of collective social benefit" and therefore, expropriation was not merely justified, it was a national necessity. The existing landlord-peasant duality was to be broken

and a decreasing stratification within the peasantry was expected. The planned solution to the problems facing cooperatives, however, did not work in reality. The regulations stated in the law concerning election of some members to lead the cooperative and to carry out administrative work within it, had little meaning to the peasants. In many cases, the organizations' leadership was part of the local power structure whose main interest was to increase production. This seemed to be the general goal of the cooperative movement.

The process of agrarian reform was strengthened by the creation of FENACOOPEARR (National Federation of Rice Cooperatives) in October 1970 (19). Approximately, 40% of the rice cooperatives belonged to this organization. The rest of cooperatives were affiliated to ACAL (Association of Agricultural Cooperatives of the Littoral) (20) and to ACAE (Association of Ecuadorean Cooperatives) (21). These organizations differ in important ways, especially in political ideology and activism at the beginning of the process of implementation of the 1001 Decree. Although all emphasized their independence from the government, active participation in the process through which land is transferred and agricultural credit obtained, has served to neutralize the more politically radical peasant organizations, like in the case of ACAE and some sectors within ACAL.

The radical change expected in terms of land distribution has been achieved. By 1978 only 29% of the land was expropriated but taking into account that the process of land distribution accelerated the last four years we estimate, that almost 70% of the 170,000 hectares which used to function under precarismo have been allocated to the tenants.

11.2.2 The Peasant Associative Forms in the context of the Law

It was already stressed that the pattern of organization implemented by the State in the peasant context and in accordance with the law was essentially cooperativist. The 1964 Agrarian Reform Law, in every article concerning peasant associative forms, called for the setting up of cooperatives. Most specifically it was repeated in those sections connected with the organization of new associations to substitute the arrendamiento and aparceria, in articles regarding peasant representation in the official institutions in order to execute the agrarian reform, in those related to the social forms to be adopted by the peasants so as to become the actual beneficiaries of the allotment of land, and above all in those sections which emphasize the integration of minifundia (22). Article 55 concerns a provision already contained in the 1937 Law of Communes: "The Ecuadorean Institute for Agrarian reform and Colonization will provide technical assistance to the agricultural cooperatives and also it will take measures to ensure that the existing communes and colonies can be transformed into agricultural and livestock production cooperatives" (Art. No.55, 1964 Agrarian Reform Law).

Regarding peasant communities there was only one indirect reference to it in article 50 when it states that "the allotment of land to traditional settlements of indigenous groups who now, as free holders of land, are cultivating it directly will be freely carried out by the State -the new owner of those lands- on behalf of indigenous sectors". There does not exist in the whole law any direct reference to the communities, excepting the stated intention to have them transformed into cooperatives. Any member of a community could join a cooperative established in the area. This cooperativist solution of abolishing the Relaciones Precarias to form cooperatives and of considering the communes as part of the "backward"

agricultural sector was adopted by the military junta, as a "necessary" goal during its governing period from 1963 to 1966. Matters regarding the indigenous communities, became the specific concern of one of the Land Reform Programmes i.e. The Peasant Integration Programme.

The Andean Mission after praising the agrarian reform measures (23) continued its activities in the communities but also carried out some complementary work with IERAC, following the new organizational model. Thus, the Andean Mission carried out development plans for the peasants in haciendas which had belonged to the Public Assistance (Asistencia Publica) and now are being reverted to the IERAC for allotting them to the peasants in the form of cooperatives. It can be said then that the project with the support of the law aimed at the slow disappearance of the communities. Whereas the initiatives aimed at progressing along the "cooperativist road" multiplied.

Besides the articles mentioned there were two further decrees concerning cooperative matters. The first one described four types of cooperatives: " a) Cooperatives applying for land to the Ecuadorean Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization, b) Cooperatives requesting lands which are subjected to expropriation and/or intervention by the agrarian reform, c) Cooperatives trying to buy lands from private owners with or without intervention of the Ecuadorean Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization, d) Cooperatives formed by agricultural owners, tenants or free-holders of land in areas subject to the intervention of the Agrarian Reform and Colonization Programmes, implemented by the IERAC".

The other decree concerned itself with a peculiar form of organization which precedes the cooperative: the agricultural production and livestock raising pre-cooperative whose aim was to capitalize the social funds considered as the

prerequisite for acquiring "waste lands" or those subjected to intervention. Furthermore, the pre-cooperative was intended as a structure for training the members in matters of cooperation, and also in the practical management of production organization. The formation of an agricultural cooperative was divided therefore into two phases: the pre-cooperative and the cooperative. Before a pre-cooperative could become a cooperative, its statutes had to be approved by IERAC. In this manner IERAC could effectively control the allocation of land and the organization of the peasantry, because no peasant could receive land unless he followed the rules prescribed by IERAC and joined an officially sanctioned cooperative. The Articles 53 and 176 of the Agrarian Reform Law gave IERAC control over the access to land ownership and the formation of peasant organizations. By controlling access to land the government hoped to create peasant organizations politically loyal to itself.

Because of the emphasis by the State and support by law, a large number of pre-cooperatives emerged as much in areas of colonization as in those where property of private and public lands was reverted/transferred to the peasants. This process, however, slow down when Clemente Ierovi Indaburu assumed power in March 1966. A clear expression of this was the reduction of the IERAC's budget from one hundred and twenty five million sucres to only twenty five million sucres. Until Velasco Ibarra came to power in 1970 there remained a period of government completed by Otto Arosemena Gomez which was characterized by a strong landowners offensive (24).

The Velasco Ibarra administration on 7 September, 1970 passed the law which abolished the existence of precarismo in agricultural labour. It reads as follows: "The results of executing, during six years, the Agrarian Reform and Colonization Law promulgated by the military junta's government, show the insufficiency of its propositions. The results not only contradict the

initial objectives but also tend to arouse false hopes among the people and to delay true solutions to the land problem". In the main articles the law forbids all the existing forms of precarismo and from the initial date of its validity on, the law releases the peasants of their obligation to pay the landlords in money, produce or labour. It is also stated that the peasants who during at least three years have worked on the land as "precaristas" are at present entitled to request the IERAC to expropriate the land and to sell it to them at the cost of their cadastral assessment.

In 18 December, 1970 the same government proclaimed the 1001 Decree on the Abolition of Precarismo in lands devoted to rice cultivation. The decree subjected to expropriation and to immediate occupation by the IERAC the lands devoted to rice cultivation which were tilled under conditions of labour force exploitation and "feudal" tenure. Lands allocated to rice cultivation, not cropped in the last productive cycle were also to be subject to intervention. The law established that the allotment of lands to the precaristas and other agricultural workers qualified by the IERAC should begin after the termination of the current productive cycle. Peasants who will benefit from it should pay the total price of the land within a 10 year-term, its cost being fixed by the cadastral assessment. The credit was provided by the National Development Bank on condition that the beneficiaries of the decree form associations of production which would also receive technical assistance from a Ministry of Production.

Valverde (1979) finds that till 1972 the allotments of land carried out by the IERAC corresponded to the agrarian reform law and the first allotments resulting from the 1001 decree, took place in 1973. It took place in an atmosphere of deep social conflict between peasants and landowners. The decree greatly affected landownership in the region and facilitated the

creation of rice cooperatives formed by ex-precaristas, now owners of their plots. Although it stipulated only that the beneficiaries form associations of production without specifying their character, the cooperative form taken was defined by the government's preferences as well as by earlier experiences of cooperative forms of production.

As suggested earlier, the state's policies were always aimed at supporting the organization of cooperatives. This meant the emergence of a new problem i.e. the imposition of these organizations in areas where communities existed as the basic organizational type. In many cases, there were serious conflicts between, cooperatives and communities caused by the allocations of land and water, the establishment of boundaries, etc. This situation was reflected in the laws passed from 1973 on.

On 15 October, 1973 the Rodriguez Lara's military government passed a new Agrarian Reform Law. It did not formally establish the cooperative as the privileged organization. Thus, Article 54 points out that "The State will tend to form enterprises, cooperatives, associations and other organizations of agricultural production and livestock raising in order to utilize, efficiently, the factors of production". Article 55 reiterates that: "After the IERAC has checked and found that in any land property, completely or partially expropriated by this institute, a suitable peasant entity having juridical recognition as such exists, the IERAC will allot the land to such entity following the respective articles of the law. Furthermore, if in the lands which fall to the IERAC there is not a suitable peasant entity, then a Provisional Peasant Organization for the Agrarian Reform (OCPRA) has to be established". The law makes clear that only ex-precaristas of an expropriated property can become members of an OCPRA. In other articles where the beneficiaries are specified, the law states that the lands will be allotted

with the character of property to "peasant organizations of any type possessing juridical recognition and organized in accordance with the law" (Art. 68).

On 2 May, 1974 a decree was passed modifying the Juridical Statute of the Peasant Communities and transferring to the Ministry of Agriculture the jurisdictional authority over its application. On 24 December, 1975 the 1089 Decree was passed, which authorizes peasant communities to unite into Provincial Federations. On 7 October, 1976 after the military junta succeeded Rodriguez Lara in government, a legislative commission was appointed to codify the reforms in a Juridical Statute of the Peasant Communities. An article which called for the transformation of the communities into production cooperatives, since it was never eliminated, reappeared in the Statute.

The attempts to push through legislation favourable to the peasant communities reached its peak with the Law of Communes bill, presented to the Parliament (Camara Nacional de Representantes) by the Jaime Rolcos' administration on 30 April, 1981 and also with the Agrarian Code bill presented subsequently by the Oswaldo Hurtado's administration to the Legislative Assembly. In both cases the communes were defined as forms of agrarian social organization. A number of articles were inserted regarding the defence of their collective lands and their privileged status for obtaining access to new lands. These bills, however, never became law, for apparently there was no political will to push them through. In result, the existing legislation continues to favour organizations of cooperative type, although within the law there exists the possibility for the communities and associations of agricultural workers to demand the allotment of land and water. Indeed, this has been happening during the last decade.

To recollect there are three main points to stress so far concerning the Cooperative Model in the country:

1. Credit constituted the core element for the cooperatives existence.
2. The cooperatives, being set up by the State, reflected the pressure of both landlord and small peasantry-communal groups. As organizational entities, the cooperatives enjoy legal rights which seem to have transformed those organizations into real communities.
3. As can be deduced from the analysis of the Agrarian Reform Laws, the cooperative movement was initiated by **legislative** action rather than a political movement. "Cooperativism" was a "model" implemented from "above", it has been imposed on the peasants who did not identify cooperatives as the type of organization representing their aspirations as a class.

11.3 Recent Agrarian Policies and the expansion of the Integrated Rural Development Programme (IRD)

From land distribution to IRD

Towards the end of the 1970s the land expropriation process through the dividing up of haciendas slowed-down. Such social phenomena as the movement of masses of peasants into urban zones, the inability of peasant groups to gain by themselves access to the land, etc. were clearly showing that the peasant movement was growing weak. This situation as well as some changes taking place at the top of the military junta -The Junta's President who represented a sector highly interested in social changes, was replaced- did lead to the promulgation of the Agricultural Production and Livestock Raising Development Law (Ley de Fomento y Desarrollo Agropecuario) by the 6 March,

1979, 3289 Decree. Article 82 of this law stated new criteria of efficiency of the production units. It obstructed the expropriation of such units. Article 89 established precise measures for preventing the occupation of lands by the peasants and to put a stop to methods utilized, till then, to expand the peasant property areas. This law intended to annul the central regulations of the Agrarian Reform Law of 1973 concerning expropriation of lands by the State.

It seemed that this indicated the decline of the agrarian development road concentrated on the distribution of land. The new alternative seemed to be the policy of integral rural development. There were some antecedents to this, for instance The Pilot Project of Integral Colonization carried out in Santo Domingo de los Colorados (colonization area in Pichincha province) with the support of the Interamerican Development Bank (IDB). However, given the impact of the project on general conceptions of Regional Planning, it did not draw particular attention to the Peasant Associative Forms, since its major interest was focussed on individual producers holding diverse sizes of agricultural units.

There are two separate issues to be emphasized within the Integral Rural Development Policy, also considered by the 1973 Agrarian Reform Law. On the one hand, there is the idea of **property**, in other words, it was considered essential to give the peasants the definite property of the land. On the other one, there is **the nature of the agricultural enterprise**. The State stressed the need for modernizing the agrarian sector, transforming traditional properties into profitable enterprises.

Towards 1975, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) became active in the country as far as the integral rural development

was concerned. In agreement with the rural development head department of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock Raising -nowadays known as the head Department for Peasant Development- the World bank initiated a training course for functionaries, giving particular emphasis to the identification of areas which were to have priority within the Rural Development Programmes. As a consequence of that course and of their studies previously developed by the Bank's functionaries, the "Quero-Huachi-Pelileo Integral Rural Development Project" emerged.

In the five years from 1975 to 1980 a number of international agencies of development converged in Ecuador in order to promote and to institutionalize the activities of integral rural development. The World Bank gave a loan of four million dollars to the Office for National Planning. Thus, this national institution was able to complete the studies of the Tungurahua project and to finance other minor programmes. The Organization of American States (OAS) assumed as one of its responsibilities the provision of expertise for the formulation of three rural development programmes, the Quinde, Canar and Santa Isabel Projects. It also offered support to supplement certain activities concerning rural development within the National Planning Programme. The Interamerican Institute for Agricultural Cooperation (IICA) pledged its support for the Quimiac-Penipe Project. The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the Agency for International Development were also strongly involved in these new perspectives of rural development.

Several projects of rural development began to establish their own specific views and methodologies and to channel their activities through different organs of the Public Sector. Thus, some agencies were promoted by the Ministry of Agriculture, some others by Regional Development Institutions such as: CREA, PREDESUR and CRM, and others by Provincial Councils and non-profit

making private bodies. This remarkable institutional fragmentation found an official response in the formulation of the Rural Development National Programme within the National Plan of Development, and also in the creation, on 8 October, 1980, of the Integral Rural Development Secretariat (SEDRI). The National Plan of Development stipulated, beside some measures for increasing agricultural production on the large properties, that the integral rural development was intended to benefit primarily minifundistas, wage-labour workers, landless peasants and marginal rural population engaged in non-agricultural and non-livestock raising activities. The Agrarian Reform has been incorporated into the Plan as one of its main principles and it was strongly emphasized by the new government in 1980 who insisted on the redistribution of land. The Parliament, however, refused to rescind the Fomento Law (Ley de Fomento) so that, two absolutely contradictory policies on the issue were in force at the same time.

Regarding Peasant Associative Forms, the rural development programmes included various ways for the beneficiaries of the projects to participate in their implementation. Thus, once SEDRI was created, it did group seventeen projects which were going through different stages of development, each of them representing not only diverse social actors but also various private and state agencies' views and methodologies. In practice, then, every project was carried out in different directions in this respect. The SEDRI tried to unify the projects' methodologies, but as far as the organized peasant participation was concerned, it prudently assumed the existence of diverse organizational modalities (25). Various styles concerning the participation of peasant organizations were developed by state agencies. On the one hand, there were some projects like the one in Tungurahua where the expert advisers themselves interpreted the peasants' needs and shaped the basic characteristics of the project through the use of traditional methodologies. On the other hand,

there were projects such as the Quinde-Malimpia Nueva Jerusalem Programme, where from the beginning there was an attempt to obtain a high level of peasant participation in the definition of the project's goals (26).

II.4 The fundamental steps of State Policies with regard to the implementation of Peasant Associative Forms

The complexity of the existing peasant associative forms and the diversity of their objectives, components, external articulations, etc. can be explained with reference to the state policies mentioned above. Several ingredients such as: the presence of a notable number of private agencies of development - including those of different religious origin-, the rural development actions carried out by state agencies both regional/provincial and national, and the succession during the last decades of contradictory and inconsistent agrarian policies contributed to create a very complex panorama (27). To all this, we should add the patterns of diverse traditional forms of organization onto which new models promoted by the agencies, were superimposed. Although the recent state policies seem to recognize this complexity, taking the existence of the peasant associative forms as given and without attempting to modify them, the basic goals of the state programmes, as far as organization is concerned, have not been achieved. They had intended to transform traditional forms into modern cooperatives and also to give the rural communities a juridical status, clearly different from that of the communes, so that one can establish with some degree of certainty which type of organization we are dealing with.

There are different phases in the state policies concerning peasant associative forms and their levels of development. Three steps can be distinguished:

a) The first step promoted the legal recognition of communes existing in those areas which were not directly controlled by the hacienda system. This allowed the State to intervene, mediate and resolve conflicts. It did not attempt to legalize and promote the commune as a particular form of production as in the case of the traditional community, but rather to officially recognize its existence, and to provide special measures for its protection. It has been said by certain scholars and government planners that the alternative to the commune in terms of production is the cooperative. Yet, the "Community Development Policy" promoted the "commune" as a suitable organizational form to channel all external resources towards the rural sector. The outcome of this policy was the legalization by way of decree of a large number of communes in the Sierra and on the coast of Ecuador whose internal dynamics showed diverse particularities, e.g. communal possession of lands combining family with collective labour, or a dynamic exclusively aimed at channelling services provided by the State. One such case was examined in the present research concerning the Ecuadorean Sierra, its results will be considered in a later chapter.


Side by side with the legalization of communal organizations there occurred the integration of indigenous and peasant sectors belonging to the hacienda system into Wage-Labourers Agricultural Associations. Its main goal was the improvement of wage levels, working conditions and labour relations. This organization had certain peculiarities resulting from the specific conditions of the subjects linked to the haciendas. However, this was not intended to function as a productive unit, but was essentially a structure for exerting pressure on the landlords to implement changes. The wage-labourers agricultural associations tried later to transform their earlier political function into a productive one.

b) The second step was connected with the Agrarian Reform Law, and was characterized by the formation of production cooperatives. One of the main particularities of this phase was the State's intention to promote a national model of industrialization based on the import substitutions. A rural prerequisite to this was the redistribution of land together with the establishment of organizational forms aimed at increasing production and productivity. It was asserted in this context that the small property is not productive, nor does it allow the development of a productive form of modern character, rather it makes difficult the introduction of new technology, etc. (see chapter 1). At the same time the incorporation of the peasants into the market was given priority so as to promote among them money saving and to give the well-to-do peasants economic power. In this context the cooperative model was promoted as the appropriate organizational form.

The organizational development of cooperatives in the country has been complex and heterogeneous. Two types of situation resulted, on the one hand, we have those situations where the State made a great effort to impose the cooperative model on the local people. These took place in areas where the state intervention in processes of land distribution was very strong e.g. zones of haciendas belonging to the "Asistencia Social" or to other state and private institutions, rice zones along the Coast, etc. The results varied, but they showed an increasing tendency towards disarticulation as pointed out in the preceding chapter (Redcliff, 1975, Furche, Portillo, 1980; Luna, 1970, etc., op. cit.). On the other hand, there are situations where the cooperatives were utilized by the peasants as an instrument for gaining access to the land of private haciendas. In those cases, there was no clear intention to implement the cooperative

model (Bustamante and Prieto, op. cit.). Besides, this tended to occur in areas considered as marginal by the Agrarian Reform Programme.

The results varied. They were more favourable in areas where the redistribution of land was carried out on a more massive scale and where state intervention was stronger. We can also observe certain reluctance in some government branches to use all the resources in order to stabilize production cooperatives.

- c) The third step is concerned with the loss of importance of the cooperative model in terms of state policy. Since Peasant Associative Forms existed without legal recognition of the law, peasants demanded such recognition. The State, on the other hand, although it recognized the diversity of peasant associative forms and their complex character (i.e. they, being not only productive structures) became interested in the establishment of indigenous and peasant organizations at regional level. Thus, at the initiative of the State, various types of grass root organizations were integrated into larger regional associations, federations, etc. This kind of organization of second degree tried not only to conduct the affairs of the grass root groups but also to channel resources from the State to the rural sector. Its basic role was that of "mediator" between peasantry and government. Besides, the regional organizations have demonstrated that peasant associative forms have not only a productive function, but that they also have a role to play with regard to marketing, alternative technology, etc. A small number of Regional Organizations have been also set up following peasant initiative. This step is expressed in our second case study to follow i.e. that of Manabi in the Ecuadorean Coast.
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The diverse organizational models have been adapted and developed by the

peasants as means to defend their interests in the overall context of the national capitalist development, particularly that in the agrarian sector. Changes in the national agrarian structure have been introduced when favourable conditions obtained. This is especially true during the 1960 and 1970 decades when the peasants took possession of the land utilizing legal forms of organization created by the State e.g. pre-cooperatives, cooperatives, etc. or more traditional forms which were later recognized i.e. communes, communities and certain type of associations.

This step and the demands of organized peasants seem to show a clearer class profile. The organizations emerging at this stage assumed a rhetoric which assigned a national character to the peasants' objectives. Nevertheless, once the process of gaining access to resources was under way -although it did not necessarily include the majority of the peasantry- a process of social differentiation commenced in the rural sector. The tenor of the class rhetoric shifted then to peasant demands for credits, technical assistance, better infrastructure, alternative mechanisms for agricultural commercialization, etc. Simultaneously, state policy changed direction with regard to rural development projects. It did still incorporate the redistribution of land into its objectives, probably due to some state functionaries who maintained this aspiration from preceding periods. Nevertheless, the State policies were increasingly focussed on specific measures promoting the development of production and productivity in the agrarian context, as well as on the supply of state services to the members of the projects.

11.5 A Point of Evaluation

Looking at these different stages it becomes apparent that the state's goals

concerning the development of the peasant associative forms have undergone a crisis, particularly when looking at the role of the organizations within the sphere of production. As the explanation of this crisis has shown, it is more useful to focus attention on those aspects of the broader organizations which permitted or restricted developments in the peasant situation. In other words it is necessary to look at the role played by peasant associative forms, their organization, but also at the context of their political representation. In the case of indigenous communities it is important to emphasize also their role as organs of social and ideological cohesion.

Santana (1983) asserted that there will be an expansion of the communities, of their capability to cope with problems of peasant differentiation. The latter aspect is, in fact, a barrier to the development of forms of cooperation especially of cooperatives. The author stresses that the community is the type of organization better adapted to the conditions of the peasant life, according to him the cooperative has proved unsuccessful. Santana based this assertion on the large number of communities which would have reached 1.650 by 1979, comprising 660.648 people, while the cooperatives which reached the number of 1.530 by 1979 did only comprise 52.089 people (Proano, 1982) (20).

Nonetheless, it is remarkable that a significant number of peasant associative forms, above all cooperatives and communes, once legally recognized converted themselves into true mechanisms of representation in the external world. Given the type of state policies, which are already being developed by DRI-P, FODERUMA, Regional Development Institutions, etc., the role of some peasant organizations as mediators of state actions has produced many readjustments in the peasantry. State institutions tried to strengthen Regional Organizations directly linked to the producers. The major peasant associative forms were in fact channels of state action. Some of them, however, have also given particular attention to the strengthening of peasant perspectives, for

instance: ethnic identity, a question posed by the regional organizations at national level. In contrast with this recent organizational development, the traditional National Federations were caught up in an ideological rhetoric aimed at achieving certain objectives of last decades, above all agrarian reform. This traditional National Federations' rhetoric has been directed at radicalized urban sectors who found within it the legitimation of their own position within the bureaucracy as part of the "superstructural apparatus". Their rhetoric has been unable to cater for the new tendencies in peasant organization. They have lost real influence among the peasants.

It seems, then, that only a certain type of Regional Organization is the suitable one to utilize existing tendencies and so, to be itself increasingly transformed into an authentic mediator which relate them with society at large.

CHAPTER III

THE METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH

A Model for the Analysis and Comparison of the Case-Studies

For our analysis it is important to review the argument for the non-viability of peasant associative forms in the agrarian sector of capitalist societies. According to this the implementation of the forms of cooperation finds obstacles through the emergence of stratification among the peasantry as well as in the processes of capital accumulation of some peasant groups. The actual agrarian processes do not show linearity expressed in this assertion, neither can they be fitted into "patterns" which would show the peasants as a traditional sector internally characterized by well known mechanisms of cooperation and mutual help, while externally are pressed towards modernization. Rather traditional forms of cooperation are being maintained which new types of organization have emerged, and the more privileged peasant groups are generally the ones who use these arrangements and the new opportunities of the market to their own benefit. The transition processes of the peasant sectors appear, then, in a very complex and diverse way.

Although the arguments which relativizes the inevitability of the social differentiation of the peasantry have been widely expressed, it is possible to observe empirically some difficulties concerning the peasant "logic" when dealing with processes of accumulation which make difficult the permanence of the peasant associative forms. We can also observe some relatively effective strategies of organizations, in confronting problems arising from the

processes of social differentiation as well as their adaptability to the peasant dynamic. However, the accumulation is the great "disjunctive" of the peasant associative forms. It involves differentiation among the members of the organization when capital accumulation favours only a few families. In these cases the work on the common land benefits the well-to-do peasants, while for the poorest groups it is no longer attractive. Accumulation also represents an alternative for certain forms of cooperation when it accrues to the whole organization as a result of the collective work. Various cases have shown that this is not viable in the long run. Illustrations of both cases can be found in the case-studies.

The existence of accumulation in the organizations is in fact a condition for their viability and a kind of "guarantee" in order, not only, to enlarge peasant production but also to organize it in an effective manner. The failure of capital accumulation is the Achilles' heel of peasant organizations. The resources obtained are exclusively used by the members of any productive unit at family level, the collective sphere some times is totally excluded from the organization. This makes for estrangement between the peasants who have more access to capital and those who remain in the poor stratum. Relationships of exploitation can be found between these two groups.

Within this overall context we can identify certain factors which tend to make more complex the processes of capital accumulation. These factors play a role within the context of peasant cooperative forms of production. They concern the following:

1. The particular dynamics of development in the different regions of the country.
2. The strategies of production implemented by the peasant associative forms.

3. The strategies of organization adopted by the peasants within the forms of cooperation.
4. The specific character of state interventions.

We shall attempt to construct a model which would allow, on the one hand, to compare some case-studies and, on the other, to carry out a general analysis regarding the viability of the peasant associative forms. Particular stress will be laid upon those factors which eventually would lead to the permanence of particular forms of cooperation or peasant production. The factors considered are as follows.

III.1 THE STRATEGIES OF PRODUCTION

Two levels of analysis can be distinguished at this stage:

III.1.1 The Regional Development

It is important to introduce a description, comparison and analysis of it due to the marked regional differences existing in the country in terms of the social organization, potential resources, as well as the different degrees of capital penetration through access to land, credit, new technology, etc. Some central elements concerning the complex peasant dynamic have so far been disregarded in analyses of the regional development in the country. The consideration of such elements in our case would provide for a better understanding of the particularities and possibilities of development of the forms of cooperation in different regional contexts. Thus, we will have areas characterized by a major productive expansion contrasting with zones of economic depression. Depending on certain conditions e.g. ecological factors, market situation, peasant economic arrangements, etc. the availability of

capital may or may not define the expansion in agricultural production. In some cases, access to capital is not enough to overcome depression in the forms of cooperation. There are areas with a major presence of peasant collective consciousness and ideological "peasantism" as against areas of conflict between its different social sub-groups. There are also areas with better access to the market and areas (more marginal to the national development) which have a larger reserve-labour force.

Our general argument asserts that peasant associative forms are more viable in areas characterized by a higher level of economic depression and/or areas marginal to the development of the society at large. Thus, they can be viewed as an important resource to the impoverished peasantry and as a suitable mechanism to overcome the economic constraints. In areas of major productive expansion the cooperation forms can be seen as important initial incentives for the peasants to gain access to resources. Nonetheless, in the long run these structures would be an obstacle to the increasing capital accumulation in some peasant sectors.

The substantiation or otherways of this assertion was the aim of the case-studies set up. Besides, it may allow us to understand under which conditions, the processes of capital accumulation among the organized peasantry take place.

III.1.2 The Strategies of Production implemented by diverse Peasant Associative Forms

By looking at certain variables such as. products, labour-organization, articulation between the family and the collective level, investment of capital and use of technology, it will be possible to analyse the peasant

associative forms as well as the relationship between these variables and the viability of the forms of cooperation. The various arrangements implemented by the peasants in the organizations at the production level vary according to the aims, regional context and social composition of the peasant associative forms. Moreover, the ways peasants link the collective and the family spheres, do play an important part in the implementation of productive strategies. Thus, we will have organizations which give priority to the collective level as against others which use this level so as to strengthen the family resources of their members. There will be organizations which will distribute their annual profits taking into consideration their members' capital shares as opposed to organizations which will do it in accordance with their members' work. There will also be organizations interested in generating some kind of technology appropriate to their environmental conditions contrasting with organizations ready to indiscriminately incorporate "modern" technology. Finally, there will be organizations based on a flexible self-management criterion of capitalization and redistribution of profits to the whole community as opposed to organizations which have an "excluding" and "closed" character regarding the use of the income obtained.

It is necessary to emphasize that the regular operation of the cooperation forms depends on the specific juridical framework in which they are being developed but above all on the real opportunities for the peasants to profit and accumulate. Initially, some organizations are strongly supported by state programmes, mainly by means of credits. Thereafter the peasants are responsible for paying the loans. Sometimes, due to economic failures in the organization its members have to make personal investments so as to keep cooperation going on. The contributions of capital among the peasants vary and this generally means internal differentiation among the members based on different degrees of accumulation of capital at family level.

To achieve success at the level of production the cooperation forms make certain arrangements particularly to secure an adequate relationship between the collective and family spheres, and an adequate distribution of surplus. The organizations must formulate a plan -since viability does require it- to respond to the objectives of the different peasant sectors who are involved in the organizational dynamics.

III.2 THE STRATEGIES OF ORGANIZATION

The peasant associative forms must implement organizational strategies basically appropriate to their objectives. This guarantees success and permanence. Associative forms have not only to put forward a model of production but also to incorporate it into the general organizational dynamic. We know from experience that peasant organizations having a more complex character develop a higher level of internal cohesion, and they have also better possibilities to define and secure a space within society. That is why there are many variables which define the organizational strategies of the peasant associative forms, e.g. mechanisms of management and leadership, levels of articulation between base-organizations and "second degree" forms of cooperation, essentially those of regional type, main objectives of the family and the collective spheres, etc. These elements would allow us to distinguish those organizations which in fact assume a more modern character. There will also be organizations having many and varied aims as opposed to those which give priority to production. Furthermore, there can be found organizations characterized by a democratic management contrasting with those of an authoritarian management style.

Another very important level to be incorporated in the analysis concerns the

type of mechanisms used by peasant associative forms to deal with the external world. Some organizations tend to develop own means to negotiate with the outside context. On the other hand, certain means of such negotiation have been developed by outside agencies. In these cases, the organization largely depends on the external support. It needs to be stressed that there is a significant number of peasant associative forms which increasingly try to develop the communal resources and to enhance self-management. Moreover, there also exist attempts on the part of the peasants to reconcile the traditional ties of kinship and neighbourhood with the requirements of economic rationale. Modern forms of cooperation often try to make the traditional ways functional to their collective aims.

The infusion of broader political ideals into forms of cooperation has been regarded by many peasant organizations as divisive, destructive or as detracting from the central objective of improved productivity. The regional organizations, on the contrary, have tried to promote the political element, and to institutionalize it as part of their objective. These "second degree" organizations regard ideological mobilization as a generative force needed also for economic success. In this context, the emphasis placed by peasant associative forms on the principle of cooperation and on the political sphere is seen as a very important element which ultimately would make fully effective the conscious "push from below" and the commitment on the part of the organizations' members.

111.3 THE STATE INTERVENTION

A third component of our model is the State. Given the present characteristics of Ecuadorean agrarian structure the State has become a necessary "mediator" between peasant organizations and the external sphere.

The role played by the State in the context of the forms of cooperation is not uniform however. It varies considerably according to the regional development, the type and character of the organizations, the social composition and aims of peasant associative forms and so on. In many cases State intervention led to a conflict and, under certain circumstances, altered the whole dynamic of some forms of cooperation. We shall focus on the specific character of the state intervention in each of the regions.

As mentioned above, the State has only been able to play the part of a "mediator" regarding the organization's dealings with the outside world. It did not constitute itself as an organizer of social relations in the agrarian sector. This view contradicts arguments which suggest that the State is the sole and necessary condition to ensure the existence of peasant associative forms.

The State intervention provides the resources for the peasants to carry on their own projects. It also put restrictions to the organizations, but it is not sufficiently effective so as to act or intervene organizing the agrarian world at local levels. In methodological terms, the State can be seen as an element linking the peasants to the external context. Although the State by itself does not determine the viability of the peasant associative forms it provides a space in which collective production takes place as well as the various strategies of production and organization implemented by the peasants.

At this stage, the description of such variables as: the political and juridical framework, the regional development policies, the financial and human resources allocated by the State to the regions, and the relationship between state policies and the local power structure would allow us to define the character of the state intervention.

There are three important questions to be discussed here: First, the extent to which the State is a direct organizer of the social relationships in the agrarian sector and not only a "mediator" between organizations and external world. Second, whether or not it is possible to think of the State as an entity which centralizes through its administrative intervention rather than decentralizes rural systems. Finally, whether or not the intervention of the State has a "technical" character rather than a political one. As to that the terms of the argument should first be clarified. By **technical** intervention we mean intervention at production level i.e. the State advances the organizations' access to resources, technology, etc. without intervening in other spheres of the peasant life. On the other hand, the State intervenes in a political sense when its support of the cooperation forms is conditioned by the political clientship of the organized peasantry as against the government party. On the whole, the State has intervened politically in the countryside by exerting control over the peasant associative forms using many and varied mechanisms. The question will be discussed in the next chapter and it will suffice here to point out that the "technical" character is often juxtaposed with the political because of the increasing role of the latter during the last decade. This refers to the attempts from the government's parties to control peasant organizations.

It is important to give attention to the following issues which are significant in the empirical evidences of the case studies to be analysed in Chapters IV and V.

Firstly, the type of arrangements that the forms of cooperation make at the level of productive strategies which would enable them to exist in the long run. Thus, particular attention is given to the integration of minifundia,


the generation of a type of technology suitable to the environmental conditions, the kind of relationship between the collective and family spheres, and the distribution of surplus.

Secondly, within the organizational strategies, we should look at the mechanisms used by peasant associative forms to strengthen internal democracy and to establish solidarities functional to their collective aims. Special emphasis is given to the type of relationship taking place between the organizations and the external context as well as to their possibilities for defining and securing a space within society at large.

Finally, the type and character of the state intervention in the context of the forms of cooperation serves as a link between the productive and organizational arrangements. At this level the State's role is defined as a "mediator" between peasant organizations and external sphere. It has not been considered any longer as an organizer of social relations in the agrarian sector. Although the State by itself does not explain the viability of the organizations it links the strategies implemented by the peasants at the level of production, and in doing so, allows a first and significant level of the viability to take place.

A schema for the comparison and analysis of the Peasant Associative forms is presented in Figure 1

FIGURE 1 SCHEMA FOR THE COMPARISON AND ANALYSIS OF THE PEASANT ASSOCIATIVE FORMS



CHAPTER IV

VIABILITY OF THE PEASANT ASSOCIATIVE FORMS

THE CASES OF TUNGURAHUA (QUERO) AND MANABI

(Comparison and Analysis)

- FIRST PART -

The comparison and analysis of the case-studies will be carried out along three parallel lines: the strategies of production (at two basic levels i.e. the regional development and that of the diverse productive strategies), the strategies of organization, and the state intervention.

These issues will be simultaneously considered for the two regions, Quero in the Highlands and Manabi on the Coast. The peasant associative forms selected for our study are the following: Pilco, Jaloa La Playa, Jaloa El Rosario, and San Nicolas Communities in the Quero area, Province of Tungurahua, Union y Trabajo Pre-cooperative, Agua Blanca Commune and Barquero Pre-cooperative in the Province of Manabi

IV.1 THE STRATEGIES OF PRODUCTION

The Regional Development

The "first degree" organizations better known as base organizations i.e. cooperatives, communities, agricultural workers associations, communes, are surrounded by diverse productive "sites" or spaces having more or less resources. Different strategies have been implemented in order to make the best use of those resources. Some organizations have defined production as the central aspect of their aims, whereas others tend to strengthen the

internal factors of cooperation.

Synthesis-Table

	<u>Tungurahua</u>	<u>Manabi</u>	<u>Tungurahua</u>	<u>Manabi</u>
			Organizations are being developed in the following contexts.	
The agricultural-ecological constraints	Highland zone characterized by favourable natural resources	Coastal zone having shortage of resources	Productive expansion	Economic depression
The differing agricultural "sites" in the rural context and their productive potentials	The diverse zones of production and the existence of resources		Giving priority to the productive aspects	Giving priority to the aspects of cooperation

IV.1.1 Tungurahua-Quero: Productive Expansion and the use of Agricultural Sites

According to official reports and other research carried out in the area, fruit growing constituted the main characteristic of the rural parts in Tungurahua province (central Sierra of Ecuador). Census information adds another dimension: a large percentage of the provincial land area between 1954-74 was occupied by haciendas, in 1974 there were only 8 production cooperatives and 4 agricultural capitalist societies. During the same period Tungurahua was considered a province of stable land tenure. There were small modifications in the agricultural production and cattle raising units (UPA) whose size varied between 100 and 500 hectares. The UPAs number and the total land area under their control was declining. Similar process took place in the UPAs comprised of 20 and 50 hectares, although, in this case there was an increase of the middle size properties of this category i.e. from 23 to 30

hectares.

The large property in Tungurahua did not have the same characteristics as in the Central Sierra. Large properties, particularly haciendas, could be found in the high areas. Besides they did not function through the huasipungo system. It seems that other "feudal" forms of labour were used by the haciendas in this province. Thus, the sharecroppers (partidarios) (1) and ayudas (2) which were linked to the comuneros or members of a commune/community established outside the hacienda, became of great importance. By the end of the 1950s about 42% of the rural population of Tungurahua was still linked to the hacienda system.

There are several areas which have historically included the main settlements of the peasants in this province. They are as follows:

- a) A large producer area located especially in plateaus (highland) and mountains as much in the Western as in the Eastern Andean Cordillera of the province. They also exist in zones of the Pillaro valley.
- b) A small producer area devoted to vegetables and fruit-growing, and basically located in watering lands of the valley.
- c) A small area of early colonization located in the Eastern sector of the province. There have been established middle size production units.

The first Agrarian Reform Law (1964) aimed at abolishing diverse modalities of Sistemas Precarios which existed in large production units. At the same time, this law allowed the huasipunguero sectors to gain access to the land. Huasipungueros were essentially the first to lead peasant-uprisings during the 1970s in the Sierra region. On the other hand, the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law allowed the handing over of state haciendas as well as those belonging to

various institutions of the private sector. Given the general conditions of rural Tungurahua, since the large state properties and/or large haciendas did not exist in this province, the first Agrarian Reform Law did not have a great impact. Certain changes in the land tenure of Tungurahua were initiated in 1974 once the Second Agrarian Reform Law (1973) was passed. We can find therefore that the total land allocated to the peasants -due to the abolition of Formas Precarias accounted for only about 0.5% of the agricultural area of Tungurahua.

The total land subject to intervention by the Agrarian Reform Law in the province accounted for about 22% of the agricultural area. Table 6 shows the amount of land subject to intervention in Tungurahua by the Agrarian Law for the 1964-1960 period.

The expropriation of land initiated by the Agrarian Reform has been essentially characterized by the dissolution of large haciendas existing in high lands of Tungurahua western cordillera. These haciendas were devoted to agricultural cultivation and sheep raising, though they were not able to adopt modernization policies imposed on the other parts of the agricultural sector. As the hacienda system became weak, peasant organizations found there an opportunity to strengthen their struggle for the expropriation of the haciendas' land.

The general estimate of land which was subjected to intervention by Agrarian reform included lands under the communal plateaus tenure (3), and others traditionally usufructed by peasants communities. Once the land intervention in Tungurahua began in 1974, this province seemed to acquire a "peasant" character, nevertheless, various processes of internal differentiation amongst the peasantry are taking place in the area. Large production units devoted to

Table 6 TUNGURAHUA: LAND SUBJECT TO INTERVENTION BY THE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW: 1964-73 AND 1974-80
(in hectares)

REGION	FORMS OF INTERVENTION BY PERIODS					TOTAL
	Negotiation - - Expropriation and reversion	Division of State "Haciendas"	Liquidation of "Sistemas Precarios"			
	1964-73	1974-80	1964-73	1974-80	1964-80	
Tungurahua	-	27.730,32	-	18,18	854,95	28.750,75
Sierra	25.870,36	159.460,98	18.947,82	71.090,29	132.905,15	436.126,30

Source: Ecuadorean Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization IERAC 1964-80 Statistics


Elaborated by the author

livestock raising can still be found, the Pillaro zone is a case in point. It can be said that, on the one hand, Tungurahua shows the existence of important processes of accumulation of capital within certain peasant sectors through the cultivation of garlic, onions, potatoes and fruits. On the other one, there are peasant zones affected by strong economic depression resulting from an increasing process of soil-erosion and the shortage of occupational alternatives (CESA, 1982).

IV.1.1.1 The Quero County


Within Tungurahua's rural dynamic, it is Quero which shows specific socio-economic phenomena of great importance in the regional context i.e. the transformation-disintegration process of the hacienda system, the persistence of communal forms of production, and the emergence of well-to-do peasant sectors.









Quero county (4) in Tungurahua province is one of the geographical focus of our attention. It is situated in the south of the province, about 20 kilometres to the south of Ambato (Tungurahua's capital city). The borders of Quero county form part of the southern boundary separating Tungurahua from Chimborazo province (see maps 2 and 3). Quero has a generally mild semi-arid and temperate climate. It is, however, subject to frequent changes. The winter season is not quite defined since there are no completely dry months. Nonetheless, the average rainfall (5) decreases between July and September and between December and January, but there is not uniformity as regards rain distribution, watering and humidity conditions in the whole country. As for the county highlands they are not homogeneous. They comprise an area extending from 2.800 to 4.400 metres above sea level. The topography of the area is uneven particularly in the high lands, so that, different types of



MAP 2: THE TUNGURAHUA PROVINCE

Source: CEPLAES, Quito
Elaborated by the author



-  Potato, broad bean, grass; without irrigation small property area.
-  Maize, runner-bean; with irrigation small property area.
-  Maize, broad bean, runner-bean; irrigated small properties.
-  Vegetables, potatoes, broad bean, grass; irrigated small property area.
-  Vegetables, potatoes, broad bean, peas, grass; forestation; with irrigation small property area.
-  3.600 - 4.000 metres above sea level
-  3.200 - 3.600 metres above sea level
-  2.800 - 3.200 metres above sea level

MAP 3: THE QUERO AGRICULTURAL ZONES

Source: PRONAREG, Quito

Elaborated by the author

land can be seen in the county.

There are certain natural conditions such as altitude, topography, rainfall and watering which restrict or extend the use of land. They determine the existence of diverse types of agriculture, climate risks and intensive cultivation. The agricultural boundaries in the zone have changed historically. However, taken the geographical aspects already mentioned into account, as well as the present use of land in the area, two agricultural zones can be distinguished (see map 3).

a) The Low Zone

The Low Zone comprises a land area beginning at approximately 2.800 and extending to 3.200 metres. It has a relatively flat topography and a rather low average annual rainfall which is being counteracted by means of draining systems existing in the area. In the following table, information is given about the estimated watered area in Quero according to different ecological zones.

Table 7 QUERO: ESTIMATED WATERED LAND AREA IN THE COUNTY BY ECOLOGICAL ZONES

ZONES	Watered hectares (a)	UPA*. Estimate hectares (b)	%
Low	1.165	2.783	41.9
High	940	8.606	10.9
TOTAL	2.105	11.389	16.5

* UPA: Agricultural production unit

Source: (a) Hydraulic Resources Ecuadorean Institute (INEKHI), Ambato.
Registered irrigation ditch (Panchalica river).
(b) Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG), 1975.

Elaborated by the author.

In the study concerning the use of soil, conducted by the National Programme for the country regionalization (PRONAREG) in 1976, Quero low zone has been classified as a small-scale production sector devoted mainly to maize, kidney-bean and broad-bean cultivation. It can be observed, however, a certain change in the cultivation patterns towards fruit growing, though the variety in cultivation has been far maintained. As can be seen in table 7, just over 40% of Quero low zone is drained. The 3.200 metres above sea level constitute the limit to the cultivation of certain products such as: maize, pumpkin, green fodder and lentil. Because of a continuous use of irrigated soil, it is possible to obtain even three harvests per two years. Besides, the climate risks do not exist in this zone. Some agricultural experts (Field, 1981) have stressed that the ecological possibilities of this zone allow to organize production on the basis of continuous labour-force requirements while given priority to the cultivation of low demand-labour force crops.

It seems that the communities which have settled in the low zone, show an earlier process of disintegration than those located in the highest one. The dissolution of communities has been essentially caused by factors such as strong market influence, a high level of population-explosion together with a particular way of organizing peasant production based on the nuclear family and with low requirements of labour force. According to Grijalva and Romero (1983, p. 123) this area has been also strongly affected by high levels of soil-erosion. In addition there can be observed a temporary labour force expulsion. The majority of these communities do not have access to communal lands, and it is difficult to ascertain if they had it before. Communities which were able to keep the communal land were the ones which had actual access to those lands. Table 8 gives some information about peasant communes located in the low zone.

Table 8 QUERO: COMUNES SITUATED IN THE LOW ZONE AND THEIR MAIN CHARACTERISTICS

COMMUNES	WITH ACCESS TO COMMUNAL LANDS (hectares)	NUMBER OF FAMILIES	AREA PER UPA (cuadras)	ALTITUDE Metres Above sea level
	(a)	(a)	(1)	(a)
Limpe Grande- and Chico	73.2	152	1.2	3.200
San Vicente	-	100	1.7	3.000
Pueblo Viejo	86.4	65	1.7	3.200
Shaushi	145.3	70	4.8	3.100
Punachiza	-	150	5.2	3.100
Quiambe	-	45	6.4	3.000
Yayulihu	-	100	1.6	3.100
San Antonio	-	70	9.2	3.100
Rumipamba	-	100	3.1	3.200

Notes: The communal lands are situated in the high zone and in plateaus. The communes' boundaries do not quite coincide with those of the agricultural zones.

(1) Cuadra: six-thousand square metres or 1.48 acres.

Source: (a) Tunguranua Project, Quero-Subarea, 1982.

(b) MAG, 1975, information based on the 1974 agrarian census and corrected and updated with the collaboration of the local producers.

Elaborated by the author.

b) The High Zone

The High Zone extends from lands which are at 3.200 to 3.600 metres above sea level. This zone is characterized by an uneven topography and a large number of slopes. The land has very little capacity for retaining humidity, and irrigation systems do not exist. Therefore, water is a decisive element regarding possibilities for improving production in this sector. There are increasing climate risks in proportion to the land altitude, thus, one can frequently see frosts, hailstorms, strong winds and rains. With the increasing land altitude the vegetative cycle of the plants increases so about one annual crop can be obtained. Fallow land is necessary within the

productive process, however, it tends to disappear on account of chemical fertilizers.

The homogeneous general characteristics typical of the low zone cannot be observed in this sector of the county. Different situations, basically concentrated on two subzones, can be found in the high zone of Quero:

- i. The Eastern Quero Subzone which comprises a small sector of producers devoted to potato cultivation together with broad beans and certain types of grass (1976). At present, there is a strong tendency towards potato cultivation.
- ii. The high Western Subzone which is favoured by watering systems (about 50% of the area is drained) so that it specializes in vegetables and cereals (1976) but mainly in onions and garlic cultivation. This type of production is specific for the dynamic or small owners of land. Table 9, shows the communities of the Quero high zone and their basic characteristics.

**Table 9 QUERO: COMMUNITIES SITUATED IN THE HIGH ZONE AND THEIR
MAIN CHARACTERISTICS**

COMMUNITIES	WITH ACCESS TO COMMUNAL LANDS (hectares)	NUMBER OF FAMILIES	AREA PER UPA cuadras	ALTITUDE metres
	(a)	(a)	(b)	(a)
Jaloe La Playa	127	68	4.4	3.300
El Placer	36.3	85	3.1	3.200
Jaloe El Rosario	39	90	7.0	3.200
San Pedro de Sabanag	82.8	47	14.0	3.300
Hualcanga Santa Anita	32	134	4.3	3.600
Hualcanga San Luis	32.4	77	7.2	3.500
Hualcanga San Francisco	3	55	4.8	3.200
Hualcanga Chico	-	50	4.7	3.200
San Nicolas	-	(x)	(x)	3.500
Cruz de Mayo	-	50	(x)	3.300
Yanayacu	-	(x)	35.6	(x)
Mochapamba	-	(x)	3.8	(x)
Hipolongo	402.5	70	4.9	(x)
Pilco	342.5	67	6.3	3.500
Huangalo	388.8	45	(x)	(x)
Chocalo	-	(x)	(x)	(x)

Notes: The individual lands of the community members are not evenly distributed, however, a high percentage of them belongs to members of communities of the higher sectors. The Quero communal lands are situated generally between this zone and the high plateaus. Column (b) gives information about the average of land properties in this zone. Therefore, the number of "cuadras" does not represent the average land belonging to the community members. For this reason, it can be seen in many cases very high averages e.g. Jaloe El Rosario, Yanayacu, San Pedro de Sabanag, etc. where the local large property has been incorporated.
(x): Without information.

Source: (a) Tungurahua Project, Quero Subarea, 1982. (b) MAG, 1975, information based on the 1974 Census, updated with local producers. Elaborated by the author.

As shown in table 9, the majority of Quero communities which have settled in the high zone of the county have access to communal lands. Those without collective lands were formed by permanent workers of the haciendas i.e. huasipungueros and sharecroppers, while the plateaus have been monopolized by large productive units. When the plateaus were considered as waste lands, they were not handed over to the communities as such, but rather held as areas of production for which peasants compete. There can be also observed that the communal lands of Quero western subzone are more extensive than those in the eastern subzone. The latter had to compete with large properties to gain access to the plateaus. On the other hand, there is a huge hacienda in the western subzone which considering the plateau as waste lands, sold it to private landowners rather than competing with small peasant production units in using these lands.

The average land of the productive units increases in proportion to the rising land height; this is due to the existence of huge properties and may also be a consequence of certain adjustments to environmental conditions i.e. the more land height rises the more land a family needs for its reproduction, the more land height rises the more climate risks and vegetative cycles increase, but also the more land height rises the less intensive farming and land actual price will be. This last aspect is not a result of the decreasing land quality and its agricultural potential but of the above mentioned factors. According to the National Programme for the Country Regionalization (PRONAREG, 1976) in Quero the lands situated above 3.600 metres from sea level do not have any capacity to produce. We found, however, some communal lands and private properties located at this altitude and devoted to potato cultivation. The economic situation of the Quero area varies considerably for the various types of production units. From this perspective it is possible to define three general processes typical of the geographical sectors within

the county i.e. the Eastern, Central and Western sectors of Quero

a) The Quero Eastern Sector

The Jaloa hacienda has 200 hectares devoted to potato and milk production. It adjoins the community also named Jaloa. The boundaries between hacienda and community have never been clearly established. By the second decade of the present century, the hacienda lands were expanded towards mountainous and flat areas; the community members were then linked through the hacienda to this particular dynamic. Thus, a complex relationship between hacienda and various peasant sectors of the community took place. It may be summed up as follows:

- i. A first type of relationship was established between hacienda and a reduced number of huasipungueros whose main activity was livestock raising. They had settled in the low part of this sector, which nowadays belongs to Punachiza. This kind of relationship widely described by some social scientists in the country was based on a large number of mutual rights and duties (Guerrero, 1975, Barsky, 1979).
- ii. A second type of relationship between hacienda and sharecroppers was essentially aimed at expanding the hacienda's agricultural frontier. To this effect the hacienda owner gave those peasants machinery and fertilizers to cultivate potatoes in uneven lands which had to be properly levelled. The whole work was carried out by the sharecroppers' families and the product was shared out between landowner and sharecroppers. The latter were also required to work once a week in the hacienda without payment.
- iii. A third type of relationship was established between hacienda and the so-called Ayudas (2). Accordingly a large number of community members gave their labour force gratuitously to the hacienda which in return allowed

them to use the high plateaus so as to keep their flocks and to get firewood. Those "ayudas" owning and keeping about 50 sheep in the hacienda's plateau sectors were required to work without wages at least one day per week in the hacienda.

This state of affairs caused permanent conflict between hacienda and community since their boundaries have not been determined. Thus, hacienda owners took possession of some plateaus and of new areas brought into production by sharecroppers. These lands were later sold to private landowners. The hacienda-community conflict was to be solved by the court which ultimately legitimated part of the hacienda's property, whereas the community members were able to determine the boundaries of only small sectors of the communal territory. The whole issue was not been solved, it is at present undergoing a new trial in order to determine the boundaries of the different productive units. The Jaloa community has been divided into several sectors, some of them (the sector nowadays known as Sabanag) were sold to the Tinajero, Albornoz and Miranda families who started cultivation on the recently acquired lands through sharecropping and leasing systems. Part of the land was let by landowners to wealthy tenants and sharecroppers, who were able to make large investments so as to enhance the local economic dynamic but with a more capitalist character. The new tenants, however, did not actually change the traditional labour process in these productive units which combined backward systems i.e. huasipungo, with wage labour force. From this situation there emerged new proprietary classes, the Bricheto family for instance who has become one of the powerful landowners of the area. As for land distribution, there can be seen several properties which were part of the Jaloa hacienda and whose cadastral assessment is over 500.000 sucres per unit of production, all of them are devoted to milk and potato production. The "feudal" labour system has practically disappeared giving place to wage labour relationships.

b) The Quero Central Sector

In the Central sector of Quero one finds the Hualcanga and San Francisco haciendas which were divided earlier. Hualcanga comprised of a large area beginning in the low part of this sector and extending towards the plateaus. It adjoins the similarly named Hualcanga community. The hacienda boundaries were determined with more precision than the other estates of the county. There was no conflict concerning expansion of lands, besides, community members had complete access to plateau areas. This situation changed later when the partition of the hacienda took place amongst new owners and heirs who did not allow the members of Hualcanga community to use the plateaus. As for the hacienda-community relationships, they were not clearly established. It seems the Hualcanga hacienda integrated the community members into its productive process mainly as sharecroppers. Some huasipunguero families and a few outside-community workers constituted the permanent labour force of the hacienda.

Unlike the hacienda situation in Quero eastern sector, in this case the sharecroppers were strongly linked to the hacienda and acquired the same privilege as those of its huasipungueros.

In 1940, Hualcanga hacienda was divided into two sections. The Benitez family inherited section one which by 1960 was let to the Pyrethrum International Company. Some years later this section was to be divided, part of the land was given to the hacienda's former workers in accordance with the Agrarian Reform Law, and the rest of it was sold to small local landowners. The Perez family inherited section two whose productive process was based on sharecropping systems and wage labour force. As for the latter, it comprised basically some skilled workers who besides their monthly wage were given a

piece of land of about 2 hectares. Section two was afterwards subdivided into three parts due to inheritance, in two of them, the new owners began a sharecropping system of potato cultivation which formed the base of the hacienda production. One of the section's two subdivisions was held by the former owner (Perez family) who rented out part of the land to some community members, namely sharecroppers because of the abolition of Sistemas Precarios. Another part was sold to local peasant landowners who became large-scale potato growers. The rest of the land was held by some members of the Perez family.

As far as the San Francisco hacienda is concerned, it underwent a similar process. The property was divided several times due to inheritance and purchases. Huasipungueros and sharecroppers constituted the main labour force of the hacienda. The former owner of San Francisco holds at present a small area devoted to the cultivation of onions, garlic and potatoes. Its production is based on wage-labour.

c) The Quero Western Sector


There are some haciendas coexisting with huasipunguero families and other peasant units who apparently had a parallel development without establishing labour relationships between them. One of the huge haciendas in the sector was maintained undivided from the beginning of this century until the Pre-Agrarian Reform period. Once the 1964 agrarian law was passed, some of the hacienda lands were given to about 40 huasipungueros who worked in that estate. Later, another section was purchased together with the whole plateaus. Thereafter a Peasant Association devoted to livestock raising was set up as a means to buy some 1.000 hectares from the remains of the hacienda. Its owner held the best lands introducing wage labour and milk production.


There productive process similar to that taking place in haciendas located in the central highlands of the country can be observed.

IV.1.2 Manabi, The "UPOCAM": Area of Economic Depression

Before analysing the UPOCAM or Provincial Union of Manabi Peasant Agricultural Organizations which is the focus of our attention in the coastal case, it is necessary to look briefly at the regional context. Manabi province (see Maps 4 and 5) is situated in the central coast of the country. It has a total area of 20.669 square kilometres or 7% of the national territory, and it is divided by small mountainous chains. Three hydrographical systems can be found: The Daule-Peripa, the Quininde-Esmeraldas and a third system comprising several rivers such as Tama, Chone, Carrizal and Portoviejo which drain the largest area of the province before emptying into the Pacific Ocean. It is in this area that most of the provincial population have settled. Manabi is deeply affected by cyclical droughts, and it has a deficient soil and a large draining shortage. As for the climate, there is a barely changing temperature, its annual average is 25 Centigrades and its maximum is approximately 36 C. The average annual rainfall tends to increase from 300 millimetres in the south to 2.000 millimetres in the north (6) (see Manabi, Documento N4, Indicadores Regionales, 1979, Banco Central del Ecuador).


These different characteristics regarding rainfall together with a uniform temperature and diverse soil qualities have determined quite distinct geographical areas in the province. According to the 1982 National Population Census, Manabi has 674.803 inhabitants, 64.44% is rural population which is distributed as follows: 51.6% men and 48.4% women. About 50% of the rural population is under 15 years of age. The density of population is approximately 48 people per square kilometre which is higher than the national




 Manabi province and its counties

MAP 4: THE MANABI PROVINCE

Source: Ecuadorean Central Bank "La Costa y la Sierra areas de depresion", Quito, 1979



MAP 5: MANABI PROVINCE; THE CASE-STUDIES

Source: C.R.M. and UPOCAM; Portoviejo

Elaborated by the author

average. This coastal province has been characterized by a high temporary emigration mainly of rural population towards the urban areas. The two principal populated sectors are the irrigated valleys and the so-called "anillo cañetaleño" of Jipijapa (Jipijapa's coffee-ring) which have experienced a high rate of urbanization during the last two decades. Manabi has been historically distinguished by certain characteristics such as its capacity for supplying agricultural and sea products as much to the internal market as to the external one, its potential industrial development linked to the agricultural sector, and the increasing market dynamic of Manta (second port in the country) which is in fact the economic centre of the province. During the last years the agrarian sector of Manabi has undergone stagnation which made difficult to satisfy the increasing demand of agricultural products. Once the agribusiness development began, Manabi rural sector modified its market production, essentially the export-oriented agricultural production which consisted of cotton, castor-oil plant, coffee and cocoa beans. Nowadays, this coastal province supplies both the external and home market with a variety of tropical and dry climate production i.e. maize, rice, banana, tomato, peanut, citrus and oleaginous products. The domestic consumption by local population, consists of banana, rice, runner bean and cassava. Table 10 gives information about the main agricultural production of Manabi province by 1979.

The technological level of the agricultural production, particularly in the small-peasant sectors is rather low; production's outputs are, generally, lower than the national average. Manabi region has been devoted also to cattle raising (16% of the total number of cows existing in the country, and 21% of pigs are being raised in this province) especially in large haciendas where their farmers breed cows and pigs. As a result of the increasing prices and demand on the external market-oriented agricultural production, the

industrial prawn fishing has been lately expanded on a large scale. In various sectors in front of the sea, and in others along the banks of some rivers of Manabi province there is an increasing number of the so-called "prawn pools". In Bahia for instance, prawn-production entrepreneurs have destroyed large areas of ecological importance, catching water from the irrigating systems and warding off the peasants trying to gain access to the sea (7).

In relation to land tenure, in this province as in the rest of the country, it has been unevenly distributed with concentration of high ownership in the diverse sectors of Manabi. The 1974 land tenure census showed that 52% of the less than 5 hectares units of agricultural production (UPA or holding) held only 4% of the total provincial land area. At the other end of the scale, 728 UPA over 500 hectares, owned 25% of Manabi total area. The majority of the peasants in this area cultivate the land without holding its ownership.

Table 10 MANABI: PRINCIPAL AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION OF THE PROVINCE, 1979

CROP	AREA PLANTED (in thousands of hectares)	PRODUCTION (in thousands of metric-tons)	OUTPUT (in thousands of kilogrammes per hectare)
Rice	2.373	7.356	3.100
Maize	41.950	40.770	972
Cassava	2.805	30.320	10.809
Watermelon	932	12.205	13.095
Tomato	393	2.959	7.529
Mandarin	600	11.040	18.400
Orange	1.506	46.775	31.059
Banana	27.268	199.056	7.300
Castor-oil plant	9.000	9.328	1.036
Cotton-plant	8.698	11.210	1.310
Coffee beans	98.880	31.443	318

Source: Estimates of harvested area, output and production of agricultural Ecuador. MAC, Quito, 1979.

Peasants were continually pressing the IERAC to obtain the legal possession of their lands, and also for the large haciendas to be expropriated. In accordance with the 1.001 Decree, some rice haciendas located in the south of Sucre county (Bahia) were indeed expropriated by IERAC and later handed over to peasants who worked in those estates. On the whole, however, Agrarian Reform did little for the local peasantry. Most of the land was transferred to peasants under "colonization" (8) particularly in 1966 and only in selected provincial areas. Tables 11 and 12, in the following pages, illustrate this situation.

As shown in table 11 land intervention in Manabi province, occurred mostly by negotiation, expropriation and reversion. These accounted for as much as 83.9% of the total transferred land, their main beneficiaries being certain counties as: El Carmen, Sucre, Rocafuerte, Jipijapa, Bolivar, Sucre. The total land subject to intervention under Agrarian Reform in this province amounted to only 2.46% of the total in the coastal region, whereas land under intervention, as far as colonization was concerned in Manabi, accounted for 28.2% of the total on the Coast. It can be seen in Table 12 that certain counties as El Carmen were important areas of expansion (colonization) and that their beneficiaries being mainly peasant organizations (9).

Colonization was given special attention in the country as a whole and particularly in the Santo Domingo-Chone Highway (El Carmen and Chone counties). In this area, colonization consisted primarily of legalizing cases of the de facto possession. No big government investment was necessary, and there were not powerful landowners to oppose the state action.

Table 11 MANABI: LANDS SUBJECT TO INTERVENTION AND TRANSFERENCE UNDER THE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW, 1964 (Sept.)- 1982 (hectares)

YEAR	FORMS OF INTERVENTION						TOTAL	
	Abolition of Sistemas <u>Precarios</u>		Negotiation - Expropriation and Reversion		Acts of Transaction		has.	F.
	has.	F.(2)	has.	F.	has.	F.		
1971	4.23	3	-	-	-	-	4.23	3
1972	21.89	21	-	-	-	-	21.89	21
1976	1.41	1	643.45*	22	-	-	644.86	23
1977	-	-	119	1	796.76	40	915.76	41
1978	-	-	526.14	38	-	-	526.14	38
1979	-	-	1017.94	7	-	-	1017.94	7
1980	-	-	1835.43	9	-	-	1835.43	9
1981	-	-	159.40	13	-	-	159.40	13
1982	0.56	2	-	-	-	-	0.56	2
TOTAL	28.09	27	4301.36	90	796.76	40	5126.21	157

Notes: (1) The information shows that these particular forms of land intervention did not exist in the 1964 (September)- 70 period. However, as regards colonization, transference of lands did take place in Manabi (see next table).

(2) It refers to the number of family beneficiaries.

* Expropriation carried out in "Portovelo" San Vicente parish, Sucre county.

Source: Agrarian Reform, Transferences of land: 1964-1982 , Statistical Archives of the IERAC Quito.
Elaborated by the author.

Table 12 MANABI: ALLOCATION OF LAND ACCORDING TO COLONIZATION 1964 - 82

Year	Hectares	Number of Beneficiary Families	Main Beneficiaries			
			Counties	Hectares	Families	Organizations
1964	132.76	2				
1965	330.35	4	Sucre	21.00	1	
1966	1,935.92	36				
1967	2,086.20	46	Sucre	211.11	3	
			El Carmen	989.33	24	
1968	3,780.24	123	El Carmen	3,722.96	122	
1969	2,011.49	45	El Carmen	1,768.11	41	
1970	8,555.59	190	Sucre	99.00	3	
			El Carmen	8,272.79	184	
1971	6,538.46	172	Sucre	129.80	1	14
			El Carmen	6,335.49	165	
1972	4,155.15	151	Sucre	126.95	5	21
			El Carmen	3,516.42	92	
1973	4,763.03	231	Jijijapa	51.25	9	
			Rocafuerte	149.90	12	
			El Carmen	4,075.24	132	22
1974	8,442.14	259	Rocafuerte	33.68	1	
			Sucre	159.06	5	
			El Carmen	7,254.55	202	25
1975	8,403.47	243	Jijijapa	588.35	19	
			Sucre	225.18	5	
			El Carmen	6,028.78	166	27
1976	12,393.47	338	Sucre	317.65	10	
			El Carmen	9,777.01	244	25
1977	13,123.54	382	Jijijapa	602.06	24	
			Sucre	207.65	2	
			El Carmen	11,606.60	230	29

Source: "Agrarian Reform and Colonization land-allocation 1964-80"
Statistical Archives IERAC, Quito-Ecuador.

Elaborated by the author

because of the high cost of planned colonization (Colonizacion dirigida) little real effort was put into the colonization of new lands, except for some pilot projects in the East region of Ecuador (Oriente). As for the periods during which transfer of land in Manabi took place, the significant fact is that the amount of land subject to intervention according to the colonization law, increased along the 1970s especially during the 1974-77 period (see table 12) when the country was ruled by the military junta which passed the 1973 Agrarian Reform Law. The process of land transfer occurred mostly under the military regime which have been characterized by several studies, as one of the most "progressive" Ecuadorean governments (10).

In relation to the communication system of the province it began to improve dramatically in the late 1960s due to the ambitious road building programmes of the Department of Public Works. This had an important social and economic impact on the Manabi region, and was one of the principal factors to break rural isolation opening up the area to urban influences. It also served as an incentive to develop commercial agriculture.

Some of the road building programmes, however, were not finalized especially those which were supposed to open up large tracts of tropical forest to agricultural production in diverse sectors of the province where poor peasants settled. Several branch roads which link peasant production cooperatives to the market have not been properly maintained by the Provincial Council and deteriorated to such an extent that during winter season there is not possibility to use them at all. Therefore large peasant sectors are practically isolated from motor vehicle traffic. There are 4.200 kilometres of branch roads which can be used in summertime only. The communication system which initially aimed at restoring the marketing network, could only contribute to the economic expansion of few populated centres as Chone,

Jipijapa or Manta, at the expense of small commercial towns. The process of commercial exchange has been characterized by a disorganized supply of the commodities. There is no real policy to guarantee market-price goods, so that middlemen (intermediarios) taking advantage of the situation, impose conditions on the producers.

Other problems which weaken the economy of Manabi refer to the existence of second-rate quality soils with a rather poor drainage and low productivity. In spite that new areas were brought into certain types of production together with the introduction of new cultivation techniques and improving fertilizers, crops-output in the province is lower than in other areas of the country. On the other hand, Manabi has a high population-mobility, its emigration-rate is the highest on the Coast. About 8.000 people leave this province per annum, the majority of them are producers or "productive" population. This interprovincial mobility is the second highest in the country. By 1974, migration-rate in Manabi accounted for 12.20% , aiming mostly at Guayas province (on the Coast) where as much as 50% of the total Manabi emigrant people have settled (Ecuadorean Central Bank, 1980 Document).

IV.1.2.1 The Provincial Union of Manabi Peasant Agricultural Organizations - UPOCAM -

This is a "second degree" provincial organization which comprises communes, associations, pre-cooperatives and cooperatives or base-organizations for agricultural production, totalling 41 "first degree" organizations. They are located in nine of the thirteen counties of Manabi province. Map 6 and table 13 give information about the location of the UPOCAM's base-organizations, the number of members and the total population of the nearest sectors receiving organizational influence. It can be said that UPOCAM's base-organizations

represent approximately 80% of Manabi agricultural cooperatives (11). This regional organization was formed in 1977 as a result of several meetings held by the representatives of base-organizations who tried to integrate "poor peasant agricultural associations" into a larger regional organization. UPOCAM was essentially aimed at breaking peasant isolation and also at gaining access to and control over resources. One of its main organizational principles stresses: "It is imperative for the peasant organizations to manage by themselves". This has been also strongly emphasized by UPOCAM as the core of its organizational structure.

Until now, UPOCAM has established contact with about 75 organizations at provincial level or 70% of the total peasant organizations in Manabi. Most of them are located in rural communities, or "caserios" (hamlets) which eases the carrying out of organizational programmes and rural projects in general. Moreover, the regional organization could integrate a larger peasant population into its process of development. Some of the organizations, especially those in the northern area of the province face a serious problem of landowners and entrepreneurs evicting peasants in order to set up prawn enterprises.

UPOCAM comprises a large area highly affected by the drought. Many factors have caused the economic depression characteristic for most of rural Manabi. These are basically the following:

a) The Land Tenure System

There is a markedly uneven distribution of land throughout the province. However, One can point out that the largest properties and therefore the highest concentration of ownership, are to be found in the north and in the

central sectors, whereas in the south, minifundia predominance can be observed. The Ecuadorean Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization has not been able, up to the present, to carry out the whole plan of land transfer in Manabi. Of the total 41 base-organizations linked to UPOCAM, as much as 21 face land conflicts mainly evictions. Since they have not obtained the ownership of communal lands, there is not legal protection against entrepreneurs' action. Only 10 organizations have been legally recognized so far. Pre-cooperatives which are provisional agricultural organizations cannot operate properly. The lack of landownership has become the major obstacle to UPOCAM's activities.

b) The Unfavourable Conditions concerning Agricultural Production


As it was mentioned earlier the agricultural production output of Manabi is one of the lowest in the region. The base-organizations cultivate mainly maize whose productivity is about 30 quintals per hectare, rice (20 quintals) and cotton (30 quintals) (12). They have had some experience of communal work and at present about 75% of the total UPOCAM's organizations are in fact tilling the land collectively. Collective area accounted for as much as 50% of the total cultivated area in the province. Peasant producers are continuously exploited by traders and middlemen. Commercialization of peasant production has become a serious problem for every organization. In addition, Manabi has been periodically affected by the drought, which increased heavily since 1967-1968 period, causing a permanent emigration of the local peasants to a number of provinces i.e. Esmeraldas, Guayas and Pichincha (Santo Domingo de los Colorados).

UPOCAM tries to implement productive and organizational patterns aimed at increasing production and also at minimizing the effects of land

fragmentation. This regional organization has given great importance to the collective work of the members, which is systematically strengthened as a means to ensure peasant participation in the activities facilitating technological development and promoting internal and inter-organization cohesion.

c) The existence of Rural Areas marginal to the Development of the whole Society

Most of the peasant families in Manabi province are characterized by poor living conditions. There is a large shortage of public services, especially health centres and educational institutes. The region has a high level of illiteracy (about 37% of the population receiving organizational influence are illiterates). UPOCAM's base-organizations have become an important economic alternative for the peasants, because individual peasants have very few means of production. Many base organizations were able to gain access to credit which meant, however, involvement in increasing debts. For instance, once the collective loan was obtained, cooperatives proceeded to distribute money amongst their members, it was very difficult to collect the individual debts later and pay back the debt. This was in fact one of the main reasons for some organizations to collapse.



MAP 6: MANABI PROVINCE; THE UPOCAM BASE-ORGANIZATIONS

Source: C.R.M. and UPOCAM, Portoviejo
 Elaborated by the author

Table 13 MANABI: THE PROVINCIAL UNION OF MANABI PEASANT AGRICULTURAL ORGANIZATIONS (UPOCAM) AND ITS BASE-ORGANIZATIONS (1)

ORGANIZATIONS	NO. OF MEMBERS	TOTAL POPULATION (2)
1. El Tigre Pre-cooperative	11	314
2. El Zapallo Pre-cooperative	13	144
3. San Cayetano Cooperative	11	275
4. El Floron Pre-cooperative	11	140
5. Union y Trabajo Pre-cooperative	22	806
6. El Porvenir Pre-cooperative	11	550
7. 28 de Enero Pre-cooperative	20	120
8. 19 de Septiembre Pre-cooperative	24	160
9. Eloy Aliaro Cooperative	19	345
10. Leonidas Plaza Pre-cooperative	13	250
11. Dos Rios Pre-cooperative	11	90
12. Guarabano agricultural-fishing Association	12	150
13. 5 de Julio Cooperative	11	550
14. El Secal Cooperative	17	120
15. Los Laureles Cooperative	15	600
16. Alejo Lascano Pre-cooperative	12	480
17. Vueltas Largas Pre-cooperative	11	275
18. La Reina Association	8	77
19. Luis Vargas Torres Agricultural Association	9	115
20. Los Caras Cooperative	(x)	(x)
21. La Union Cooperative	20	200
22. La Fortuna	20	300
23. Barquero Pre-cooperative	24	307
24. Salinas Pre-cooperative	12	109
25. Simon Bolivar Cooperative	16	160
26. La Rivera Cooperative	19	116
27. Las Habras Cooperative	24	133
28. 10 de Agosto Pre-cooperative	15	130
29. Santa Rosa Pre-cooperative	16	144
30. Buena Fe Pre-cooperative	40	220
31. San Jose de Manantiales Pre-cooperative	11	200
32. Union Ecuatoriana Pre-cooperative	31	780
33. Manabi Cooperative	16	150
34. Nuevos Horizontes Pre-cooperative	11	300
35. Nueva Reforma Pre-cooperative	65	790
36. Nuevo Progreso Pre-cooperative	11	85
37. 16 de Marzo Pre-cooperative	14	150
38. Mariscal Sucre Pre-cooperative	41	(x)
39. Agua Blanca Commune	44	264
40. Chorrera Commune	137	(x)
41. Membrillar Commune	200	(x)
TOTAL. 41 organizations	1.056	10.119

Table 13 cont.

Notes: UPOCAM is establishing links with the following communes: Sucre, Eloy Alfaro, Salango, Marzo Eloy Vallejo, El Pital, and Las Tunas.

- (1) The order of the organizations follows that of Map 5 and shows the location of them.
- (2) It refers to the total number of inhabitants receiving organizational influence in the nearest sectors to a base-organization.
- (x) Without information

Source: UPOCAM's headquarters, Portoviejo 1982-83.
Elaborated by the author.

d) The dominant Power Structure of the Region

UPOCAM's base organizations when implementing their various activities have to confront in their respective localities other powerful economic forces. These comprise essentially of three groups: the landowners of huge farms devoted to agricultural production (coffee and cotton) and cattle raising, the prawn entrepreneurs, and the merchants and middlemen. All of them determine the economic development of the region. To these sectors, one more be added i.e. the sphere of state institutions whose support has been, in many cases, conditioned by the interests of political parties.

To sum up we can assert that within the regional context there are production areas with specific ecological characteristics to which peasant associative forms have access, and where complex and varied socio-economic processes take place. There are productive expansion areas i.e. Tungurahua, which are favoured by extensive resources to which competing peasant groups try to gain access. On the other hand, there exist areas of economic depression, heavily affected by out-migration processes i.e. Manabí. In this sector the base

organizations coming under the UPOCAH umbrella implement development programmes so as to overcome the critical situations they face. In some cases the organizations give priority to the economic goals, in others, communal solidarity is the main aim of cooperation. Therefore, in the first case there is a tendency to consolidate the organizations as purely productive structures, whereas in the second one, the organizations are mainly been consolidated as entities of social cooperation due to cope with the dominant power structure at the local and the regional levels.

IV.2 The Strategies of Production of the Peasant Associative Forms

The Peasant Associative forms are more viable in contexts of economic depression since they become the only alternative for the peasants to overcome the crisis. In these cases, there is an interesting adaptation of resources in order to consolidate the collective sphere of the organizations. In contexts of productive expansion, on the other hand, there are certain conditions that enable the productive organizations to exist in the long term. These are basically the following: production consisting mainly of profitable crops, the existence of dynamic elements aimed at enhancing the internal cohesion of the forms of cooperation, and the diffusion of successful experiences, even if they give priority to the family production sphere.

Synthesis-Table

	<u>Tungurahua</u>	<u>Manabi</u>	<u>Tungurahua</u>	<u>Manabi</u>
communal areas	Plateaus	<u>Huertos*</u>	implementing strategies of production by means of:	
The arrangements to carry out production and to consolidate forms of organization	Family	Collective	Increasing resources: capital and labour	integration of all the resources
The adaptation of technology	Transferring technology from the State	Developing appropriate technologies	State intervention	Regional Organization as a "mediator"

* Large market-gardens cultivated collectively by the members of a base-organization.

IV.2.1. The Collective Areas

IV.2.1.1 Quero and the Plateaus

The existence of collective areas required from the peasants to make arrangements to carry out the collective production. The explanation which follows, points out the forms in which the collective sphere of the organizations is operating:

- a) Some communes in Quero, which were traditionally linked to haciendas by means of the "ayudas" and sharecropping labour-systems, nowadays maintain communal lands in mountains and plateaus, and have allocated pieces of land for cultivation to the family units. Because the hacienda-commune

boundaries, in many cases, were not determined a number of conflicts have taken place between members of the communes and hacienda owners which are still unresolved. Large plateaus and mountainous areas have been disputed by commune members and landowners. These areas are being used by peasants for raising cattle, hunting and exploiting wood. To gain access to them, the peasant families had often to work unpaid for the landowners. A number of peasant families have specialized in woodcrafts.

The communal lands are slowly becoming private ownership of haciendas and of the peasant families as members of a commune. They are usufructing these lands whose agricultural frontier has been greatly expanded during the last years. Once their land conflicts with hacienda owners were resolved, some of the communes in Queró obtained through the State the legal possession of parts of the plateaus and mountainous sectors. Therefore, these lands were appropriated in some cases by private producers and in others they were by family units. Three basic points can be stressed in this first situation:

- i. The uneven use of communal resources according to the productive capability of the various family units in the commune. The productive capability refers to the available family labour-force and a series of arrangements implemented by the peasants and different to those taken place in the nuclear family.
- ii. The gradual "de-collectivization" of the communal lands and the parallel expansion of the agricultural-frontier. Both haciendas and communes compete for gaining private ownership of these areas. It must be emphasized that the possibility of expanding the agricultural frontier in the area would determine the emergence and expansion of well-to-do peasants, at the same time, that makes possible to carry out

communal production programmes using the collective lands that still exist.

iii. The special relationship between commune and hacienda is based on boundary conflicts since the highlands' boundaries of the hacienda have not been established, the commune members have increased their labour relationships with the haciendas. This type of link according to the peasants is the only way to gain access to the highlands.

b) A second pattern of use of the communal lands in high plateaus takes the form of shares and rights acquired by peasant family units in those areas. It is difficult to establish the origin of this situation, however, we can assume that these family units belonged to communes which would have disintegrated. The only evidence dating from the beginning of the present century that they existed as communal production units is the collective exploitation of plateaus carried out by them. These plateaus were by that time devoted to livestock raising and exploitation of firewood. The communal use of these lands was restricted to the commune members themselves, according to the needs of the family units. Some of these peasant households who had shares and rights in high plateaus were never linked to the hacienda system in spite of their residence in the same area. It seems that these zones were inhabited, since early times, by small independent producers whose access to plateau areas was not given through customary land holding by the commune, but through commune's legal ownership of land. Therefore, the land property deed, allowed the peasants to have individual shares and rights in plateaus and mountains, but it did not specify the actual area of this lands, neither did regarding mechanisms of exploitation. We can assume that all this had been defined by the communes' oral tradition. At present this type of commune considers the

highlands as appropriate free-spaces for keeping the cattle but unsuitable for agriculture. There is no conflict or competition for access to these lands. Therefore, this pattern functions in areas where the existing large properties are not competing with communes for the ownership of plateau and mountainous lands or else the large properties do not exist at all.

- c) The third pattern can be seen when plateaus and mountainous areas have been traditionally controlled by the haciendas whose productive process was based on the sharecropping system. In this situation the haciendas gave the sharecroppers -who did not recognize themselves as commune members (Comuneros)- the rights for usufructing plateau areas which were considered unsuitable for entrepreneurial use. It was difficult to see this case as one of a communal work-system. Nevertheless, some links based not only on kinship but also on mutual help and cooperation exist among the sharecroppers. It is this type of relationship which has allowed to treat these groups as a commune. The labour relationships between hacienda and sharecroppers allowed the latter to gain access to some sectors of the plateaus which were in most of the cases appropriated by the former. Thus, the hacienda became the actual owner of these lands without holding legal ownership. An increasing landowner-peasants competition for the use of the plateaus took place later in the zone. At the end, sharecroppers were unable to gain access to the highlands which were brought into production under landowners's control. Therefore, they tried to secure their families' living by working as sharecroppers and by obtaining some resources from small parts of plateaus to which they had access. A complex dynamic took place in this area when the State came to play the role of a "mediator" between the local peasantry and the public institutions. With the Agrarian Reform Law, the plateau areas were reverted to the State which without

considering the traditional land tenure, implemented a contradictory policy in the sector.

- i. There has been an attempt by the state institutions in the zone to standardize the use of highlands i.e. the plateaus and mountains. It was necessary, from the state view, to break the traditional system of their usage and to bring them into capitalist process of production. However, the State was also implementing a policy of ecological protection in the countryside giving special attention to plateau areas and forbidding their indiscriminating use which break the environment's balance,
- ii. Ever since the State had classified the plateaus as productive potential areas an increasing competition to gain access to them has taken place between the diverse socio-productive sectors. It should be pointed out that the land reversion process was not fully applied in the zone, therefore, hacienda owners and those few sharecroppers who had had earlier access to plateaus began an increasing indiscriminating exploitation of these lands.

These three patterns of use of the plateaus and mountainous areas are being nowadays replaced by peasant collective enterprises set up by the state initiative. Despite the government interest in equalizing the use of highlands, there were no practical state measures aimed at achieving such an objective. Moreover, the peasants who gained access to these lands were not able to carry out its exploitation. A type of "transition" can be observed from a non-commercial plateau exploitation to one of commercial character. It seems that consolidation of peasant associative forms in these sectors is never likely to succeed (13).

IV.2.1.2 Manabi and the "huertos"

The majority of UPOCAM's base-organizations have tried to develop their collective sphere by carrying out agricultural production on "experimental pieces of land" which as "demonstrative instances" allowed the peasants to test their own technologies and introduced new forms of practical training for the organized peasants. This system initiated by UPOCAM as a means to get peasants together, was based on the experimental cultivation of several products, e.g. castor-oil plant, cotton, tomato, peanut, etc. The method consisted basically of the following: some members from different base organizations gathered in one of the cooperatives which provided with a piece of land for the experimental cultivation of a specific product. The whole productive cycle was carried out by a small group of peasants selected among the regional organization (UPOCAM) and whose responsibility ended once the crop was harvested. Thereafter it was for the cooperative where the "demonstration effect" took place to carry on the productive process. This type of experiment took place in several zones where most of the UPOCAM's base-organizations were concentrated. Moreover, the "demonstration effect" reached also broad sectors of the rural population who were not organized. Many organizations had to abandon these type of work because of some natural disasters i.e. periodic droughts and the recent flood in Manabi (1962-1963). Others continue to develop the huertos which are worked collectively by the members of the first degree organizations and are based on short cycle-cultivation whose product is partly commercialized, the rest being devoted to family consumption. The cultivation of land by means of the huertos system was the only economic alternative for the peasant families of this coastal area. Given the historical fact that despite having had access to communal lands the communities in this province were not collectively cultivated, the

case of Manabi became a significant example of collective-labour system.

The coastal conditions were characterized by the individual usufruct of the communal lands and by the individual system of inheriting the plots which were long before part of the so-called "communal sites". On these "sites" each member had equal rights and shares while usufructing these lands. When one member wanted to consolidate the individual ownership on a communal site he had to buy out the rights and shares from the other members of the commune. Thus, through the sale of site's shares in communal lands, individual ownership in the commune was strengthened (14). For some communities, the collective property of land is an expiring system because of its many limitations, e.g. the communal land is not considered as sufficient guarantee for getting access to credit needed to carry out the agricultural production in the family plot. Besides, for the community to carry out agricultural activities for collective benefit it is necessary to be transformed into a peasant enterprise which should require the labour force of only a few members. It would also mean to impose objectives on the members of the community impeding their common interest in any other activity.

Peasant communities in Manabi had access to lands in hilly sectors where these organizations were devoted to wood exploitation and coal production. As the ownership deed of these lands was never acquired by the peasants, the haciendas did take possession of those lands in spite of strong attempts of the peasants to defend them. At present, the State is taking possession of the hilly areas of the province, particularly of those in the north-central and southern sectors. They have been declared "National Inheritance" by the government who is implementing there large reforestation Programmes. These areas have been named "National Parks" by the State.

IV.2.2 The Pattern for Managing Production and for Consolidating the Cooperation Principle in the Organizations

IV.2.2.1 Quero: Giving priority to the Family Work

The strategy for getting the peasants of Quero involved in the dynamic of communal work has not been aimed at integrating them into a peasant associative enterprise. In this case the collective strategy was aimed at complementing family incomes, socializing resources and restraining migratory moves. The work on the family plot (in many cases the peasants have more than one piece of land) is combined with one on the communal lands and also with the labour outside the community-plots. This type of combination operates as long as the family unit can provide the sufficient labour force for the diverse types of labour. The following case-studies carried out in Quero county show the different situations regarding communal work in the region.

a) The Pilco Community

The Pilco community is situated in Quero centre-western zone between the 3.200 and 3.500 metres above sea level (see map 3 and table 9). About 30% of the total area is insufficiently irrigated. The main cultivation consists of: onion, potato and garlic. In 1983 the estimated population of this community was about 450 people.

According to the government reports, Pilco constitutes a successful case of communal production where by developing their own initiative the well-to-do peasants carry out collective production in the plateau areas. This fact has favoured generation of a labour market. Two working groups were formed in order to perform the communal production. Some conflicts took place amongst

the members of the groups who began presently to compete to gain control over the same resources. Group N.1, initiated its work during a period characterized by agricultural prosperity which brought benefits to the peasants. Group N.2 was formed in a time of economic crisis in the area when the access to resources was becoming difficult for the peasants.

Both groups initiated the collective production by growing potatoes in small areas which gradually expanded allowing the peasants to introduce new types of cultivation e.g. onions in group number one. From the outset, the members contributed monthly with small amounts of money to buy seeds, fertilizers and to pay the fumigation costs. In 1980-1981, group N.1 was given credit for the first time by the National Development Bank, after receiving appropriate training on financial matters some members of the group took responsibility for the dealings with the bank which were totally unknown to them.

In the breaking of new ground in the plateau areas machinery was never used, the whole work was manually done by the peasants of both groups. The individual labour investment was very high, decreasing later due to the introduction of machines (basically tractors) in areas where it was possible to do it. This farm-machinery is hired in by the groups for the shortest possible time because of its high cost. On the whole, contribution of labour is the base of this form of cooperation.

Regarding the organization of communal work, there is no one criterion to carry it out. In both cases each member of the group has to fulfill a specific task at each phase of the agricultural cycle. The two groups operate according to a monthly plan of activities which establishes an obligatory contribution of one working day per week for all the members. This organization is not based on the capital-shares of the individual members but

on the self-management principle which gives full recognition to the individual investment of labour (there is also a general agreement to reward the community some of the obtaining benefits). During certain periods of high labour force requirements, the peasants' labour contribution per week trebles; in these cases, however, any of the members is allowed to provide a substitute to fulfil his individual task or to pay a fixed fine (in some cases he may be expelled from the group). Since the labour invested by the members is not paid, some of them have to look for wages usually as day-labourers in the locality, some others have to supply the force demand on their own properties. In both cases, this situation constitutes a serious limitation for the peasants success and for the viability of their organizations. Despite that, both the working groups -especially N. 1- have succeeded in production. However, this cannot be seen as a permanent factor strengthening the cooperation perspective.

Initially, there was certain rationale in maintaining the collective work as a means to exploit appropriately the new lands brought into production and whose ownership has not been established. Thereafter, however, the organizations lost interest in collective labour, especially since the Ministry of Agriculture as well as other state institutions began to intervene in the organizations' life, mainly through the rural development projects which on the whole have strengthened production at family levels. At present, there is a general tendency to end up the associative forms by distributing the collectively cultivated lands among their members. In 1982, for instance, both groups decided to share out 2 hectares of the communal lands between the members. According to the peasants, the only thing that counts is to keep these plateau areas under production. As for the relationships between community and working groups it is not very clear. The Cabildo's autonomy was increasingly diminished since its governing structure was made up and

controlled by the same members who form the managing-boards of the working groups. Recently the organized peasants were very interested in finding a mechanism in order to integrate the unincorporated members of the community into the production dynamic of the groups, but also to reward the community by a reasonable amount of benefits. Until now, these are still on problems, however, both groups have been continually rewarding the community because they feel morally obliged to do it but not as a payment to their usufruct on the collective lands of the community.

Taking into consideration the obtained benefits, the groups reward the community in different ways: through amounts of money to be used in works of collective benefit (e.g. the construction of the local church, the patronal festival's preparations, etc.), and/or by means of mingas i.e. when collective labour by the members, usually once a month, maintain tracks, roads and other communal works.

There are some conflicts between the members of the groups and the members of the community. The main cause has been the appropriation of the community's uncultivated lands by the groups. There is, however, a general agreement by which either of the two groups can expand their frontier on condition that the land which was previously handed over to each group is being properly incorporated into agricultural production. This agreement has not been taken into account by the members, therefore, there is a tendency to distribute new lands arbitrarily.

For the well-to-do members of the groups the communal work has a supplementary character not only regarding income but also the requirements of the labour force. On the other hand, for the poor peasants the collective work means in the short-term certain contradiction with the labour they carry out in the

family plots. For these peasants, the communal work replaces to some extent wage-labour since investment of labour is the key element for sharing out the organization's profits. It is important to remember that collective work on the communal lands is unpaid. According to this labour system, the poorest peasants ought to make a great effort since they depend on wages. This has been one of the causes of disintegration of the communal production in the area. When the well-to-do peasants work outside their plots, they do it mainly in the transport sector and/or as traders. Thus, in many cases, they are gradually breaking links with agricultural activities or change the strategies of production. The main problem for these peasants is to hire waged labour-force because of the large demand of wage-labour in the zone, the high local wages which in most of the cases peasants cannot afford to pay, and the fear that there may emerge a labour conflict. Therefore, well-to-do peasants are trying to change the type of production i.e. from the cultivation of onions, potatoes or garlic to move into cattle raising. Simultaneously, they tend to incorporate new technology so as to decrease the labour-force demand. These peasants combine agriculture with commerce and transport activities.

The relationship between the organization of labour in the family plot and the absorption-expulsion of the labour-force is a complex one. It is important to emphasize that the fairly rich peasants as much as the poor hire wage labour in order to cope with the sowing and harvest of crops. In earlier times the demand of labour on the family plot was solved by mutual-help systems (cambio de manos). Nowadays, there is an increasing use by the peasantry of the labour market. Table 14 gives information about organization of labour on the family plots of Pilco community.

Table 14 PILCO: THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR ON FAMILY PLOTS OF THE COMMUNITY

TYPES OF LABOUR	Group N.1	Group N.2	Community	Total
Using wage labour only	1	-	-	1
Using family labour only	2	5	3	10
Combining family labour and wage labour	3	2	3	8
No information	-	1	-	1
TOTAL	6	8	6	20

Source: Field work 1982-83

There is a very complex dynamic regarding the hiring of wage labour force in the area. Factors as gender, age, ethnic condition, productivity and links between labourer and contractor are considered when hiring labour force. The impoverishing peasants while offering labour force, absorb it also in certain moments of the productive cycle. Thus for instance, in the case of a poor peasant unit, the family-head combines the work in his plot with wage-labour. He usually obtains the maximum local wage (about 100 sucres per day), besides, two teenage women members of his family go to work in the nearer sector obtaining extremely low wages (30 sucres per day) due to conditions of sex and age. In turn, he hires wage labourers at the peak of labour demand of the productive cycle paying them daily wages between 30 and 40 sucres.

On the other hand, well-to-do peasants do not offer labour force neither do they work as wage labourers. They engage in three forms of labour contract:

a) hiring individually local peasants who earn high wages, b) hiring parties of labourers to harvest onions and potatoes in large cultivated areas. These are brought from the most depressed areas of Chimborazo and/or Tungurahua provinces and obtain lower wages than those demanded by the local labourers, c) contracting a permanent labourer who lives with the formers family as a "servant". He gets the lowest wage known in the zone.

On the whole, the Quero zone sends off in a permanent way a small population basically the youngest members of peasant families. This takes place mainly among some of the richest peasants who want their children to be educated. It is interesting to see the change that has taken place in the zone concerning absorption-expulsion of labourers. Some years ago, a large number of peasants used to migrate, before getting married or temporarily once married, towards the Coast where they worked in huge banana and rice plantations. Higher wages allowed them to make important savings so as to invest in animals and lands at home.

Returning to our main point i.e. that of the communal plateaus, it needs to be stressed that the incorporation of these areas into agricultural production together with a series of factors concerning the economic and commercial dynamic of the zone, has determined the emergence of a small holders labour market. It also has meant the permanence of peasant economy which combines communal work with wage-labour. The well-to-do peasants benefit by this dynamic which allow them to obtain enough labour force to meet the needs of the productive cycle on their plots.

b) The Jaloa La Playa Community

Jaloa La Playa community is situated in Quero south-eastern zone, 12

kilometres from the populated centre of Quero towards the south of Tanguahua province, at 3.300 metres above sea level (see map 3 and table 9). In 1983 the estimated population of this community was about 602 people. According to the government Jaloa La Playa represents an unsuccessful experience of communal production. However, from the peasants point of view it is a successful organization for managing agricultural production. This community has access to communal plateaus where collective production is carried out by a small working group formed to that effect. Production in the community is organized on the basis of the family work combined with hired-wage labourers. There also exists a few share-cropping modalities which are not very important in the sector. The local day wages fluctuates from 100 to 120 sueres plus food. Table 15 gives information about the organization of labour in Jaloa La Playa community.

Table 15 JALOA LA PLAYA: THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR ON FAMILY PLOTS OF THE COMMUNITY

TYPES OF LABOUR	Working group	Members of the community	Total
Using wage labour only	-	-	-
Using family labour only	3	1	4
Combining family labour and wage labour	4	5	9
No information	1	1	2
TOTAL	8	7	15

Source: Field work, 1982-83

Most of the members of the community find their sustenance by working on the individual plots. Of the total number of head of families in the community, about 35% complement their incomes by labouring at the communal plateaus as members of the working group (15). Others, supplement their income by carrying out various activities in the commercial, transport and craftsmanship sectors. Although purchase is the general way by which peasants in this community acquire land property they also obtain it by working at the communal plateaus. In this sector one part is collectively cultivated, whereas the rest of communal land was distributed amongst the members of the community in order to be individually cultivated. The basic produce of this zone i.e. potatoes, is tended out collectively by the working group which consists of 31 members of the community most of them related each other by family ties. They are required to work two days per week in the communal plateau otherwise they have to pay a fine up to 100 sucres. In order to combine individual labour with the collective one, the members of the working group are allowed to be replaced by their kin or wage labourers hired by the group. From the production viewpoint the working group has been able to achieve success. There exists, however, a serious problem regarding misappropriation of the group's funds. In the harvest period members of the group's managing-board embezzled the profits so that at the end of the agricultural year a minimum of them is shared out amongst the members of the organization.

Owing to these problems and given the increasing pressure of the community, the working group underwent a process of disintegration. There are two alternatives for the peasants involved in such organizations: either they share out the communal lands among all the members of the community and so put an end to the existing working group, or they re-organize this peasant associative form while leaving out the small family group (e.g. Guerrero family) which has obtained most of the organization's benefits.

At present the communal plateau area is used in three different ways: a) individually, due to the 1970 distribution of half-plateau sector, b) collectively, in order to grow potatoes and rodger, c) as a reforestation area supported by the state institutions.

Jaloe La Playa community, including the working group, comprises basically of young population. The process of differentiation taking place within the community seems to originate with the working group. The kinship system facilitates it selectively, strengthening some of its members. After five years of communal production the members of the working group differentiated from the rest of the community members by means of the obtained profits (16).

c) The Jaloe El Rosario Community

The Jaloe El Rosario community is situated in Tungurahua centre-eastern sector, 10 kilometres from the populated centre of Quero, at 3,200 metres above sea level (see map 3 and table 9). In 1983, the estimated population of this community was about 355 people.

Jaloe El Rosario possesses communal plateaus which were distributed between the members to carry out family based production. There was only one early attempt to cultivate those areas collectively. Although the members of the community have achieved neither an economic nor an organizational success by means of the communal plateaus, their organization was successful in the invasion of lands of the Jaloe hacienda. This is one of the few conflicts of land that took place in the Quero area. Owing to the growth of the community population and the early disarticulation of the adjoining hacienda, local peasants started to break new ground in the natural forest areas. This satisfied some basic needs of the community members.

In appropriating these forest area the community confronted conflicts with the local landowners who considered themselves its owners. The appropriation of these lands by the landowning sector began through the sharecropping system, some community members were the basic labour-force in bringing forest areas into agricultural production. To carry out this process, the landowners provided the peasants with capital and technology (nowadays, a similar process is taking place in the plateau areas since the forest sectors already cultivated cannot satisfy the community needs. This type of land expansion is causing some ecological imbalances).

Jaloe El Rosario is an impoverished community, its members cannot afford the money for hiring wage labourers. The production is carried out by the peasant family, there also exist cases of reciprocity i.e. mutual-help and labour force exchange. Collective production was carried out only once by a working group formed by the community. During that agricultural year there were some problems within the community and the communal labour group, basically caused by a disregard of the organizations' rules i.e. while substitution of the members at work was not allowed, some of them managed to hire wage labourers and send them as their replacements to do the collective labour of the group. The community and the group then decided to lease the collective lands individually to each member of the community, 1 hectare per member at an annual cost of 200 sucres. In this way the working group was dissolved. In 1980 a land invasion took place, about 100 hectares of the uncultivated lands of the Jaloe hacienda were taken by the community members who immediately formed a new group for carrying out communal production, its productive plan did not succeed however. As far as the organization was concerned the group has been able to see it work. By means of purchase the members of this community, especially those forming the working group, acquire land property.

Because of the small area of the family plots, the majority of the peasants supplement their incomes by carrying out non-agricultural activities, particularly, in the commercial and craftsmanship sectors. Nevertheless a large number of the family members remain in the productive unit especially those over 12 years of age. There was no problem concerning labour-force requirements so that the working group was able to carry out successfully its organizational scheme. Table 16 gives information about organization of labour at family level in Jaloa El Kosario community.

The collective lands were devoted mainly to potatoes and broad bean cultivation. Most of the product was used to satisfy family needs, a small surplus only is marketed allowing the peasants to obtain some money to complement their daily food. In these lands the members of the working group have to work collectively two days per week during regular periods of labour force requirements. If they are unable to attend the collective working days, then, the members ought to pay individually a fine of 100 sucres per each non-attendance at every working day. They are not allowed to send instead any substitute. In this aspect they are in fact very strict since their last collective experience of labour failed due to disregard of the internal norms of the group. Economic success could be expected through collective production on the invaded lands, however, this was not the case. Thus, at the end of the agricultural year e.g. 1983 there were not profits to share out. The members of the group expressed the view that with the help of this organization they have obtained certain advantages in the political and organizational spheres.

**Table 16 JALOA EL ROSARIO: THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR ON FAMILY PLOTS
OF THE COMMUNITY**

TYPES OF LABOUR	Working group	Community members	Total
Using wage labour only	-	-	-
Using family labour only	7	4	11
Combining family labour and wage labour	-	-	-
No information	-	-	-
TOTAL	7	4	11

Source: Field work, 1982-83

Table 17 shows the model of communal management carried out in Jaloa El Rosario Community by the working group.

**Table 17 JALOA EL ROSARIO: THE WORKING GROUP AND ITS MODEL OF COMMUNAL
MANAGEMENT**

	FIRST YEAR	SECOND YEAR
Number of members	15	32
Cultivated area (hectares)	10	10
Type of cultivation	Potato and broad-beans	Potato and broad-beans
Monetary contributions	3.000 sucres	3.000 sucres
Working days contributed per member	48	4
Distribution of profits per member	-	*

* By the time the field work was carried out the second agricultural cycle just started, so that, it was impossible to know whether the group obtained profits or not.

Source: Field work, 1982-83

d) The San Nicolas Community

The San Nicolas community has some peculiar characteristics within the general context of the peasant organizations of Quero county. This community is situated in the high-southern zone of Quero towards the south of Tungurahua province, at 3.500 metres above sea level (see map 3 and table 9). In 1983 the estimated population of this community was about 313 people.

San Nicolas does not have access to communal plateaus since these lands belong to three local landowners who inherited one part and bought another to the hualcanga hacienda which owned the plateau areas before. These landowners are also founders of San Nicolas and consequently they are considered by the peasants as members of the community. Despite the fact that the community does not have any project for collective production, the State, by means of the Tungurahua Integral Rural Development Project (DRI-T), has considered it an interesting enough a case so as to carry out there some state programmes. The community comprises small and large owners of land (the category of "large owner" includes those who possess 20 hectares of land or more). The production in San Nicolas is carried out by the following types of units:

- i. A first consists of small owners of land, based on the peasant family labour and the mutual-help systems (especially labour-force exchange amongst relatives and/or friends).
- ii. A second consists of individuals already involved in a process of accumulation of capital and lands. They are essentially the local large owners of land i.e. the ex-landowners' families, ex-administrators and ex-functionaries of the hacienda, the foremen (mayordomos) offer an example of the latter. In this case land is

acquired by purchase and agricultural production is carried out through the hiring of labour-force (in San Nicolas, the daily wage average is 60 sucres plus food).

iii. The third type of production involved is based on the share-cropping system by which farms of type i. work in the land belonging to the individuals of type ii. Sometimes the system is inverted.

In this community, labour on the plot, is based on the nuclear family. Table 18 gives information about the organization of labour in San Nicolas.

Table 18 SAN NICOLAS: THE ORGANIZATION OF LABOUR ON FAMILY PLOTS OF THE COMMUNITY

TYPES OF LABOUR	Ex-sharecroppers	Members of the community	Total
Using wage labour only	-	-	-
Using family labour only	1	2	3
Combining family labour and wage labour	2	5	7
no information	-	-	-
TOTAL	3	7	10

Source: Field work, 1962-63

There are no expectations by the San Nicolas peasants to gain access to plateau areas or other communal lands. The members of the community ensure their subsistence by working on their individual plots and also hiring out their labour force within the community. There is a very low level of

migration particularly from San Nicolas. An increasing process of peasant differentiation is taking place in the community, the causes of which can be described as follows:

- i. The strong difference regarding the ecological conditions of the individual plots.
- ii. The present social situation of the ex-sharecroppers of the hacienda. These peasants are still subordinated in some ways to ex-landowners and to more powerful peasant units i.e. ex-functionaries of the hacienda.
- iii. The early accumulation of lands, which were bought at low costs, carried out by the ex-functionaries of the hacienda.
- iv. The sharecropping system still in existence.
- v. The access of only a minority of the community members to the plateau areas.
- vi. The type of leadership existing within the community i.e. one of ex-landowners and their relations who control the community, encouraging and conducting to their own benefit certain activities such as mingas (17).

IV.2.2.2 Manabi: Giving Priority to the Collective Work

At this stage we would like to emphasize the strategies of production implemented by the UFOCAM's base-organizations in order to use the few available resources as efficiently as possible. There has been to that purpose integration between labour, capital and the existing regional infrastructure. We shall illustrate this point by means of the following case studies:

a) The Union y Trabajo Pre-cooperative

The Union y Trabajo pre-cooperative is situated in the centre-western zone of Manabi province in "San Jose de las Penas" community, Rocafuerte county and parish (see map 5). It comprises 22 members or 33% of the total population of the community. It started with a collective area of 14 hectares, half of them leased land while the other half consisted of contributions of land by the founder members (some of them as small as 400 square metres). The organization operated initially on the basis of a credit provided by the National Development Bank so as to pay the cost of leasing lands. Thereafter new credit was acquired to carry out tomato cultivation.

According to the general plan of the pre-cooperative its members were collectively responsible for the cultivations on the integrated lands. Concerning the annual profit distribution it is to take place at the end of the agricultural year taking into account whether or not the members brought into the organization a piece of land and their individual contribution of labour. The annual benefits are divided into two parts, one is distributed in accordance with the amount of land individually integrated into the pre-cooperative, and the other one is shared out according to the total number of working days per member during the year. There are two working-periods per day, the first from 6.30 a.m. to 12 o'clock whose remuneration is 50 sucres and the second one from 1.30 p.m. to 4.30 p.m. whose payment is 25 sucres. This time-table was set up to give the members the opportunity to work full or part-time during the week i.e. from Monday to Saturday. As for replacements of labourers the organization does not allow it.

Although the resources of the pre-cooperative were never sufficient, the collective labour was successfully carried out. The agricultural production

could have had excellent results if the drought had not taken place. The organization underwent a serious crisis particularly regarding demands made by the members for increase in wages. As the pre-cooperative could not satisfy them, some of the members left. Those who resigned could not leave together with the initially integrated piece of land (only one member of the resigned group did integrate land into the organization). Before the drought Union y Trabajo carried out short-cycle cultivations i.e. tomato, watermelon, melon, maize, green pepper, broad beans, kidney beans and cucumber. During that period there was a large demand for labour force which required the participation of the peasant family to satisfy it. The distribution of profits took place in the two early years, in the third one the organization acquired the landownership which is being paid according to its possibilities. Besides the 7 hectares of leasing lands and the other 7 has. integrated by the members in the beginning some more adjoining lands were acquired so that the total area of the pre-cooperative amounted to 43 has. In 1982, owing to the drought, the agricultural projects came to a halt. There was no possibility of obtaining water to irrigate the "huertos" since the water in the region is very scarce. In addition some wells dug lately by the peasants have only salty water.

The Centre of Socio-economic Development for Manabi province (CRM) has supplied the local population with amount of water which was just enough for human consumption, but insufficient for the organization to irrigate lands. Another problem that Union y Trabajo has to face concerns emigration. Some peasant families have emigrated to Esmeraldas and Guayas provinces as well as to Santo Domingo de los Colorados county. Those who stayed in the region, waiting for the winter to come, were able to earn some money as wage-labourers which is not, however, a solution in the long run.

b) The Agua Blanca Commune

The Agua Blanca commune is situated in the south-western zone of Manabi province, in Machalilla parish, Jipijapa county (see map 5). The commune comprises 15.000 hectares which are at present considered as state property. Its boundaries have never been clearly established. In 1983, the estimated population of Agua Blanca was 284 people (44 families).

Because of the drought and the type of cultivation i.e. huertos, only a small communal area is used by the community members. Most of the communal lands consist of savannah, wasteland and mountainous sectors where timber is increasingly exploited. In these lands some peasant families, as many others in the communes of the region pick up firewood to be burned and sold later in the locality. They are also devoted to the breeding of goats. The members of this commune have expressed that although the State has itself constituted as the owner of a large communal area in the region, Agua Blanca still possesses an important sector of those lands. Table 19 shows the total area of this commune.

Once 15.000 hectares the communal lands of Agua Blanca were declared in 1979 state property, they became part of the reforestation programmes in the country under the name of "Machalilla National Park". Since then, Agua Blanca in alliance with other adjacent communes found itself in serious conflict with the State. These peasant organizations are demanding the government to turn, at least, part of the lands to them. This situation together with the drought lead to stagnation of the agricultural activities in the zone.

Table 19 AGUA BLANCA: THE LANDS OF THE COMMUNE

TYPE	NUMBER OF CUADRAS
Coffee plantations	97
Pasture land	43.5
Artificial grassland	8
Savannah	174
Wasteland	11
Uncultivated mountainous sectors	119
Area of dwellings and other constructions	36.5
TOTAL	489.0
Land average per member of the commune	10.2
Land average per member of the commune possessing land	10.7
Coffee plantation size average (there are 40 farms **)	2.4

** These are private property

Source: The German Volunteer Service in Ecuador, 1980
Elaborated by the author.

The collective production started with two communal Committee for working the huertos which were integrated by women and men separately and in different periods. They were formed during a crisis in the regional economy when the commune itself was looking for alternatives. The amount of land collectively exploited by them is only two hectares in both cases, and it is impossible to extend it due to the large shortage of water. The existing water supply is just enough for irrigating the present cultivated area. The irrigation of huertos, as all the activities of the agricultural cycle is carried out collectively. Initially, a newly formed Women Communal Committee watered the land by using buckets, they carried water from a well located near the communal centre, to the huertos. Later owing to some contributions provided by private agencies for rural development, the members of the commune built a

new well and a windmill in order to store water. The huertos main production consists of tomatoes and other additional products such as: lettuce, onion, cabbage, pepper, cucumber, parsley and watermelon. Before the drought, both the groups for communal production obtained very good harvests, so that there was a large surplus to be sold.

There is also an apicultural (honey production) programme in the commune whose successful results during the first two years have offered an important income source to the peasants. However, it does not seem to be viable in the short-term since there is a lack of flowers to ensure that the bees stay.

The Men Communal Committee formed in 1982 has tried to extend the huertos area, to this effect it has obtained the collaboration of the Women Group as well as the financial support of some rural development agencies. The organization of the collective labour has succeeded, however, it is not possible to be sure of the permanence of this organization, essentially, because of natural disasters i.e. the prolonged droughts and floods.

c) The Barquero Pre-cooperative

The Barquero pre-cooperative is situated in the north-western zone of Manabi province, in San Vicente parish, Sucre county (see map 5). In 1983, the estimated population of Barquero was 144 people or 24 families whose head-families have joined the pre-cooperative. There has been general economic depression in the area (caused basically by the drought) which has deeply affected the organization. Thus, at present, there does not exist any programme of communal production, and it can be said that this is a case of organization's slow disintegration. There were plans of transforming this organization into a fishing cooperative which would be very difficult given

the present conditions of Barquero. The pre-cooperative focussed on cotton cultivation which in the beginning was successful, so that its members decided to extend the area of cultivation taking a large loan provided by the National Development bank. When the drought came the whole programme of agricultural production failed. The members of the Barquero pre-cooperative were unable to pay the debt back. In addition to this serious problem the organization faces a high level of emigration. Its members are involved in many different economic activities. They work in timber and firewood exploitation (in places far away from the locality), as wage-labourers during specific times in urban sectors as well as in prawn enterprises which are increasingly set up in the whole province. The organization attempted recently to obtain a new credit, but the "Fomento" Bank refused to grant it. The UPOCAM, as the regional organization to which Barquero belongs, is trying now to implement in the area the communal huertos. Despite the serious difficulties that the members of the pre-cooperative face i.e. unfavourable ecological conditions, shortage of infrastructure and little capital to initiate the huertos, they see this possibility as the last resource in their wish for maintaining the organization.

IV.2.3 The Adaptation of Technology

As a consequence of the existing natural conditions in the two regional contexts pointed out earlier, there are two different types of production and use of technology. This is very clear on the family plots (whether or not they participate also in the collective production) on which agricultural produce is essentially devoted to the market. The State is strongly interested in strengthening this dynamic, thus, through its diverse governmental programmes it has provided the peasant organizations with the appropriate technical aid in order to lead the small and middle producers into

a process of more effective production. This is the way, according to the government, for the peasants to support the State's goals.

In the case of Manabi, as far as the UPOCAM's base-organizations is concerned, the adaptation of technology refers to the use of appropriate methods to the conditions of the area. They have been initiated by the second degree organization by means of agricultural promoters who operate with the support of private institutions for rural development. The appropriate technologies are successful with the organized peasants who after acquiring the knowledge, take the responsibility of diffusing it in the first degree organizations. Those methods aim to improve cultivations, to facilitate irrigation systems, to increase and improve grafts, prepare seedlings, etc. They are imparted during the meetings for experimental cultivations and also through the training courses carried out by UPOCAM in the majority of the first degree organizations i.e. pre-cooperatives, cooperatives, communes, associations and committee.

In summing up the strategies of production in Tungurahua and Manabi, it should be stressed that the peasant associative forms are more viable in such a depressed contexts where the peasants are compelled to confront the crisis through the organizations. As was pointed out earlier, not only the type of strategy that the peasants use in order to ensure their subsistence is in question but also the way the organized members integrate resources into the actual labour systems. The integration of minifundia was a coherent measure initiated by UPOCAM for that purpose in the central zone of Manabi province where a good many of large properties and a very wide sector of minifundia coexist. It is also important to emphasize the UPOCAM's initiative to enhance cooperation as a means to spread and consolidate the communal huertos. The collective labour is, in these cases, the core of the strategies of production

implemented by the peasant associative forms.

Should resources be available we can think of certain conditions which make possible the permanence of the forms of cooperation, i.e. investments of capital and labour force in a profitable production for the market. On the other hand, there are methods of organization able to strengthen the associative forms of production. The integration of plateau areas in Quero into the agricultural production and the diffusion of successful experiences are good illustrations of that. The type of management as well as the links and internal arrangements taking place in the base organizations are factors which determine success in communal production. We cannot refer to it all as permanent organizations for the communal production, since as structures the family units proved stronger than the communal ones. Nonetheless, at least in certain situations some strategies of production have been very effective allowing the collective sphere to operate. In this sense effective family units together with a strong and centralizing authority, give collective structures major possibilities to obtain stability and success.

CHAPTER V

VIABILITY OF THE PEASANT ASSOCIATIVE FORMS

THE CASES OF TUNGURAHUA (QUERO) AND MANABI

(Comparison and Analysis)

- SECOND PART -

V.1 The Strategies of Organization

The internal arrangements of the peasant associative forms show diverse degrees of efficiency. These aim at consolidating, in some cases, the sphere of cooperation and, in others, the sphere of production. These organizations are important structures for the State to establish relationships with the peasantry. They are essentially responsible for negotiating resources with the institutions external to peasant communities as well as for distributing them internally. Moreover, the organization is a framework in which, a series of complex social relationships take place: the emergence and development of a power structure, is a case in point. The base-organizations have more possibilities for gaining access to resources so far as there exists a major organizational entity playing the role of a mediator between the internal and external contexts.

Synthesis-Table

	<u>Tungurahua</u>	<u>Nanabi</u>	<u>Tungurahua</u>	<u>Nanabi</u>
			Organizations while searching their viability strengthen some important elements:	
Forms of organization	Working groups	Pre-cooperatives/cooperatives	From traditional communes to market-oriented organizations	Base-organizations taking part in programmes
The internal structure of the organizations	<pre>graph TD; A[Levels of efficiency] --> B[Family chieftdom]; A --> C[Sharing decisions]; B --> D[Leadership]; C --> D;</pre>		<pre>graph TD; A[Self-management/negotiation authoritarian/democratic political/organizational] --> B[The peasantry relates to the State through the base-organizations]; A --> C[The base-organizations themselves relate to the regional organization];</pre>	
The base-organizations and their external contacts	State institutions	Regional organization	The peasantry relates to the State through the base-organizations	The base-organizations themselves relate to the regional organization

V.1.1 The basic Forms of Organization

V.1.1.1 Quero: Organizational Diversity

Some organizations in the area were set up by the peasants in order to defend their lands i.e. Communes, and their properties i.e. Juntas for the peasant defence. Other organizational processes occurred as the result of external initiative particularly of the private and state institutions which while giving support to the rural sector started to readjust organizations set up by peasant initiative. Thus, a large number of peasant associative forms can be found with more or less specific objectives. The legal recognition of the

first communes in this area took place in 1959, all of them were established to overcome peasant conflicts concerning boundaries of communal lands and/or ways of gaining access to resources, especially water. Communes like Punachiza, Shaushi and Pueblo Viejo are a good illustrations of the problem. The juridical recognition has always been a very important requirement enabling the peasants to apply for the intervention of the law and of the Ministry of Social Welfare as their central link with the State.

In 1965, after the majority of communes were legally recognized, the peasants attempted to channel resources from either the State or the private institutions to the rural areas. Thus, Communes-State relationships increased during the 1970s. The Quero communes were readjusted in accordance with the 1972 legislation about the use of plateau areas. The law stated that plateau lands under unproductive exploitation ought to revert to the State. Under this legislation, the legal recognition of plateau lands started at the same time when a contract for tilling those lands was also established between the commune and the State. By means of this contract the State pressed the peasants to form agricultural organizations to carry out communal production on the plateaus. The use of these areas by family units only was forbidden by law.

In 1972, some Quero communities began to bring the plateau lands into collective agricultural production. In 1977 this became official while simultaneously it became evident that the Law of Communes was devoid of a conception of the commune as economic entity. It was never considered by the law as an economic and productive structure, but as one of political and administrative character. In this sense, the commune was only a geographical division smaller than the parish and formed by a minimum of 50 people over 18 years of age. The legislation did not provide any criterion for carrying out

communal production, but it encouraged the establishment of cooperatives. Thus, peasants interested in the collective production formed the working groups or agricultural associations, so that a new type of organization was superimposed on the commune.

The institutions which conducted rural development programmes in the zone played very important roles in training peasant leaders and also in offering the organizations optimistic prospects in the short and long terms. However, the organizations have not been able to establish themselves as the structures which would represent the most important demands of the peasantry and also as mediators with the external sphere. Table 20, gives information about the organizations existing in the different communities of Quero county.

During 1973-1974 there was an attempt to form a second degree organization to represent, at regional level, all the communes existing in Quero. It did not succeed then and it is only now that local peasants are considering the idea by means of the Peasant Coordinating Committee which was formed with the support of the DRI-Tungurahua Project. In 1961, the Junta for the Peasant Defence was set up in the Guambalo zone (Pelileo county) by the initiative of the local priest. It was aimed at putting an end to the bands of robbers of cattle and other peasant properties. This type of organization acquired juridical recognition by the Ministry of Government and it was greatly welcomed by the peasants. It was not only a vigilance Junta but also an associative form which eventually stimulated the community development. Thereafter, there was an attempt to form a provisional Federation of Juntas but it was never consolidated. Thus, in the Quero zone, the Juntas for peasant defence continue to operate at diverse levels of importance supported by the law.

Table 20

QUERO: PEASANT ORGANIZATIONS EXISTING IN DIFFERENT
COMMUNITIES OF THE COUNTY

COMMUNITIES	JUNTA FOR PEASANT DEFENCE	AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATION	WATER JUNTA	PARENTS' COMMITTEE	IMPROVE FERT'S COMMITTEE	CLUBS
Jalao La Playa	x	x		x		x
Pilco	x	x		x		x
Pueblo Viejo	x	x		x		
Shaushi	x					
El Placer	x	x		x		x
Jalao El Rosario	x	x		x		
Sabanag	x	x				
Hualcanga Santa Anita	x	x		x		x
Hualcanga San Luis	x	x		x		
Hualcanga San Francisco	x	x		x		x
Hualcanga Chico	x	x				
Guangalo						
Llimpe	x	x	x			x
San Vicente			x	x		
Punachiza	x	x		x		x
Quimbe	x				x	x
Chocalo						
Hipolanguito (1)	x	x				x
Rumipamba				x		x
Yayulihui			x	x		x
Hipolongo				x		
San Miguel						
Mochapata				x	x	
Cruz de Mayo (2)						
Yanayacu (3)				x		x

Notes: (1) It includes San Antonio and San Nicolas, the latter without legal recognition. (2) Without juridical recognition. (3) This community has acquired the category of "parish" in 1972.

Source: Ministry of Agriculture, 1975, Field work, 1982-83.
Elaborated by the author.

Once the Water Law was passed in 1972, water Juntas were established in the zone. It was necessary to organize the peasants in order to regulate the use and distribution of the irrigation channels. Besides, the organizations were useful instruments to avoid conflicts over water not only with haciendas but also with other communities.

There are also other types of organization such as the Peasant Committee aimed at supporting the educational activities of the schools, the Pro-improvements Committee concerned with the infrastructure works, and diverse Clubs e.g. Mothers, Sports, etc.

On the whole these organizations do not operate in coordination, neither do they take into account the complex rural life when defining their aims. Moreover, within the communities, a strong rivalry and a series of power conflicts amongst the peasants are taking place. The existing legislation which regulates peasant associative forms has not contributed to the solution of this problem, but on the contrary has caused much confusion due to a lack of specific criteria regarding peasant cooperation.

To carry on its programmes the government established links with the organizations which are the potential clients of the State. Thus, these organizations are a necessary link between peasantry and State. The organizations moreover, are socio-economic structures where local family economies can be reproduced and where some goals are given priority e.g. the consolidation of communal production, the enhancing of internal democracy or the generation of mechanisms to ease the relationship with the State.

Within the Quero context, an interesting fact was the initiation of the working groups as the organizational structures aimed at integrating the

plateau areas into the agricultural production. The first attempt to use the communal plateaus took place in 1976 in the Pilco community. It was then that an informal group formed by peasants from the communities of Pilco, Nipoongo and Hocha gathered in order to break new ground where potatoes were later sown. This group faced strong opposition, firstly from the Pilco's Cabildo whose members did not rely very much on the working group, foreseeing the loss of the communal lands, and secondly, from the landowners of the high zone who used a large plateau area for cattle raising, and were to be deprived of these lands. This opposition was to continue as against the various attempts by the peasants to incorporate those lands in agriculture:

"There was a group of betters off up there which was all the time against us, making threats against the working group... They had their properties beside the plateaus which were for years and years an exclusive privilege for them to breed cows and sheep" (L.R. 1982, interview).

A series of problems which were pointed out above as well as the shortage of capital, caused the failure of the working group.

The second attempt took place in 1976 when a working group was finally set up to carry out for the first time collective agricultural production in the communal plateaus. It comprised of 11 members who received technical assistance from the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG). Many resisted the group since they were afraid the Ministry of Agriculture would confiscate the produce:

"Everybody says that once the crops are harvested the MAG's people or the government will come here to take the

crops away. So, all the members of the group are afraid of it" (H.G. 1982, interview).

When the first agricultural cycle was successfully accomplished new peasants entered the working group so that the total number of members increased to 35. In 1981, a new conflict took place when some peasants of Pilco community, who in the beginning rejected to join the working group, expressed their wish to become members of the organization convinced now by the successful results of the agricultural production. As a condition for the interested peasants to enter the group, the initial group demanded up to 20,000 sucres in recognition of the labour invested by the founders, especially as they broke virgin lands in the plateau areas. The new people considered it an extremely high price and in response decided to form a new group to cultivate other areas of the plateaus. The Ecuadorean Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization intervened in the conflict, pointing out that its policy does not allow the proliferation of working groups in the communal areas. Nevertheless, the new group took possession of some plateau lands and began to break new ground. In this way, the second group consisting of 45 members established its existence and the whole community became involved in collective production. However, some of the initial members in both groups resigned later their membership so that in 1983 there were 29 members in group one and 41 in group two.

Simultaneously to these communal forms of cooperation a new type of organization was formed. It is an association devoted to cattle raising and integrated by 12 well-to-do members of the Pilco community, Mocha and Ambato. They had acquired in 1970, 2,000 hectares in the plateau areas of the Yanayacu hacienda. The association paid for those lands 570,000 sucres. It should be stressed that this association does not function as a collective structure. Its members use individually the plateaus for grazing, and also they can keep

there a maximum of 50 cows. One sector of the plateaus has been divided in order to incorporate part of it in agriculture by cultivating potatoes. The leadership of the association is trying to establish some mechanisms to carry out communal production in these lands. It would be based on milk production, cultivation of cereals or bullfighting raising. However, this proposition has not been welcomed by the members who do not foresee economic success in this matter.

It is interesting to observe that within the existing organizational diversity in the Quero area, the working groups implemented, as it was pointed out above, certain strategies which made these organizations into viable structures. Jaloa La Playa is an important case where the community as well as the working group are conducted by the same people. They are leaders belonging to powerful family clans who are well known along the county. It can be said that the working group in this community has achieved a relative success regarding its management. However, some of the benefits of the group have been monopolized by the leadership.

In impoverished zones as the Jaloa El Rosario community for instance, the organizational systems seem to have a better structure. In this sense peasant associative forms of production are also interested in strengthening solidarity and reciprocity amongst their members. In the case of the Rosario community, the first organization set up by the peasants was the Association of Agricultural Producers which comprised 12 head-families devoted to collective cultivation in the communal plateaus which were handed over in 1976 to the community by the IERAC.

There was little interest in carrying out collective work since the number of people interested in exploiting the communal plateaus was not important. This

situation continued for two years until 1980 when owing to the failure of the collective labour, the Cabildo -as the governing structure of the community- decided to share out the communal plateaus amongst the members of the Rosario community by means of land leasing system. In this new alternative all the members of the community participated despite state's opposition, particularly from the functionaries of the Tungurahua Rural Development Project (DRI-IT).

In 1980 the majority of the members of the Rosario community decided to take possession of some lands belonging to the Hernan Vasconez Sevilla's hacienda to which the local peasants were linked, as labour force, during many years. To this effect a new organization was formed, however, once the lands were taken, the group was weakened by strong opposition not only from local landowners and some of the State functionaries, but also from some members of the group, ex-labourers of the Vasconez Sevilla's hacienda with whom they still have certain links. These latter peasants suggested that the organization should buy the already taken lands, however, the rest of the group did not approve of that idea, so that the hacienda's ex-labourers renounced the organization. Other members of the group also resigned since they were afraid of reprisals.

In spite of these problems, the working group has been able to maintain within the organization at least 40% of the members of the Rosario community (about 20 families) who already started to carry out communal production. Although the working group has been strongly supported by the Rosario community, the State institutions have given little attention to this form of cooperation. The lands which are cultivated by the group, have not been definitely handed over by IERAC to the peasants. On the whole, the organization faces a series of economic problems and conflicts. It can be predicted with fair certainty that in the long term the working group will not be viable.

As for the rest of organizations existing in Quero which are not involved in productive activities e.g. Parents Committee, Juntas for the Peasant Defence, Pro-improvements Committee, etc. we can state that they were able to achieve a coherent and functional operation because their members are not required to make large payments, neither they have obligations towards the organization in the long run.

V.1.1.2 Consolidating a Specific Type of Organization

The peasant associative forms belonging to UPOCAM show an interesting peculiarity in the sense that the majority of them have not been basically set up as production structures. The second degree organization which works essentially with cooperatives or pre-cooperatives tries to transform forms of cooperation into the organizational core of the communities. The first degree organizations then, have to be strongly linked to the communal sphere, and to the various scopes of the local life e.g. production, festivities, infrastructure, health, education, housing, local sanitation, etc. UPOCAM has played an important role as a mediator in serious conflicts which took place usually between cooperatives and communes.

The great diversity and frequent superposition of organizations as in the Quero zone does not exist in this region. The cooperatives, in general, when carrying out their programmes try to include the minor local organizations in them. The UPOCAM's base-organizations have succeeded in this respect, essentially because their objectives respond to common interests, having also a diffusive effect amongst the population of the locality. A central role played by UPOCAM so far refers to its capacity to order the diverse activities and programmes of the base organizations and to channel resources from the

external context towards the forms of cooperation existing in the region.

V.1.2 The Internal Articulation of the Organizations

At this stage it is important to analyse the various levels of efficiency that the peasant associative forms have been able to achieve. In Quero, it refers especially to the organizational structure of some working groups, and in Manabi it refers essentially to the regional (second degree) organization. The internal adjustments carried out by the organizations are in a way an answer to their first objective i.e. the transformation of the peasant associative forms into elements of "self-management and negotiation with the outside context" (UPOCAM: "Camino", Peasant bulletin, 1982-83). In this sense, diverse organizations have elected their governing bodies on the basis of certain criteria as for instance: the peasants who have been appointed to lead the groups ought to be good mediators between the external institutions, particularly those belonging to the State and the organizations. In many cases, the leadership of the forms of cooperation is formed by the fairly rich peasants of the locality.

The Pilco community in the Quero zone is one of the cases where collective participation of the members almost does not exist, especially regarding important matters of the organizations. The poorest peasants in particular, seem to have no interest in cooperation, they do not make any proposals, neither do they aspire to any kind of change concerning the social dynamic taking place within the organizations. Therefore, decisions are usually made by the managing-boards whose members do not participate directly in the collective labour, being rather involved in control of the coordination of works and the financial activities. This situation, some times, has caused problems and conflicts amongst the members of the working groups. The

relationship between Working Group and Cabildo has been established by their leaders since the members of the Cabildo's governing body are also members of the working groups. This fact has avoided, until now, the conflict between both organizations. In 1960, some members of group two took over the Pilco's Cabildo in order to legitimate the existence of the group within the community. Before that, the Cabildo was fully formed by members of group one. Table 21 gives information about the Presidents of the Cabildo as well as the Working groups in Pilco community.

The leading members of the organizations tend to exchange duties between themselves so that all of them remain within the managing-boards in charge of specific activities. The other members of the governing bodies do not belong to the well-to-do peasant sector, thus, the poor peasants have in fact some representation. Nevertheless, they do not have an alternative project or position.

Table 21 PILCO: THE PRESIDENTS OF THE CABILDO AND THE WORKING GROUPS
IN THE COMMUNITY, SOME CHARACTERISTICS, 1980-82

PRESIDENTS	ORGANIZATION CONTROLLED BY THE PRESIDENT	YEAR	MEMBERSHIP WORKING GROUPS		VALUE OF THE PROPERTY* sacres	ECONOMIC ACTIVITIES occupation
			N1	N2		
Guillermo Urrutia	Cabildo	1980		x	320.856	agriculture/ transport
Guillermo Urrutia	Cabildo	1981		x	320.856	agriculture/ transport
Gustavo Marino	Cabildo	1982		x	**	agriculture/ transport
Raul Lozada	Working Group N1	1982	x		191.030	agriculture/ transport/ commerce
Hugo Gavilanez	Working Group N2	1982		x	573.269	agriculture/ transport

Notes: * information according to the Cadastral Assessments of Properties.

** No information.

Source: National Office of Cadastral Assessments ONAC 1981.

Field work, 1982-83.

Elaborated by the author.

The table shows some interesting characteristics concerning the economic activities of the leading members. These individuals do not have exclusive interests in agriculture, they keep close relationships with other economic sectors i.e. transport and commerce. However, they present themselves as agricultural producers. Thus, for instance, during the National Strike of the Transport Sector in October 1982, serious supplying problems occurred in the most important cities of the country, since the demand of agricultural

products increased enormously. Those peasants-drivers managed to carry products to the market breaking their solidarity with the transport sector to which they belong, but supporting the agricultural producers.

It needs to be stressed that in all the cases, as much in Manabi as in Quero, peasant negotiations with the State are highly important for gaining access to resources. Thus, for instance, UPOCAM is the negotiator with the State and other public and private institutions which have been required by this regional organization to establish some kind of written agreement in order to carry out rural development projects in the peasant areas. UPOCAM has given priority to the strengthening of self-management as well as to the establishment of a governing structure in which the members are to take responsibilities in rotation, so as to handle not only the internal matters of the organizations but also those concerning the external context. According to UPOCAM, it is an important incentive for those peasants who are interested in taking part in leadership. Simultaneously, it is an element of training for the organized members and a factor to promote internal democracy.

There is, therefore, within the various base-organizations a continuous flow of information and a sharing of the decisions. It is interesting to observe that UPOCAM not only train some of its members to negotiate with the State and to diffuse this knowledge, but also that this organization tries to make the peasants conscious of the fact that UPOCAM's role is in a context controlled by the State. The second degree organization has given particular emphasis to preparing the diverse peasant associative forms to cope with the administrative sphere of the state apparatus e.g. to the performance of paperwork required by the bureaucratic sector, the political actions at local and regional levels, etc. UPOCAM is conscious of its limitations, essentially, of impossibility to be stronger than the government as far as these matters

are concerned. Peasants tried to learn from state institutions the way to deal with cooperation methods when running their own organizations.

Other important elements to be considered within the internal function of the organizations are those of their democratic and authoritarian character. The Jaloa La Playa community in the Quero zone, represents a situation where the productive programmes have been carried out using authoritarian proceedings. There is a family-chieftom in this case which controls the local dynamic. It seems that although these types of organization have achieved favourable results concerning economic management, they appear to be bodiless entities without prospects for the collective production. In Manabi case the UPOCAM has tried to enhance the democratic factors. Thus, the regional organization plays an important role when planning programmes and making decisions which are known and discussed by the organized peasants, however, the responsibility for carrying them out, possibly with modifications, is entirely up to the base-organizations.

We shall illustrate this situation so as to comprehend the diverse phases that UPOCAM went through during its early relationship with the government. The peasant participation by then underwent some problems.

- a) In the beginning, UPOCAM appeared to act as the "spokesman" of a State Project i.e. The Fund for Rural Development of Marginal Areas (FODEMUMA). The demands expressed by the regional organization were determined to some extent by the objectives of FODEMUMA. This fact caused certain fragmentation within UPOCAM, the base disagreed with the leading members, giving place to a series of conflicts and to the disruption of communication between both levels.

- b) In carrying out the state programmes, FODERCHA lead to a feeling of frustration among the organized peasants who pressed UPOCAM for putting an end to its relationship with this state institution. UPOCAM tried to strengthen its links with the base-groups, to know their opinions, proceeding afterwards to implement its own projects e.g. internal training, giving special attention to the promoter groups, women committee, programmes of education, agricultural development, health and local sanitation, etc. However, most of the debates, discussions and decisions took place in the leadership the base being still diminished.
- c) Within the various programmes implemented by UPOCAM with the base-organizations it is possible to find more coherent objectives. At the same time peasant demands tend to be more specific. The leadership has become stronger and at present it is able to propose more concrete plans. Nevertheless, the promoters who are considered the bridge between the base and the managing committee, has not come to strengthen the link between both levels. For a long period UPOCAM discussed whether to maintain the promoter group, who seemed to become an elite within the second degree organization. They continued to exist as a useful structure and the organization attempted to give them a new character as a means to improve the relationship between the base and the leading members. There were a number of courses and meetings by UPOCAM for the majority of peasants to participate, and also weekly sessions for the Cabildo to discuss communal affairs. Peasant participation is a central element within the programmes conducted by the regional organization and it takes place together with the state intervention, UPOCAM, however, has overcome early negative experiences with governmental institutions and nowadays it has acquired the right for

imposing conditions on institutions which carry out rural development projects. Simultaneously it argues over the State's proposals, analyses the government's objectives and puts limits on intervention outside the organization.

The organizational and party political dimensions of the peasant associative forms should be considered even though this is not the major point of our discussion. As it was pointed out before, the forms of cooperation in quero give priority to production while the organizational level, on the whole, lacks importance. Party political activities have been rarely carried out without participation of the majority of peasants. In Manabi, on the contrary, UPOCAM was able to generate some mechanisms to consolidate the organizational sphere.

One of the measures developed by UPOCAM and supported by the base was the creation of labour opportunities as economic alternatives which eventually enhance cooperation. They are also seen as checks to the emigration process.

Groups of organized peasants have been trained to use resources obtained from different sources, and to execute a series of tasks aimed at promoting and consolidating the collective labour. The fact that UPOCAM has given priority to matters of cooperation does not necessarily mean that the party political element is absent from the discussions and struggles of the regional organization. However, that is not the factor to be consolidated for the moment since it is not clear to what extent the political question is posed by the peasant organizations in national terms, and also, in which circumstances it has a different meaning when regional matters are at stake. Obviously, peasant demands at regional level differ and are of more specific character. This fact, therefore, makes more difficult to understand the UPOCAM's ways of

participation in the national politics. According to this organization views however, it is essential to other demands which would answer the interests of different members of rural communities. The peasantry should establish alliances with other groups which would give peasants an opportunity to influence the national politics. UPOCAM has also discussed the participation of non-peasants institutions and its political activities. Peasants through the UPOCAM have strongly criticized the Ecuadorean Left which tended to disperse, rather than integrate political forces supported by the peasant associative forms.

V.1.3 The base-Organizations and their External Relations

Although the base-organizations and their external relations are better analysed when we refer to the state intervention, it is important to emphasize here a certain point. In the Quero (Tungurahua) case, the State is a necessary link between peasant organizations and society, in this sense, the whole peasant dynamic of this sector is closely related to the state action. In the case of Manabi the actual presence of the State is mediated by the second degree organization (UPOCAM). The base-organizations, themselves, relate to the regional organization.

The relationship between the first degree organizations and UPOCAM is based on a mutual agreement and not on complex procedures. Thus, it is not possible in this context to refer to affiliation at least in the formal sense of the word. This type of connection has given the base-organizations a high level of assurance and independence. The Union y Trabajo pre-cooperative, on the other hand, is strongly linked to UPOCAM, the latter participates in the former's preparations of programmes as well as in searching for alternative labour sources. In the case of Agua Blanca community where the non-peasant

institutions have implemented various development projects, UPOCAM respected the internal autonomy of the base-organizations. UPOCAM's role in the communal programmes of Agua Blanca was always decided by the base-organization. For this community the most important duty of the regional organization is to play the role of a mediator with the external sphere. In this sense UPOCAM is the censor and regulator of all the rural development programmes coming from outside implemented in the peasant areas.

The case of Barquero pre-cooperative, on the other hand, shows a weak relationship with UPOCAM due to a lack of interest expressed by the pre-cooperative in the general and sectional programmes of the regional organization. Barquero began working as one of the UPOCAM's first degree associations, next it decided to work with one of the state projects, i.e. FODERUMA, without establishing any relationship with peasant associative forms in the region. Having continuously failed in carrying out rural development programmes with the support of the State, the pre-cooperative finally decided to reenter UPOCAM, however, its members do not show a special interest in the projects of the Regional Organization.

To sum up briefly the issue concerning the organizational strategies it is important to underline that the internal arrangements of the peasant associative forms determine their diverse degrees of efficiency. The internal structure is aimed at consolidating, in some cases, aspects of cooperation and, in others, the sphere of production. However, production is not the only reason which makes possible the existence of the communal forms. Peasant organization is an important element for the State relations with the peasantry. It is also an appropriate structure to negotiate resources with external agents and to distribute those resources internally amongst the peasants. In this way a peasant organization can be considered as an

important sphere where the peasant dynamic takes place. Nonetheless, peasant associative forms are also the framework of various and complex social relationships i.e. the existing power structure capable of controlling the decisions made by the peasants, and the increasing process of social differentiation where the emergence of rich peasant sectors is weakening the sense of cooperation amongst the associations. From the economic viewpoint, the well-to-do peasants have been certainly favoured e.g. in the case of Quero. At times, the second degree or regional organizations try to neutralize these types of situation by using pressure to preserve the base-organizations.

V.2 The State Intervention

The state intervention does not guarantee the viability of the peasant associative forms. It is possible to find in both cases, Quero and Manabi, important levels of peasant autonomy. The State offers only an element of mediation to the organizations. Besides, it has not been itself constituted in the present "organizer" of the social relationships in the two regions. There are regional differences regarding the state intervention. Owing to the conditions of economic depression in Manabi areas there is a relative convergence between the state proposals and those of the peasants concerning the development of the forms of cooperation and the implementation of certain mechanisms to face the crisis.

Synthesis-Table

	<u>Tungurahua</u>	<u>Manabi</u>	<u>Tungurahua</u>	<u>Manabi</u>
			The type of state intervention.	
The juridical-political frame	The commune and other organizations	Cooperatives and communes		
Specific policies	Centralization of the policies through the Tungurahua Project (DRI-T)	De-centralization and presence of various institutions	As a mediator between organizations and the sphere of resources	
The State and the Organizations, Human and Financial resources	A reduced group of functionaries serving a large peasant population	Agreements between the regional Organization and the State	Technical	Political

V.2.1 The Juridical-Political Frame of the Peasant Associative Forms

In the Tungurahua context, the community means an organizational alternative for the peasant groups to get themselves involved in a process of change and development. The case of Quero illustrates the transformation of a traditional community into one of strong penetration of capital. There, the community has been used by diverse powerful local groups as a mechanism for exercising their power and for strengthening their social prestige. This case also shows a process of development quite different from the one taking place amongst the communities located in the so-called "refuge's zones" i.e. those sectors scarcely incorporated in the capitalist dynamic and having a rather poor level of agricultural production. From the economic viewpoint, the maintenance of the communal agriculture can be understood as an element for generating an appropriate labour market so as to favour the development of the

well-to-do peasants. The communal work gives occupational opportunities to the poor peasant sectors, decreasing simultaneously the migration-rate. This in turn provides an answer to the labour force demands by the prosperous peasant economies.

Regarding the juridical-political position of the peasant communities in this region, there are two categories to be considered:

- a) The first one refers to certain groups of affinity existing within the communities which share a variety of tasks and are themselves represented by some of their members. The joint activities vary from the collective agricultural labour to the preparations of local festivities. Under this category one can also consider those peasant groups set up essentially in contexts of economic depression in order to carry out productive activities through specific mechanisms of mutual-help and reciprocity. On the other hand, in more commercialized contexts there are a series of complex mediations and relationships amongst the groups where money is a central element.
- b) The second category refers to the community in general as an element of mediation with the external world. At this level, the peasant communities are not required to obtain juridical recognition, though it can exist. In any case, the community is linked to the State as well as to other social agents and can freely express its demands and defend its patrimony. Although the diverse groups and social sectors existing in the community can be represented separately there is a tendency towards establishing an integrated group to represent the interests of the community.

The Quero zone according to the law is divided into 23 communities following basically a geographical criterion. Legally, all the inhabitants of a community are part of it, but in actuality, it is not so. The community is a form of cooperation characterized by a high degree of heterogeneity regarding its forms of social dynamic.

The economic and social aspects of the communities have not been recognized in the legislation. However, once this type of organization is set up and its role as a mediator with the external world begins, the juridical element becomes highly important.

The process of development of the peasant organizations in this region of the Ecuadorean Highlands, has not only included the community but also other associative forms of agricultural production which have diverse juridical modalities i.e. pre-cooperatives, cooperatives, associations of agricultural workers and communes.

Table 22 gives information about the number of these organizations existing in Tungurahua province during 1960 and 1980.

The cooperative system is not of great importance in Tungurahua. The majority of the peasants in this province have opted for the commune as the most appropriate form of cooperation whose antecedents are previous to the 1960s, and also for the agricultural association which is a recent form of peasant organization. Table 22 is based on the information about peasant associative forms legally recognized by the State. Therefore, many communes, which were in fact functioning by then without juridical recognition have not been taken into account.

Unfortunately there is no information, at provincial level, about the number of organizations which possess and cultivate communal lands. According to the 1974 Agrarian Census (whose information is not quite reliable) there are 25 production organizations in Tungurahua -taking into account communes, cooperatives and agricultural associations- which hold 24,335 hectares or 10% of the total provincial area.

**Table 22 TUNGURAHUA: NUMBER OF COMMUNES, ASSOCIATIONS AND COOPERATIVES
IN THE PROVINCE, 1960 AND 1980**

TYPES OF ORGANIZATION	1960		1980	
	Number of Organizations	Total Members	Number of Organizations	Total Members
Communes	83	*	159	68,665
Associations	-	-	18	*
Cooperatives	7	641	55	2,404

Notes: * No information

Source: Archives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock, Ecuadorian Institute for Agrarian Reform and Colonization, Hurtado and Herudek, 1974.

Elaborated by the author.

This information does not mention the various forms of exploitation of these lands, neither the ways of organizing production within these collective forms. Peasant associative forms of production in this zone are of no great importance. These organizations tend to dissolve given place to agricultural units cultivated by the families who were part of the organizations. The general experience of this area allows to state that the long run existence of cooperatives for agricultural production cannot be guaranteed.

An interesting aspect is the existence of communes without communal lands. The following table gives information in this regard.

**Table 23 TUNGURAHUA: COMUNES WITH AND WITHOUT COMMUNAL LANDS
IN THE PROVINCE, 1978**

REGION	NUMBER OF COMUNES with communal land	NUMBER OF COMUNES without communal land	TOTAL
Tungurahua	26	127	153
Sierra	250	1.068	1.318

Source: Proano, 1982
Elaborated by the author.

At present there are few communes holding communal lands. The majority of those organizations either have lost them or they have never possessed collective lands. A distinction should be made here. Not all of the communes which have acquired juridical recognition belong to the traditional type (by "traditional" we mean any commune set up during or after the colonial period, having a specific statute and recognition by which it was possible to distinguish it, explicitly, from the hacienda. This traditional organization has been denominated by certain Ecuadorean literature as "free community"). Many communes have their origins in state programmes concerning agrarian reform and/or community development.

An attempt was made in 1981 to estimate the total land area held under communal exploitation. Table 24 gives information regarding the estimated total area of communal lands in 1981 in Tungurahua province.

The juridical recognition is in fact an useful instrument for the peasant

organizations to carry out their external relationships (i) and above all to channel resources, particularly agricultural credits. In the case of organizations which have been established within the community, not being legally recognized, they ought to turn to the community as a juridical structure for managing external affairs. This fact caused many conflicts since the interests of the organizations, in many cases, are dissimilar. Moreover some of the traditional communities undergo process of disintegration.

The degree of disintegration of traditional communities may be very serious since in these cases the community tends to be an organizational structure for channelling important levels of relationship between the peasants and the State. The community seems to be a structure which comprises many peasant units among which the permanent bases to lay the foundations for communal relationships have not been established.

Table 24 TUNGURAHUA: ESTIMATED TOTAL AREA OF COMMUNAL LANDS*
IN THE PROVINCE, 1981
(in hectares)

REGION	TOTAL COMMUNAL area	TOTAL AGRICULTURAL area	%
Tungurahua	17.880	149.412	11.9
Sierra	126.150	27954.065	4.2

Notes: * Unfortunately it has not been possible to know what was exactly meant by commune and communal lands. Neither it is clear whether such terms included the existence of systems of usufruct or communal possession as far as cattle raising in plateau areas is concerned.

Source: Proano, 1981
 Elaborated by the author.

When the Spanish arrived in Ecuador in 1534, the indigenous population was concentrated in the Andean valleys. The Sierra Indians had developed agriculture and lived in well-established communities. The Andean villages fell easy victims to the Spanish need for a permanent labour supply. The encomienda system introduced to protect the Indians from Spanish rapacity, became the feudal hacienda which bound the Indians to the soil. In contrast, the littoral was scarcely settled by tribes at a lower level of cultural development. When the Spaniards tried to subject the coastal tribes they fled into the jungle (2).

In the case of Manabi, especially in the Jipijapa sector, the commune seems to have an ancient but different origin. The Spanish crown attempted to protect the rights of the Indian lands by providing for tenure in common. Thus, by the Royal Decree (Cedula Real) of 15 April, 1541 of King Carlos V, communal settlements were established for the local Indians to usufruct them freely. Those areas known then as reducciones (initial systems of indigenous relocation) were considered by the Spanish conquerors as mechanism to control the Coastal Indians who could not be dominated in the same way as the indigenous population of the Sierra. As a large number of coastal Indians could not be assimilated by the "reducciones" system, they left their lands.

The communes of Manabi have had access to the mountain. However, the commune in this province cannot be considered as a dynamic and homogeneous organization. In this sense the coastal commune is not very different from that one in Tungurahua region. From the juridical viewpoint, in the majority of the cases the community cannot be considered as an effective instrument for peasant management. It is the smallest administrative structure within the parish and its members are considered part of this organization. Nonetheless, according to the law, a commune is based on free affiliation, i.e. any

inhabitant of the commune can be or not be its member. There are peasant groups working on communal lands who are totally uninterested in the commune as an organization, though they have settled on its territory. This situation caused a number of conflicts and complications so that the coastal peasants have preferred to establish a cooperative based on self-management. One of the most serious problems that peasant organizations have to face regards their legal recognition.

From this perspective, the State has not implemented any steps to accelerate legal proceedings in such a way that the organized peasants can avoid those trying processes. On the contrary, the persistence of the peasant organizations as illegal entities facilitates the state control over them. In Nanabi, the peasants have had to use the political clientele networks in order to facilitate the completion of the legal recognition process of the forms of cooperation.

As it was pointed out above, the majority of the UPOCA's base-organizations have not obtained their juridical recognition and therefore find it difficult to approach the state for resources. This fact has tended to deepen the marginality and the economic depression of the region.

Regarding the number of peasant associative forms in Nanabi, table 25 gives some information about the existing organizations in the province, in the coastal region and in the country in 1982. Table 26 focuses on the number of communes registered in 1983 in Nanabi province

Although there is no official information about the number of cooperatives and associations existing in Nanabi province in 1983, according to the information available, the number of them has increased. The communes function as

juridical-administrative structures without much importance as far as production and implementation of economic programmes are concerned. It is the cooperative which assumed the role as an active organizational entity.

Table 25 ECUADOR: NUMBER OF COMUNES, COOPERATIVES AND AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS IN MANABI PROVINCE, THE COASTAL REGION AND THE COUNTRY, 1982

REGION	COMUNES	PRODUCTION COOPERATIVES	AGRICULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS
Manabi	140	134	4
Coast	526	1.153	21
Country	1.812	2.277	66

Source: Archives of the Ministry of Agriculture and Livestock (MAG),
National Council for Development (CONADE), 1983.
Elaborated by the author.

Table 26 MANABI: NUMBER OF COMUNES BY COUNTIES IN THE PROVINCE, 1983

COUNTIES	NUMBER OF COMUNES
Jipijapa	5
Junin	8
Manta	11
El Carmen	11
Montecristi	24
Pagan	15
Portoviejo	17
Kocauerte	11
Santa Ana	10
Sucre	24
24 de Mayo	5
TOTAL	141

Source: Ministry of Social Welfare (MES), 1983
Elaborated by the author.

V.2.2 The Specific Policies

Although the State became the pivot of the local social dynamic, playing the role of a general mediator between the organizations and the external context, regions differ. We shall first consider the state and its mediating functions.

Quero, unlike other zones of the country had highly coherent policies implemented by the State for the peasant sectors. It has not had great influence on the way the resources are redistributed, though there was an attempt to organize those resources e.g. legalizing communal lands, implementing collective forms of production and water-use, etc. The impact refers essentially to the capability of a development project to generate favourable conditions for consolidation of the peasant producers. Those organized peasants are supposed to take charge efficiently of specific sectors within agricultural production. Because the Quero zone presents appropriate conditions for carrying out its objective, the State has tried to develop the area by means of the implementation of community development programmes and basically through the Tungurahua project. The State did not develop very specific actions but a continuous work which underwent many readjustments since the mid-1960s.

The Tungurahua project has been generally aimed at improving the standard of living of the agricultural producers, at increasing incomes and the level of productivity, at decreasing unemployment, and at incorporating the producers into the national economy and the state services' sphere.

From the economic view, the project tries to intensify the use of fertilizers and land. The increment of the cultivated area is the central element of the

project's economic strategy, especially that one concerning more profitable cultivations i.e. fruits, vegetables and certain cereals. The project also tries to increase milk production as well as to decrease the cultivated area devoted to self-consumption. On the basis of these aims, the project provides the peasants with technical assistance, credits, fertilizers and infrastructure to support the productive sector. Simultaneously it tries to intervene in the trade-process, essentially, by means of building store places for the agricultural produce and specifically through the construction of a wholesale market in Ambato city (in the Ecuadorean Sierra).

From the social viewpoint the project is aimed at strengthening the forms of cooperation. The core of the project's social strategy consists of programmes of local sanitation, improvement of the health conditions, construction of communal houses and the execution of training courses for the peasant sectors. The project attempts to benefit directly to 12.500 agricultural producers. 10.400 individuals in the irrigation sector and 2.100 in the "secano" or dry-area. Approximately half of them receive credit services which amount to 205.5 million sucres. The total cost of the DRI-T for 6 years is 664.9 million sucres, about 90% will be devoted to irrigation programmes and infrastructure works. The credit will be given together with technical assistance in order to plan individual farms which will comprise 9.255 hectares. The main infrastructure works are the following: the construction of roads (27 kilometres) and the improvement of the existing ones (89 kilometres), 11 health sub-centres, 16 water-supply systems, 7111 latrines, 23 communal houses, 3 stores for vegetables, cereals and fertilizers.

The Tungurahua project has been used by the state as a vehicle for centralizing its administration. The implementation of this rural programme in the area has caused conflict with the local power structure, the peasant

organizations, the large landowners and the rural bourgeoisie.

a) The Local Power Structure

Quero is basically a rural county which was constituted in 1972 as the result of pressures of the local bourgeoisie against the last military junta. The constitution of the county has meant a larger allocation of resources to the zone, the consolidation of a production sector and also the possibility for the local people to express their needs and demands.

The local power structure has two main formal foundations. Firstly, there are the political authorities appointed by the Ministry of Government e.g. the County's Head, the Commissioner, etc. Secondly, there are the authorities democratically elected by the local people i.e. The Municipal Councillors. All these authorities have a close relationship with peasant sectors. Most of them are of peasant origins being also related to local peasant units by family ties. Some others come from the nearest town where they had worked as merchants and artisans. On the whole, they support the consolidation of the well-to-do peasants as well as of those organizations by which they can be politically supported.

Another important component of the local power structure is the moral influence of the priest on the peasants. His action is based on the Gospel's propagation, the Mass, and other rites. By means of the preaching, the local priest tries to influence peasants' opinions. Moreover, a peasant group known as "The Word's Celebrators" was set up in the zone, they committed themselves to conduct their organizations in accordance with The God's Word. Their rhetoric is essentially anti-communist and is being linked to the political debates at national level. Finally, there is a strong economic influence of

the commercial and transport institutions on the local peasant population. (It is difficult to define the links and networks of these sectors due to their high complexity).

The attitudes of the local authorities towards the functionaries of the Tungurahua project have a very particular character. Initially, the Project did not exert the authorities as the local governing structure. Local authorities had to contend with the state project to get control over the peasants. There was no competition for carrying out alternative projects aimed at supporting the community development. Both organizations were heavily interested in incorporating the peasants into the dynamic of the market at regional and national levels.

Therefore, on the one hand, the Tungurahua project emphasized the productive aspects of the peasant programmes as well as their self-organization as an efficient structure which facilitates institutional action. On the other hand, the local authorities give priority to the constitution of peasants as "citizens" i.e. individuals who have rights and duties and have full capacity to elect or to be elected. The authorities try to strengthen the various systems of control so as to legitimate, exert and maintain their leadership. The main preoccupation of the authorities is essentially of a party political type. Thus, for instance, the attitudes of the local population during the last electoral processes have been the result of the "caudillos" manipulation" with ideological debate absent from these processes.

b) The Peasant Organizations

The Tungurahua project has not been accepted by all the peasant organizations of the region. Some of them have shown definite opposition to it. The big

majority of them took towards it a critical position, others a submissive one. However, there no alternative position was proposed by the peasant sector. It would be interesting to know the base of this diversity and also whether or not the state action and the actual peasant programmes constituted alternative projects locked in mutual opposition. It can be said that the conflict stems from the following elements:

- i. The inefficiency of the state functionaries concerning the execution of their activities.
- ii. The great difference in the logic of providing peasants credits and the type of technical assistance. According to the state project the credit constitutes the central element of the attempt to modify peasant cultivation patterns incorporating them into a more profitable type of production. To this effect the project has offered long-term credits which are however totally inconvenient in the peasants' opinion. Peasants look for an appropriate balance between cultivation for self-consumption and that a profit-focussed one. Regarding the latter, the peasants are extremely cautious; they are used to short-term credits and planning their activities for a year only and not a 10 years' mortgage under a changeable market, and with a specific pattern of cultivation imposed.
- iii. The Tungurahua project is seen by the government within the socio-economic context of the province. Quero is considered as a homogeneous zone, the majority of the functionaries are not aware of its internal differences. Therefore, there is no special treatment for the diverse peasant sectors of the province. This is not to say that the peasants are pressing for the recognition of such differences, but they have

expressed opposition to the inadequate treatment that various peasant groups are in fact receiving.

- iv. The irregular operation of the local peasant organizations. There exist associative forms showing high levels of participation and self-management. In them, the project was strongly criticized because of the lack of respect towards the organizations' autonomy. However, there are other peasant organizations which prefer the functionaries' paternalistic attitudes. There is no suitable strategy to treat diverse situations and requirements.
- v. The last element concerns the level of contradiction between the legislation and the reality. The local leadership has clearly expressed the view that the lack of precision of the law regarding forms of cooperation amongst the peasants is in fact a serious obstacle in the process of development of the organizations, especially those dealing with collective production.

c) The large Landowners and the Rural Bourgeoisie

This sector has expressed the view that the Tungurahua Project considers them as a group whose existence is "marginal" to the state programmes. They are not a homogeneous group, differences exist between large proprietors devoted to cattle raising and those devoted to agricultural production i.e. potato, onion and garlic. The latter group has to face some problems which in certain way are similar to those of the peasants. However, their attitude concerning land problems is a different one. The landowners accused the functionaries of the Tungurahua project of being responsible for the peasant invasion of some of

their lands. In fact the state functionaries made a strong attempt to grant communal plateau areas to some peasant organizations e.g. San Nicolás, Cruz de Mayo, etc. which did not have access to those lands before. The functionaries, being protected by the agrarian legislation, tried to transfer these areas to the State. The landowners reacted by initiating agricultural works in these areas.

On the other hand, the large landowners devoted to cattle raising do not make demands against Tungurahua project at the level of production. They have requested the State to intervene in the process of commercialization so as to regulate it to their benefit. This proprietor group together with some landowners involved in agricultural production have expressed the view that the State ought to regulate market prices and must limit the seasonal fluctuations of prices of their main products (potato, garlic, onions). This sector criticizes the project, pointing out that there is an increasing shortage of labour force in the zone since new lands were brought into agricultural production without any planning, and so, this situation has restricted the local labour market. On the whole, they consider the Tungurahua project "as an inefficient entity unable to grasp the central problems of the agricultural producers" (R.H., 1982, interview).

Since 1974, the Tungurahua project has carried out important readjustments concerning the state action towards the peasant sectors. It was then that the so-called "Integral Rural Development" became known at the national level, but it was not established as an alternative to the Agrarian Reform policies. Its main objectives have laid the stress on: technical assistance for the peasants, redistribution of lands, improvement of infrastructure and market-channels, etc. It is only in 1980, after two years of negotiation between the State and the World Bank, that the execution of the DRI-Tungurahua (with new

contents) was finally initiated. The project functions through a special unit which has a relative autonomy in relation to the state apparatus. However, the project itself has not been able to generate effective mechanisms able to run its own administrative and financial matters, and to advance project's goals.

Some other state entities and Agricultural Public Sectors (SPA) participate in the DRI-T e.g. Provincial Councils, Ecuadorean Institute for Sanitary Works (IEOS), etc. They are responsible for developing certain activities such as improvement of roads, local sanitation and so on. There is a leading Junta and an Adviser Committee for coordinating the project's actions, coordinating relationships amongst the various social forces in the region. All the institutions involved in the project, as well as the sectional government and the peasant groups are being represented in those structures. Besides, there is a Credit Committee in charge of selecting the future beneficiaries of this resource. Initially, the peasant had no representation, but nowadays by means of the Peasant Coordinating Committee, their base-organizations are supposed to be represented.

The Tungurahua project did make clear that the focus of its attention is the peasant family. The relationship with organizations was also not emphasized. This was modified later by the increasing articulation between the project and the Secretariat for Integral Rural Development (SEDRI). Thus, the 1982 plan states the following: "Great attention will be given to the consolidation of the existing peasant organizations as well as to the establishment of new associative forms in accordance with the needs of the project's areas" (DRI-T Project, 1982). In some other documents of the same project (1982) special emphasis has been given to the need of planning the actions of the various programmes together with the community. The joint planning refers to the

improvement of the following: material conditions (social infrastructure), professional conditions (legal and technical education), cultural conditions (formal and extra-academic education), and general conditions concerning the access to resources in order to improve the standards of living of the local population. The respect to the cultural values of the peasant sectors constitutes one of the central criterion for the general planning of the project.

None of the project's documents defines the mechanisms for treating either peasant organizations in general or communal forms of production in particular. There is only a very general criterion concerning peasant organization, it stresses that a form of cooperation is a helpful instrument to the promoters' activities. As for the ways of dealing with peasant organizations, the state functionaries have expressed two positions. Firstly, they think that peasant organizations ought to be transformed into agricultural and livestock enterprises based on individual contributions of capital and general profit's logic. Secondly, they think that the communal forms of production are not seen as structures economically viable, they are only a complement to the family incomes.

The Tungurahua project has recently tried to define the mechanisms for the peasants to participate in the various activities of the programmes. Thus, under its own initiative, the Peasant Coordinating Committee was established which at first had mainly an administrative character. As against this view, according to some of the state functionaries, the project constitutes an administrative structure rather than a means for the peasants to participate in the various programmes. Others believe that this is the only way for the peasants to express themselves, channelling their initiatives and evaluating the project's actions. It is in fact very difficult to define, at present,

the actual role of the DRI-T. The SEDRI has pointed out that the traditional relationship between peasants and state functionaries ought to be modified. The implementation of the project in the area has become very complex since various peasant groups do not consider it as a significant need.

In fact, at least through the forms of cooperation, peasant participation in the state policies carried out by the DRI-T project has not taken place. State measures tended to consolidate peasant producers. Pilco community is a case in point, there, the objectives of the Tungurahua project and those of the well-to-do peasants linked. However, peasants have strongly criticized the state functionaries for being unable to provide them with the credit service. The project operates through the organized leadership as the best way to meet most of the community members' needs, but without defining a long term-strategy. According to the state functionaries, the handing over of credits is a way to persuade the peasants to take part in the activities of the project. Peasants were not given credits either at family level or at communal one, so that a gap has been maintained between them and the project. At the level of the organizations, credits have been given to consolidate peasant enterprises and also to invest them in communal production. In this way the DRI-T allows the organizations to achieve important levels of autonomy which have been used, for instance, in the gradual distribution of the communal lands amongst the organized peasants. This, of course, clearly contradicts not only the present legislation on communities but also the functionaries' rhetoric.

The various actions of the DRI-T project, until now, have been concentrated on the technical assistance at the family and communal levels. Besides, some programmes regarding commercialization were carried out. On the one hand, there was an attempt to lower the prices of fertilizers by making direct trade-contracts between peasant organizations and the fertilizer factory. On

the other hand, an attempt was made to reach some kind of agreement between peasant organizations and the quito's wholesale market, so as to sell the peasant produce.

Despite the accentuation of the state actions in the Quero zone, the private institutions have been also present since 1964. They did allow the peasants access for the first time to the credit system as well as to technology following the "green revolution" model, which was welcomed by the local producers. In this sense the state action was supported by the private institutions.

In 1964, with Andean Mission, the private institutions for development started to work in Quero. Their methodology has been based on the "community development" principle. It has been very difficult to evaluate the private action in terms of actual results. Andean Mission, on the one hand, promoted the incorporation of peasants into the market. Through the credits and the green revolution's technology, provided by this institution, some of the local peasants were able to adapt themselves successfully to the market demands. On the other hand, the Andean Mission attempted to improve the standard of living of the peasants. This marked the beginning of a series of peasants' demands in this respect e.g. construction of latrines, drinkable-water systems, new roads, etc.

Andean Mission was later dissolved by the Rural Development Department of the Ministry of Agriculture established by the government in 1973 which took charge of the Mission's programmes. This state institution was to continue until the Tungurahua Rural Development Project was set up in the area. When Andean Mission came to an end, two new institutions were set up in Quero: CESA and SEV. The former carrying out a more integral plan, the latter emphasizing the training of leaders and the organization of the peasantry. It was by then

that the incorporation of the communal plateaus into the agricultural production was proposed, though, it took place in fact only in few communities. CESA has also handed over credits to the peasants so as to make feasible this project and also to support peasant production at the level of the family unit. Table 27 lists the public and private institutions which have operated in the Quero area from 1964 to 1980.

In the case of Manabi, the state policies have been decentralized. Thus, there can be found various institutions not only from the state sector e.g. Ministry of Agriculture, the Jipijapa Integral Rural Development Project, the hydraulic Resource Junta, the National Development bank, FODERUMA, IERAC, and so on, but also those from the private sector such as, Peasant Promotion Groups, the Brethren Foundation, the German and Italian Volunteer Services, etc. On the other hand, UPOCAM which represents the regional peasantry limits the impact of state policies by acting as a mediator between the peasant associative forms and the external forces.

This diverse influence of the institutional sector has not contributed to the implementation of coherent policies in Manabi. Since the mid-1970s the government, taking into account the marginal conditions of the province, has increased the number of public institutions operating in the area. Owing to the long drought, Manabi was declared by the Hurtado's administration as an "emergency zone" (1982-84), consequently it became the focus of attention of additional state programmes and the recipient of large resources. In accordance with the peasants' opinion the inter-institutional coordination established in the province to carry out development programmes did not succeed. It was UPOCAM which played a very important role in this sense, especially regarding the aid from the outside context.

**Table 27 QUERO: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INSTITUTIONS* EXISTING IN QUERO
FROM 1964 TO 1980**

NAME	YEARS	BENEFICIARY	MAIN INSTITUTIONAL ACTIVITIES
Andean Mission	1964-72	Yanayacu El Placer Llimpe	Production: Pyrethrum cultivation. Development of agricultural technology. Reforestation. Credits. Health: First aids. Preventive medicine. Infrastructure: improvement of water systems. Construction of communal houses, roads, etc. Peasant Organization: leaders training, legalization of the organizations, etc.
Ecuadorean Centre for Agricultural Services CESA (private)	1972-76	Punachiza Hualcanga- Chico. Jaloa El Placer Rosario. San Vicente. Pueblo Viejo. Sta. Anita S.Luis. S.Antonio	Production. Credits, technical assistance. Training: Socio-economic training. Coordination with other institutions e.g. SEV, MAG, etc.
The Ecuadorean Volunteer Service SEV (private)	1976	Punachiza. San Vicente. Jaloa Pueblo Viejo Hualcanga	Organization: Training of leaders and peasant organizations.
The Peace Corps (private)	1976	El Placer. San Vicente Urban centres	Production: Reforestation. Barley cultivation. Craftsmanship.
MAG-SEDRI	1973-80	All communities	Continuation Andean Mission Action.

* The information refers to the institutions which worked in the area.

Source: MAG, 1975. Field work, 1982-83.
Elaborated by the author.

The state presence in those areas where the UPOCAM's base-organizations were set has rather a party political character. There has been some experiences in the province by which state institutions tried to implement big projects by imposing certain conditions, mainly concerning party political support, on the peasants. This happened very often during the 1981-82 electoral campaign, especially in 1984 when the elections took place. As UPOCAM decided to maintain its autonomy, some public institutions have systematically placed many obstacles to the development of its regional organization. From this perspective, UPOCAM and its base organizations have started to discuss seriously the meaning of the state control and they are also trying to establish specific mechanisms to face this type of institutional action.

V.2.3 The State and the Organizations, Human and Financial Resources

We would like to emphasize at this stage the way human and financial resources are combined in order to carry out peasant development programmes. As far as Quero is concerned, there were 4 functionaries in charge of the project. 3 of them were trained in agricultural matters, and the other one received some training on formal education. All of them have expressed "technical" criteria to their attitudes towards the peasants. Their aim is to impart technical knowledge and they do not consider themselves as suitable promoters (rural extension personnel). According to these functionaries "promotion" is a very special topic which should be imparted by training courses to those in charge of carrying out this type of activities within the rural development programmes.

There is no understanding by the functionaries concerning peasant organizations and their process of development. It has been declared by the government that the base of the Tungurahua project constitutes the peasant

organization. This assertion was understood in two ways by the state functionaries. On the one hand, some of the functionaries believe that the assertion refers essentially to a matter of efficiency. Thus, the project's costs can be lowered if there were to exist organizational structures aimed at influencing a large number of rural population. Peasant Associative Forms are considered suitable mechanisms to propagate the project's goals and its actions in the area. "The project comprises 13.000 hectares in this zone where small producers have settled. Despite their small numbers the functionaries are doing their best to cope with the work. Still one can say that the project is not very efficient at this level. The present method tries to stress the family sphere rather than the communal one" (I.C., 1982, interview). On the other hand, some other functionaries consider that peasant organizations are the appropriate structures to benefit the majority of the peasantry. The forms of cooperation allow the incorporation of the poorest peasants in the project. "The organization has to channel all the possible benefits towards those agricultural producers who have very few resources. This sector of the peasantry should be the focus of attention of the state institutions" (I.C., 1982, interview).

In spite of the emphasis given to the peasant organization within the project, the functionaries have actually dismissed this matter. The official goal stresses in reality the need of strengthening production at the family level. State functionaries carry out their activities through local leaders, who are considered by the state project as the real "link" between functionaries and communities. Simultaneously, those leaders who do not accept the functionaries' actions and do not want to participate in the state programmes, are seen by the project managers as negative elements. "The peasant leaders have helped us to enter the communities. An organization without a leader means nothing; a good organization with a negative leader will surely fail and

with it also the whole project. Leadership is in fact the functionaries' right-hand" (L.C., 1982, interview).

The functionaries of the Tungurahua project have not only established good relationships with the local leaders, but also were invited to intervene in the peasant election where they supported those candidates who represent the interests of the state project. If there exist problems between peasant leaders and functionaries, the latter ought to work with other members of the leading Committee. In conditions of conflict, the functionaries made local leaders resign from the Committee.

The communities which oppose the project loose the support of the state functionaries. The central role of the project concerning organization refers to the legalization of associative forms and the communication of knowledge to the peasants regarding their rights and duties specified by the law. The various demands made by the peasants for obtaining state attention are higher than the actual capacity of the existing institutions. The DRI-T project for instance on the whole has 72 functionaries who have to cover a populated sector of 11.383 inhabitants, i.e. the total population of the sectors around Quero (Census, 1983).

Table 28 gives information about the 1982-83 State National Budget for the agricultural sector.

As can be seen from the table, the Tungurahua project represents a large state investment, especially, if we compare it with the provincial allocation. In the case of Manabí there is a larger allocation than in Tungurahua which goes mostly to CRM. There are, however, other public institutions which receive larger financial resources at national level e.g. IERAC, IERHI, MAC, etc. as

Table 28 ECUADOR: STATE BUDGET FOR THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 1982-83

(in thousands of Sucres)

Years	Total	National Agricultural and Livestock Development	Provincial Agricultural and Livestock Development		Tungurahua Project (*)	Manabi (**)		
			Tungurahua	Manabi		C.R.M.	DRI-Jijjapa Project	ILA-CHON
1982	64,770,000	4,145,087	10,118	12,752	12,271	390,000,000	2,047	13,195
1983	75,800,000	4,308,807	8,367	10,755	14,455	432,300,000	4,319	13,195

Notes: (*) The total cost of the Tungurahua Project for 6 years is S/ 884,994,000 (sucres) of which 35 % constitutes the World Bank contribution, 56 % is the Government contribution (the information above refers to it) and 9 % constitutes peasant contribution.

(**) This information refers to public Institutions receiving the largest State allocation in the province.

Source: Official Registers No. 153 of 4 January 1982 and No. 402 of 3 January 1983

Elaborated by the author

well as some specific programmes aimed at developing agricultural production (coffee, cotton), forestation and cattle raising among others. These entities should satisfy the basic demands of 546.226 people, i.e. the Manabi rural population (Census, 1983).

UPOCAM in the coastal province has tried to obtain most of the available state resources for the peasant organizations. The usual mechanism used by this organization is a kind of agreement between the state institution and the organization, where mutual responsibilities are clearly established. Thus, for instance, the agreement between the Hydraulic Resources Junta and UPOCAM illustrates the point: "both UPOCAM and The Junta, should look for peasant participation as much during the socio-economic studies as during the execution of the programmes to be implemented by this institution. The regional peasant organization will take charge of extending its influence not only towards its base organizations, but also to those groups which are not linked to it; or towards any form of peasant cooperation" (Agreement between UPOCAM and the Hydraulic Resources Junta, for implementing development programmes in Jipijapa and Pajan counties, 1982).

A series of agreements like this have taken place between UPOCAM and public-private institutions. It needs to be stressed that this form of cooperation has gradually become an organizational structure for "centralizing" the "decentralized" state actions in the rural areas of the region.

To conclude, it is important to emphasize that the state intervention itself does not guarantee the viability of the peasant associative forms. As it was pointed out earlier, both in Quero and Manabi, the peasant organizations have important levels of autonomy concerning their relationship with the State, which is not the organizer of the peasant life, but rather an element of

mediation between the organizations and the external sphere. The state intervention is in fact different in each regional context i.e. in Tungurahua it plays a more technical role, in Manabi it has been diminished by the integrating function of the regional organization. However, the party political role of the State is indeed taking place in the area, and it is there where the UPOCAM has to face the more difficult situations. The organization has tried to implement some policies so as to neutralize the government's influence on the peasantry in this respect.

Peasant associative forms are able to gain access to various "spaces" or "sites" and to obtain resources in the outside context while searching for their own viability. The consolidation of the collective forms of production will depend, essentially, on the type of arrangements inside peasant organization forms of cooperation and on the relationships that these peasants organizations establish with the external sphere.

CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSIONS

The main objective of this thesis was to clarify the factors which have been affecting the existence and the viability of the peasant associative forms.

The arguments as to the non-viability of peasant organizations have been given special attention. Failures of the peasant associative forms can be explained by the fact that they exist in a capitalist society which by its very nature disarticulates collective forms of production. This context, characterized by complex processes of social differentiation and capital accumulation within the peasant sectors seems to be the core of the problem. We can distinguish between two variants. On the one hand there are those peasant associative forms whose viability will depend on varying levels of accumulation, and on the other, those to which capital accumulation becomes a serious constraint to their existence. Thus, accumulation at the early stages determines success, but this initial success leads at the latest stage to tensions which may lead to disintegration. Therefore, capital accumulation determines success or failure of peasant associative forms. Since the peasant associative forms do not exist in isolation, this has to be understood in the overall context of the economic, social and political processes of the various agrarian sectors.

To comprehend the functioning of the collective forms it is necessary to take into consideration not only state policies but also the aims of the peasant groups. Thus, cooperative structures have been successful in contexts where strong social movements and decisive state intervention occurred. Social movements fought for projects in which peasant associative forms would serve

not only as a framework for production but also as a mechanism for political demands.

The insights gained from this investigation led conclusions which can be summed up as follows. Peasant Associative forms can succeed under very specific circumstances: a) The regional context, organizations are more viable in areas of economic depression and/or areas marginal to the development of the society at large. On the other hand, in areas of productive expansion the peasant associative forms can be seen as initial incentives for the peasants to gain access to resources. However, in the long term these structures will become an obstacle to the economic aspirations of the richest peasants and so they are bound to disintegrate. b) The type of arrangements implemented by the peasants according to their interests not only as members of organizations but also as members of domestic units. Those arrangements or strategies will contribute to develop the organizations' capacity for self-management, and also they will enable the peasants to deal successfully with the external sphere where the State is a major agent.

Let us consider briefly these two sets of conditions which are determined socially and economically by their respective regional contexts. The reason for selecting Tungurahua, and specifically four communities (Pilco, Jaloa La Playa, Jaloa El Rosario and San Nicolas) in Quero county as the case-studies in the Ecuadorean highlands was to understand the impact of state projects on the existing peasant associative forms. In this case, state policies did perform a central role in the development of rural projects, and peasants' attempts to generate alternative programmes depended on the existing state projects. At the same time we also found in this area some traditional communes in the process of being transformed, by way of state initiative, into communes more strongly influenced by the market mechanism. For this purpose

the State helped to incorporate communal areas into agricultural market production.

The objective of selecting Manabi and particularly three of its base-organizations (Union y Trabajo Pre-cooperative, Agua Blanca Commune and Sarquero Pre-cooperative) as the case-studies in the Ecuadorian Coast was to comprehend the real impact of a Regional Peasant Organization (OPOCA) on the existing peasant associative forms. This coastal context is characterized by severe economic depression resulting from unfavourable ecological conditions and natural disasters i.e. periodic droughts and floods. There seems to exist an interrelationship between the external context and the internal dynamic and conflicts of the peasant organizations. For instance, there is close relationship between severe economic depression in an area, a considerable degree of migration and the type of local peasant associative form. The base-organizations have joined the regional association while preserving their own autonomy. This regional organization mobilizes the base-groups and tries to gain influence on the regional economic structure and local power relations.

The distinctiveness of the two sets of conditions mentioned above, served also to elaborate a model for the comparison and analysis of peasant associative forms. From the methodological point of view, this model is useful for establishing parameters of comparison in those fields where diversity is the strongest characteristic. The essence of the model relies upon capital accumulation of the peasant associative forms. The factors which determine accumulation are the following: The strategies of production derived by the regional development and by the internal dynamic of the base-organizations, the strategies of organization, and the state intervention.

There are three principal conclusions regarding the viability of the peasant

associative forms in the Quero experience.

1. The first relates to the obstacles faced by peasant communes in carrying out collective forms of production. In this context the following was found to be most significant:

- A. Peasants access to communal plateaus. In attempting to have access to those areas, the peasants had to face several conflicts with large and medium landowners.
- B. The external imposition on some of the peasant organizations of a model of collective production unsuitable for the local tradition. The productive process was traditionally organized around the family unit.
- C. The scarcity of capital and labour force available to develop communal agricultural production.

The last situation (C) obtained in one of the poorest communities where wage-labour was essential for the subsistence of the family unit. This community has taken possession of a land area in dispute with a neighbouring hacienda. There, its members have started communal works. The peasants have made a great and complex effort to integrate themselves into this new dynamic. Their collective experience has been based mainly on incorporating labour rather than capital. It seemed to suggest that collective forms of agricultural production would be successful in the area. Nonetheless it is necessary to understand this particular situation as the temporary result of an appeal to the traditional communal "conscience" made by state functionaries and by a sector of the peasant leadership rather than the outcome of a deliberate rational and informed

choice of the communal alternative on the part of the peasantry.

2. The second conclusion points to the conditions which make possible the permanent existence of peasant associative forms of agricultural production. When there was direct state support in the area, the peasants responded with certain arrangements which were a combination of productive and organizational strategies. Those arrangements were.

A. The peasants gave priority to collective forms which required large investments of capital and labour, and which were primarily oriented to the market.

B. There was an increasing incorporation of open communal areas into agricultural production, especially of the plateaus. This is a process which, at different stages, demands more extensive cooperation of peasants particularly when the financial resources are scarce. Variable quantities of land available were also incorporated. The process facilitated the internal integration of the peasant associative form.

C. Success in the terms of agricultural production is a factor which can operate in two directions. On the one hand, it is the basic condition for the reproduction of the collective form. At the same time, it rises expectations inducing the peasants, in some cases unwisely, to expand the productive processes in anticipation of future success.

D. The type of management and the internal links of the organizations have been important factors in the success or failure of the communal

organization. In some communities of the area collective management tended to be based on existing family "cliques". Communal legislation as well as state functionaries assumed that these family "groups" will prove totally inefficient when managing functions were concerned. The actual experience has shown that no other important elements for integrating communal structures did exist, nor was the membership as a whole capable of articulating communal objectives. Therefore, the cohesion provided by kinship systems or family networks together with a strong and centralized local authority (usually members of the Cabildo or governing body of a rural community) promised much greater chances of success and stability of these collective forms.

E. In the peasant dynamic of this area the intervention of state functionaries has not been able to coherently contribute to the successful internal functioning of the peasant associative forms of agricultural production. They did not initiate specific programmes in which peasant organizations could advance their own identity and management. However, these functionaries represent necessary elements of communal activities, since they control and distribute resources and ensure that organizations and programmes remain within the bounds of legality.

3. The third conclusion established that production is not the only possible rationale for the peasant associative forms. It is at this level that the state presence is pertinent since it served as a support for those associations which have not necessarily defined themselves exclusively as units of production. The alternative rationale in the present dynamic of rural Ecuador is socio-political organization. A peasant organization is an important link which can be considered by the State to improve its

relationship with the rural sector.

Organization of local peasant authorities is important because it facilitates the negotiation of resources with all external agents including the State, and takes care of the internal distribution of resources among and within the organized groups. In this sense a peasant associative form constitutes an effective structure for the reproduction of peasant life and its complex network of social relations.

In the case of Manabi, when analysing peasant associative forms, an important point to underline is the fact that the adaptation of resources and the implementation of production strategies for specific types of organizations do not guarantee the viability of collective forms. The state social policies in this area was not a decisive one, however, it was mainly an instrument of control.

Many organizations in Manabi coastal province have been initiated by peasant initiative. Different strategies have been implemented as a response to specific goals expressed by the base-organizations and channelled by the regional association. The "second degree" organizational structure has, to some extent, provided economic alternatives such as construction programmes for unemployment sectors of the peasantry and has added some elements of internal cohesion to its base-organizations such as educational programmes, political meetings and discussion groups. The Regional Associative Form has committed itself to carry out an increasing struggle aiming to obtain an actual place in that society of resources, services and decisions for the peasants. It is interesting to notice that peasant associative forms in the case of Manabi province developed in a regional context of economic depression and that the mechanisms used by the organizations to overcome that situation,

outlined above, have been implemented by the peasants themselves and not by the State.

A central question follows: is it true to say that given the existing set of circumstances and conditions a Regional Peasant Organization is indispensable for the success and permanence of base-organizations?. In order to answer it one must consider some fundamental elements of the regional organizational structure. These are for instance the diverse relationships with the context external to the rural communities which permit the regional organization to negotiate resources and to develop assertive structures of self-management. Most base-organizations have achieved high levels of self-management and do attempt to consolidate the internal organizational structure which serve to back up political strategies in support of long-term peasant projects.

base-organizations have found a very important support in the regional organization, but their permanence or viability should be achieved by themselves. Viability, as it was pointed out above, does not depend on one isolated set of factors only. The viability of the peasant associative forms depends on the balanced combination of the different sets of conditions carried out by the peasants according to the nature and aims of the organizations.

NOTES

CHAPTER 1

- (1) For further information concerning the process of agrarian change in the Ecuadorean Sierra see the compilation of articles in "Ecuador: cambios en el agro Serrano", Barsky et. al., 1980, Quito, Ecuador.
- (2) For the Ecuadorean case, see the study by CIDA (Interamerican Committee for Agricultural Development), 1965, Washington D.C.
- (3) The different studies carried out in this respect were addressed basically in the highlands of the country. It has become a prime area of study for the Social Sciences.
- (4) See the study by CAMP (Andean Centre for Popular Action) called "Comunidad Andina: Alternativas politicas de Desarrollo", 1982, and Santana, 1983.
- (5) An interesting fact stemmed from the agrarian change related to the collective exploitation of the land. There are various groups of peasants, who under certain legal proceedings, using non-traditional arrangements have become owners of the land. Communes, during the Colonial period, did not develop agriculture through communal work but through family arrangements despite the communal character of the property.
- (6) The Agricultural Workers Associations were formed in accordance with Agreement N.037 of October 1978.
- (7) Ayllu: initial type of indigenous organization which comprised a number of aboriginal families living together.
- (8) Some examples in this sense can be found in Cisneros, 1948, and Saenz, 1933.
- (9) Despite the accelerating pace of urbanization, Ecuadorean society remains predominantly rural. approximately 50% of the population lives on the land and over 70% of Ecuador's 344,234 production units consist of less than 5 hectares. The peasants working these "minifundia" are perpetually underemployed, underpaid and dependent on capricious markets. They have little access to additional resources, credit, services or technology. As a result, the rural sector is marked by extreme poverty, while at the same time, Ecuador itself is saddled with inadequate agricultural production, particularly in regard to those products from which the peasants receive a share in lieu of wages.
- (10) It is assumed that the private institutions act according to state policies while strengthening certain levels of autonomy to define their activities.
- (11) See (a) Djurfeldt, Goren (1981), "What happened to the agrarian

bourgeoisie and rural proletariat under monopoly capitalism", *Acta Sociologica, Scandinavian Review of Sociology*, 24, 3, pp. 167-91.

(b) Djurfeldt, Gören (1985), *Rural Development, Theories of peasant economy and agrarian change*, edited by John Harriss, pp. 139-59.

- (12) The formation of organizations allows access to credit, provides better guarantees for the financial institutions to recover their investments, allows the promotion of special crops, makes possible the transfer of modern technology, expands the consumer market, rationalizes competition, offers greater continuity in government planning and state projects and overcomes the tendency towards individualism among landowning peasants.
- (13) It refers to the study of two cooperatives located in Cayambe, province of Pichincha, which were part of "Cayambe Project" whose implementation took place in land that belonged to the Church. The Land Reform Institute intervened offering excellent conditions of payment for the land and promoting at the same time a programme which included credit facilities and technical assistance. The project was initiated in 1969.
- (14) See the studies by Luna, 1970, Kedclift, 1975 and 1976, Valverde, 1979 and 1980.
- (15) The Velasco Ibarra's government passed on December 1970, the 1001 Decree on the Abolition of Precarismo in lands devoted to rice cultivation (next chapter gives more information about this matter).
- (16) In this respect, Kedclift (1975) finds that initially the credit encourages an external proletarianization in the cooperative. This decreased afterwards due to the mechanization process which dispensed with part of the labour force.
- (17) It refers to a study, not yet published, carried out in 1981-82.
- (18) Part of the field work carried out in the Ecuadorean Sierra for this thesis shows diverse situations in this perspective. There are zones of high altitude which allow peasant sectors to expand production and consequently there is a rupture of traditional forms of cooperation between family units.

NOTES

CHAPTER 11

- (1) During the colonial period, the indigenous population of South America were organized by the conquerors into settlements or "reducciones" in order to facilitate the socio-economic control of the Spaniards over the natives.
- (2) These names correspond to the Territorial Division of Ecuador at local levels but only in the rural areas.
- (3) Article 23 says. "The structure and function of the Peasant Communities are to be subjected to the Law of Communes".
Article 24 states: "The Cabildo's President will be the representative of the community. He has to intervene in all the local controversies".
Decree N.23, Official Registers N.39 and 40, December 10 and 11, 1957.
- (4) According to the recommendations of the Mission, the United Nations Organization as well as those of special institutions for studying the indigenous population in the Andean zones, the Andean Programme in Ecuador was created in June, 1954 under the administrative responsibility of the International Labour Organization and with the participation of UNO's agencies such as: FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization) and UNESCO (United Nations Educational Scientific & Cultural Organization).
- (5) One of the principal sub-projects of the Andean Mission was one concerning the resettlement programme of peasants in "San Agustin de Callo" Hacienda, which was carried out with the collaboration of the Ecuadorean Housing Bank. The hacienda's owner was Jose Maria Plaza Lasso, an important landowner who had started a process of productive modernization based on the increasing development of milk-production. The programme included the construction of 66 dwellings for the hacienda's ex-huasipungueros, and other accessory buildings. All these referred to the relocation of the workers in plots of about 2 has. which were allocated by the landowner instead of eliminating the precarious relationships and as a way of covering the owed land which in accordance with the "huasipungueros Reserve Fund" ought to have been paid to them.
- (6) Andean Mission, Summary of activities, Document 61-2 from May, 1956 to April, 1961.
- (7) The available information comprises: Andean Mission Activities' term-reports, various articles published by the journalist Lilo Linke and Miguel Alborno in "El Comercio" Quito's newspaper, during 1960 and 1961, and some evaluations carried out years ago in indigenous communities of the Ecuadorean Sierra e.g. there was an evaluation carried out by Roberto Santana in 1923 which took place in Loja province in the Saraguros Indigenous Communities.
- (8) "The Andean Mission has devoted special effort to the organization of the indigenous communities in order to channel the basic aims of the programmes. The first step was to provide the communities with a legal

statute under the protection of 'The Law of Communes' and 'The Juridical Statute of the Peasant Communities' which are already in force in the country. Regarding the organization of the communities, the mission has achieved a great success in promoting free and democratic elections to form the 'Cabildos' (governing structures in the rural communities). In the past, this election in the communes had suffered in many cases the influence of civil or religious authorities as well as of some outsiders" (Andean Mission, Summary of activities, May, 1950-April, 1961, document 61-2).

- (9) "If we have a look at the country side, we can notice that some changes are taking place. One very important aspect is the fact that for the first time selected groups of indigenous are living together with members of diverse communities of the Sierra. This is a significant experience since through it, the indigenous groups are being aware of themselves as part of a collective. In other words, they are learning now that beyond their tribes and their villages there exist other people like them, affected by the same problems and necessities, and also for the first time they are hearing such words as: Nation, Motherland and Ecuador. They did arrive to new areas as human beings whose horizon ended at the nearest village-market, and now they do come back to their native communities as '**citizens**' though with an incipient development" (El Comercio Quito's newspaper, April 5, 1961).
- (10) Lilo Linke illustrates in one of her articles the case of an indigenous peasant who at the age of 27 became president of his community (Tullupamba, Azuay province). Because of his relationship with Andean Mission, he was included in one of the training-leadership programmes, once it finished he promoted and actually conducted the construction of a school in the community. This fact allowed him to gain people's sympathy and respect. The newspaper article quoted one of his expressions: "we were used to have the old people leading our communities. They were supposed to have a great deal of experience and because of this we did respect them. But now things have changed and we are getting new ideas. It seems that ideas come from the highest mountains, they are carried away by strong winds and so they come to us..." (El Comercio, Quito's newspaper, March 27, 1961).
- (11) "A tragic incident took place in San Cristobal, Azuay province, when an aggressive crowd of peasants attacked the Medical Service's Team of the Mission, killing two of its members. Therefore the activities of the Mission have been considerably affected by an atmosphere of tension and disturbance that prevailed among the peasants in the whole country long before and even after the Second National Census of Housing and Population was carried out (November 25). Agitators belonging to extreme sections of the right-wing and also the left-wing have spread confusion in the rural areas deceiving the peasants about the objectives of the National Census. In the whole Ecuadorean Sierra violence rose leaving as a result some teachers and public servants assassinated by groups of over-excited peasants" (Andean Mission, Report of activities, January-March, 1962).
- (12) In spite of the junta's pronouncement in favour of agrarian reform upon seizing power, passage of an agrarian reform law was delayed for a full year. There were various facts to explain the delay e.g. the military's appreciation of the economic strength of the coastal agrarian interests and their own efforts to form a coalition in support of reform. See Uggem, 1975, "Peasant Mobilization in Ecuador: a case study of Guayas

province", Michigan USA. Regarding the objectives of the Land Reform Law as well as previous facts to the promulgation of it, there is a broad analysis in Barsky et. al. op. cit.

- (13) The current regulations governing cooperatives were drafted on the basis of Executive Decree No. 1031 and Agreement No. 342 of September 1966.
- (14) Most coastal crop production, like that of cocoa, which formed the basis of Ecuador's boom in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is founded upon the plantation using a more advanced technology than that of the highland hacienda. The absence of sufficient labour for plantation work also stimulated employers to provide better working conditions and better wages than those found in the Sierra.
- (15) By 1973 there were 1039 production cooperatives in Ecuador, 85% of which listed farming as their principal activity.
- (16) "Peasant Organizations were more successful on the Coast, on the remnants of the old cocoa plantations. The cocoa crisis of the 1920s ruined the planter elite. Who declined in influence with the expansion of corporate agriculture. When demand for cocoa rose after 1948, the peasants challenged the planters for control of the land. Urban political groups became actively engaged in peasant mobilization with the decline of the economy after 1955. Although an agrarian reform law was passed in 1964, powerful agrarian interests limited its effectiveness, causing the alienation of the peasantry and continued rural discontent" (Uggen, John F. 1975, op. cit.).
- (17) Historically the Communist Party of Ecuador (PCE) has had limited support and success. Its main centre of activity has been Guayaquil and outlying areas. In the mid-1950s, the PCE perceived the possibility of extending its influence in the countryside because of the negative impact of commercial agriculture on the peasantry. As the landlord-peasant conflict intensified, in a bid for political power the PCE articulated peasant demands for agrarian reform.
- (18) In 1940-44 and 1944-48, rice represented 38 and 45% respectively, of the total value of Ecuador's exports (Lilo Linke, Ecuador. Country of Contrasts. London: Oxford University Press, 1960, p. 137-138, Bra. ed.). Part of the explanation lies in favourable world market conditions during this period, due to the loss of the Asian supply sources because of the world war. By 1952 rice had dropped to 14% behind cocoa, coffee and bananas. Rice has never regained its prominence because lack of technology has caused soil depletion and severe shortages. In 1974 large amounts of rice had to be imported to meet consumer demand.
- (19) The National Federation of Rice Growers Cooperatives was established in 1970 with the financial and technical assistance of USAID. The main organizer of the Federation was Gonzalo Riofrio Cevallos a former AIB employee, who by 1975 was Assistant Minister for Development under the military regime and a key advisor to the government on agricultural and peasant problems on the Coast, especially in Guayas province.
- (20) By August, 1966 those cooperatives constituting the Association of Milagro Cooperatives formed the ACAL, affiliated with the CENOC -the Catholic Church Labour Union-. The ACAL was aided financially by the Milagro IERAC office and represented the moderate segment of the peasant movement which accepted compensation to landowners (El Telegrafo, 21

August, 1966).

- (21) A rival to ACAL, ACAE was set up at the third congress of FIAL in Milagro on September, 1966. ACAL was affiliated to the FIAL-CTL and represented the more radical element of the peasant movement. By 1967-68 ACAE and ACAL agreed to cooperate to face government pressure against peasants. The collaboration of the two centrals resulted in the formation of FLAOC (National Federation of Peasant Organizations) which was the culmination of the earlier efforts in November, 1965 to form a National Peasant Federation at Santo Domingo de los Colorados (Pichincha province).
- (22) See articles 5,6,9,41,52,53, and 54 of the Agrarian Reform Law .
- (23) "Andean Mission as the responsible institution for executing the Rural Development Programme in the Ecuadorean Sierra, supports the initiation of the Agrarian Reform Process, since it is necessary for the development of the country. The unjust system of land tenure is essentially the cause of poverty of the indian population and it is also an obstructive factor for the Mission Programme to obtain more positive results regarding mostly the improvement of the peasantry's standards of living" (General report of the Andean Mission, October-December, 1964).
- (24) "The daring and haughty attitude of some landowners and their wish for revenge towards those sectors who are considered by the landowners as defeatists in their hopes about the Agrarian Reform, are accumulating tension and deepening problems which of course will lead to situations of violence and general disorder in the rural areas" (Andean Mission Report, April-June, 1966).
- (25) "There will be any kind of support to promote associations, communal enterprises and production or marketing and services cooperatives. It will be given support and respect to any organizational form set up by the peasants, even to those which are not yet operating" (SEDRI, Document p.16-17 without date).
- (26) "The question regarding peasant participation in the carrying out of the programmes was considered the pivot of any project. Thus, an active and organized participation was to be promoted among the peasantry, not only to carry out the activities as such, but also to incorporate the people to the more general decision-making process. In other words it is not the project's intention to obtain people's confidence and then to impose a programme from outside. Its main will is to incorporate the population to the project from the outset. Such participation would only reach its completeness in the project's fully development and once the necessary resources have been achieved" (Barsky, et. al., 1960, 1962:182).
- (27) There are a large variety of organizations which comprise diverse sectors of the population e.g. women, wage-labourers, youths, etc. They also play a central role in socio-economic relations. As a good illustration of this we have organizations such as. The Wage-Labourers Agricultural Associations, The General Associations of Workers, The 4-F Clubs, The Housewives Clubs, etc. However, none of them have achieved an outstanding and clear form of organization, not even the Wage-labourers Agricultural Associations -known in Ecuador as "Sindicatos"- which have finally transformed their wage-labourers' demands into peasant claims.
- (28) The quantitative information about existing communes and their population

is rather confusing. It is due to the fact that the communes comprise all people located in areas which do not have the category of "parish" so that the commune not necessarily implies the existence of an associative form at rural levels, neither does the collective ownership of lands. Proano (1982) finds that by 1978 there were only 354 communes having communal lands -300,000 hectares- which represented about 4.5% of the total land in the Sierra and on the Coast of Ecuador.

NOTES

CHAPTER IV

- (1) According to the "share-cropping" system, the owner of the land gave the share-croppers larger plots of land than those given by him to the "huasipungueros". Once the crop was harvested the products were to be equally shared out between the owner of the land and the share-cropper. The latter was also required to work without any payment in various activities of the hacienda. The contract might be temporally renewed though it tended to be maintained for a long time.
- (2) The peasant units and the members of the communities established around the haciendas were allowed to keep their flocks in the haciendas' plateaus. For gaining access to and making use of those lands the peasants had to work without receiving any wage in the haciendas. It is in this way that the "ayuda" system existed.
- (3) According to the 1973 Agrarian Reform Law, the plateau areas are considered as state property and they can be reverted under specific usufruct contracts.
- (4) The "county" is a denomination corresponding to the administrative-political division of Ecuador. The correlative order from major level to minor is as follows: province, county, parish, community.
- (5) It has been estimated that the maximum average rainfall in October is about 55.1 millimetres (1 millimetre = 0.039 inch.), and the minimum average rainfall in January is approximately 23.2 m.m. (see Grijalva and Romero, 1983).
There are two "irregular" seasons in Ecuador: Summer from May to October, and Winter from November to April.
- (6) There is the dry coastal zone which extends towards "Bahia" whose average annual rainfall is of 300 m.m. Next, there can be found the mountainous coastal zone which has an increasing average annual rainfall from 500 m.m. to 1,200 millimetres. It comprises Chone and other sectors located around this mountainous zone whose altitude is about 800 metres above sea level. Finally, there is a large area where the land slopes down to the sea, it has an average annual rainfall of approximately 2,000 millimetres.
- (7) The entrepreneur sector has been strongly supported by the State through the National Development Bank (BNF) in order to increase the prawn industrial production. This profitable business together with cattle raising, poultry farming and coffee cultivation, constitute the basic production of Manabi agrarian sector. Thus, the government has established a stimulating financial policy in order to ensure its successful development.
- (8) Together with the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law a new "Ley de tierras baldias y Colonizacion" or colonization of vacant lands law was passed. The new law abolished all titles based on "acciones de sitio y de montana" i.e.

those titles which had been acquired by claiming vacant lands. In order to protect their properties, some owners whose claims were based on the abolished titles were required to have them validated by the ILRAC.

- (9) Article 53 of the 1964 Agrarian Reform Law gave preference in the handing over of land to those peasants organized into agricultural cooperatives, which according to article 176 were placed under the direct control of ILRAC. A provision was inserted into this article by which, all cooperative applications had to be first approved by ILRAC. Therefore, the government would control the formation of peasant organizations.
- (10) While it has been a popular practice of Ecuadorean writers to portray the 1963-66 military junta, as well as the others who followed it, as "fascist dictatorships", the Juntas were in fact the most "progressive" governments since World War II (see Uggen J. 1975 op. cit.).
- (11) The Provincial Union of Manabi Peasant Agricultural Organizations, does not comprise the following organizations: 8 coffee market-cooperatives which have been affected by the rises and falls of coffee-prices, and about 14 communes which at present are involved with Rural Development Programmes of the Ministry of Agriculture. Because of the regional drought, the communes have initiated an increasing exploitation of mountainous areas. They have no importance in organizational terms. If they still functioning it is due to certain arrangements for exploiting highland sectors. It can be predicted that such communes will shortly face a process of disintegration.
- (12) 1 quintal = 1 hundredweight (50.80 kilograms).
- (13) According to the 1974 Agrarian Census, about 42% of the Quero agricultural land area consisted of plateaus which were mostly controlled by large properties. Some of these lands have been considered as areas of potential production. In accordance with the 1970 decree, plateau unproductive areas have to be handed over to the State, which as the new owner gives them to the peasant organizations through a contract of usufruct and under the condition of being collectively cultivated. The fact of legalizing the exploitation of communal plateaus is considered by the State as an important policy aimed at distributing land and ordering the land tenure system.
- (14) See "Tenencia de las tierras en las Comunas legalmente constituidas", Otavalo: Instituto Otavaleño de Antropología, 1970, and also Uggen J. Forrest. Op. cit. 1975.
- (15) No all of the so-called members of the community are head-families at the same time. Thus, Jesus Guerrero is the head of a family in Jaicoa La Playa community, but three of his sons, together with him, belong to the Working Group.
- (16) Within the working group, the Guerrero family has monopolized the organization's profits. In fact most of the members of the group belong to this family which controls and conducts the organization's affairs in accordance with its own interests.
- (17) The "mingas" or collective working days in the community, took place many times in order to improve the conditions of roads around the ex-landowners' properties e.g. N. Mancheno and his relations.

NOTES

CHAPTER V

- (1) The Pilco community acquired juridical recognition in 1965, San Nicolas initiated its legal proceedings in 1980, however, it actually functioned since 1977, Jaloa La Playa was legally recognized together with other two communities by 1966, and in this same year the juridical constitution of Jaloa El Rosario community took place.
- (2) See Steward, H. Julian, ed, Handbook of South American Indians, 1948, and Uggren, J. 1975 Op. cit.).

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